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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the effect of the changing constitutional 
relationship between Scotland and England on the Scottish approach to conflicts of law 
with an English element (i. e., competitions of jurisdiction between Scots and English 
courts; cases in which both Scots and English law have a claim to application; and 
recognition and enforcement of English court orders in Scotland). Dewar Gibb once 
wrote a work entitled "Law from over the Border": although the conflicts relationship 
between Scotland and England may be viewed, to some extent, as interdependent, the 
exposition provided in this thesis is a view principally from north of the Tweed, though 
the English view is sometimes recorded. 
A historical perspective is obtained by brief study of the period prior to 
parliamentary union. Once united in one political state, the constitutionalising of 
conflicts, the internalising of conflicts, and the use of international private law rules, are 
three ways in which conflicts of law within that state might be handled. The extent to 
which each of these methods has influenced the Scottish approach to intra-UK conflicts, 
and the effect of devolution on each, is examined. The availability to Scots courts of 
public policy objections in respect of English law is also investigated. The context of the 
Anglo-Scottish relationship changed with UK entry into the (now) European Union, and 
the effect of that on intra-UK conflict rules is considered. 
The conclusion is that the nature of the constitutional relationship between Scotland 
and England impacts upon the handling in Scotland of conflicts of law with an English 
element. The parliamentary union may not have resulted in wide-spread 
constitutionalisation of conflicts, but there has been a degree of internalisation of 
conflicts. In general, however, the interaction of the constitutional relationship between 
Scotland and England and its private law consequences has permitted, indeed sometimes 
necessitated, the use (in certain areas) of Scottish international private law rules without 
differentiation between intra-UK, and international, conflicts. Public policy allows the 
exclusion of English law by Scots courts. Devolution might permit further 
constitutionalising of conflicts in Scotland, but this is neither appropriate nor desirable. 
Whilst devolution might not diminish the internalisation of conflicts, international private 
law rules may be of increased importance in the intra-UK context. It also presents an 
opportunity for reform of these rules. In the long term, however, the most significant 
constitutional event for intra-UK conflicts is likely to come to be regarded as entry into 
the EU. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The study of international private law involves exposure to the rules and norms of 
very different cultures. That the same rules as are utilised to solve international 
conflicts of laws, may also be relied upon as between the jurisdictions within the 
United Kingdom (UK), might often seem to merit no more than an aside. It is 
contended that, on the contrary, the handling in Scots law of issues of jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, arising in the 
context of the constitutional relationship between Scotland and England, deserves 
study in its own right. 
How, for example, does one draw together all the different strands exemplified by 
the following statements: "the law of England and other foreign nations being 
matter of fact to us"; ' "nothing more anomalous or indecent than that any Court 
in Great Britain or Ireland should scrutinise the decrees of another Court of the 
United Kingdom, as if they were those of a foreign country"; 
2 "no greater 
deference was due to the law of England than that which was due to the laws of 
other civilized Countries"; 3 "the question of territorial limitation as between the 
different jurisdictions 
... within the United 
Kingdom ... 
depends on constitutional 
practice, not on international comity"; 4 "it is said that the Scotch court is asked to 
enforce a law which is against the public policy of the law of Scotland"5 (the law 
in question being English law); "[a] receiver appointed under the law of either 
part of Great Britain ... may exercise his powers in the other part of 
Great Britain 
so far as their exercise is not inconsistent with the law applicable there"; 
6 and 
Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland 6`h edn., (ed. ) D. M. Walker (Edinburgh & 
Glasgow University Presses, 1981), I, i, 16. 
2 Wilkie v Cathcart (1870) 9M 168 per Lord President Inglis at 171. 
3 Argument put forward in the 1812 case of Pollock v Manners, reproduced in L. Leneman, 
Alienated Affections: The Scottish Experience of Divorce and Separation 1684-1830 
(Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p224. 
4Rv Treacy [1971] AC 537 per Lord Diplock at 564. 
Hamlyn & Co v Talisker Distillery (1894) 21 R (HL) 21 per Lord Chancellor Herschell at 23. 
6 Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, s72(1). 
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"Scotland has made history today, signing the Hague Convention for the first 
time". 7 
Purpose of thesis 
This thesis sets out to explore the link between the constitutional relationship of 
Scotland to England, and the Scottish approach to the resolution of questions of 
conflict of laws arising between these two countries. The term conflict of laws 
encompasses three separate issues. Firstly, the subject treats the situation when 
there is a competition of jurisdiction between a Scottish and an English court, 
with each asserting that it could properly hear the case. Secondly, it must decide 
cases in which there are links with both Scotland and England, such that there is a 
dispute over whether it would be most appropriate for Scots or English law to be 
used to determine the issues of the case. Thirdly, it informs the Scottish attitude 
to judgments and orders pronounced by English courts: are such judgments 
afforded recognition in Scotland, and may they be enforced? Essentially then, 
what is being sought to be examined is the content and operation of rules to 
resolve such conflicts within a state, rather than those as between politically 
foreign jurisdictions. It is submitted that this is a matter which has not been 
adequately studied in the UK. In contrast, as will be seen, in Canada and 
Australia in recent years there has been discussion and debate on the interplay 
between the constitution and conflicts of law arising between the different 
Canadian provinces, and Australian states, respectively. 
Indeed although both of these countries might often have looked, or look, to 
English Common Law for guidance, it was asserted that the English approach to 
conflict of laws was inappropriate for a quasi-federal state such as Canada, 
8 or a 
federation such as Australia. 9 The UK, it seemed to be assumed, had nothing to 
contribute to a debate on the use of international private law for resolving 
conflicts within a country. In fact, it is submitted, the reverse is true. The 
constitutional relationship between Scotland and England is more subtle than a 
1 "Scotland makes history at the Hague", Scottish Executive News Release (SEJD349/2003), 4 
November 2003. 
8 For example, see Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077 per La Forest J 
at 1101-1102. 
9 See, for example, John Pfeiffer Pty Limited v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36 per Kirby J at paras 
119-124. 
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federal system, but is one in which the resolution of cross-border British conflicts 
has been of great importance. For almost three hundred years after the union of 
the Scottish and English Parliaments in 1707, a most unusual constitutional 
relationship prevailed: one Parliament served both countries, but the separate 
Scottish and English systems of private law were retained. Each legal system has 
distinct court hierarchies and, in terms of substantive law, each draws on different 
roots. Whereas England is the pre-eminent Common Law jurisdiction, 10 the 
Scottish legal system has, at least in the past, been more open to civilian 
influences, and is now commonly described as a mixed legal system. Prior to the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, Scotland (and certain other 
components of the UK) were perhaps unique in each being a jurisdiction with its 
own legal system, but no legislature of its own. 11 The devolution settlement of 
the late twentieth century has created another interesting constitutional 
relationship between Scotland and England. Scotland now has its own Parliament 
with legislative (and limited tax-raising) powers, but certain matters are reserved 
to the UK Parliament at Westminster. Devolution for Scotland, however, has not 
been achieved by a federalisation of the UK. Primary legislation for England and 
Wales continues to be delivered by the UK Parliament, and there is no English 
equivalent of the National Assembly for Wales or the Northern Irish Assembly 
and Executive. 
In this thesis will be examined the interplay between these permutations of the 
Anglo-Scottish constitutional relationship and the Scottish approach to resolving 
cross-border conflicts within Britain. 
Schema 
Before embarking upon the main focus of the study, it is first necessary to explore 
the development of Scottish international private law rules applying as between 
10 Pre-eminent in the sense that it begat the systems of law prevailing in other Common Law 
jurisdictions, and that English law is still looked to by many members of the Commonwealth 
for guidance in difficult cases. 
31 In the White Paper preceding devolution, Scotland was described as "the only democratic 
country with its own legal system but no legislature of its own" ("Scotland's Parliament" (Cm 
3658) (1997), Foreword, p. vii). Himsworth noted that Washington DC might be said to be in 
the same position (C. Himsworth, "Devolution and the mixed legal system of Scotland" 2002 
JR 115 at 115). However, since the Parliament which sits at Westminster is a UK Parliament, 
England must theoretically have been in the same position. 
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Scotland and England before the union of their Parliaments in the eighteenth 
century. Prior to this, and from their inceptions as nation states, Scotland and 
England were independent countries, and politically foreign to each other. 
Therefore the aim of Chapter Two is to provide a historical perspective. The 
thesis will seek to identify the time at which it could be said that all of the 
conditions necessary for the development of Scottish international private law 
rules were satisfied in the Anglo-Scottish context. The occurrence of conflicts 
between Scots and English law in this period, and their resolution, will be studied. 
Events of the seventeenth century, such as the Union of the Crowns and the later 
Cromwellian occupation, had the potential to end altogether the occurrence of 
conflicts between the Scottish and English legal systems. The reasons for this 
potential not being realised will be investigated, and the consequences explained. 
Once Scotland and England had joined to form the state of Great Britain in 1707, 
arguably three main methods were available for dealing with conflicts arising 
between the two countries: the constitutionalising of conflicts; the internalising 
of conflicts; and the use of rules of international private law. These are 
discussed 
in turn. 
Chapter Three, therefore, is an examination of the constitutionalising of conflicts, 
whereby potential clashes of jurisdiction, or laws, and questions of recognition, 
are referred to constitutional rules rather than to rules of international private law. 
There will be an analysis of how far this took place in the context of the 
constitutional relationship obtaining between Scotland and England from 1707 to 
1999. The question of whether there might be an increase in the 
constitutionalisation of conflicts following the devolution settlement, will then be 
addressed. In this connection the Canadian experience will be drawn upon: 
Canada does not have an orthodox written constitution, and encompasses the 
mixed legal system of Quebec. Are then the reasons given to justify the 
constitutionalisation of conflicts in Canada equally valid in a devolved Scotland? 
Finally, the important question of whether it would be desirable to handle intra- 
UK conflicts by this method will be discussed. 
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The putting in place of special rules which either remove an Anglo-Scottish 
conflict altogether, or which provide for specified consequences to follow in what 
would otherwise be a cross-border conflicts matter, is referred to in this thesis as 
the internalising of conflicts, and is discussed in Chapter Four. The areas in 
which the internalisation of conflicts within the UK has been most common are 
identified. It is also questioned whether the internalising of conflicts can, or has, 
been achieved by judge-made law. The impact of devolution upon this 
phenomenon is then examined. 
In Chapter Five are studied those areas in which rules of Scottish international 
private law have been used to resolve intra-UK conflicts, just as they would be 
used in truly international conflicts. The reasons for the use of international 
private law in these areas are discussed, and the question of whether any of the 
rules would profit from reform is also considered. The extent to which Scottish 
and English conflict rules are the same, or similar, is briefly analysed. The 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament heralds a new constitutional 
arrangement, and the consequences of this both for the Scottish conflict rules 
themselves, and the use of international private law within the UK, is examined. 
The possibility of increased differences between the laws of Scotland and 
England in the wake of devolution also renders useful a discussion of what is 
often (critically) referred to as 'forum shopping' within the UK. 
Based as it is on the relationship between conflicts of law and the constitution 
there is a further important constitutional change, which took place in the 
twentieth century, which must be examined in this thesis. The passing of the 
European Communities Act 197212 signalled the UK's entry into the then 
European Economic Community, now the European Union (EU). It must be 
recognised that it also wreaked an alteration in the relationship under discussion, 
namely that between the legal systems of Scotland and England, by interposing 
the power of the EU over the UK Parliament at Westminster, heretofore 
considered sovereign. 13 The significance of UK membership of the EU for the 
subject-matter of this thesis is increased by the great interest shown by the EU in 
12 1972, c. 68. 
13 Rv Secretary of State for Transport, exparte Factortame [1990] 2 AC 85. 
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harmonising conflict rules, possibly as a step towards harmonisation of 
substantive law itself. In Chapter Six, therefore, the impact of EU legislation on 
intra-UK conflict rules is analysed. Examination of the short-term consequences 
for intra-UK international private law encompasses questions such as whether EU 
measures on jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition have applied 
automatically within the UK, with or without an opinion for special treatment 
being offered. What have been the factors behind such decisions? A study of the 
long-term impact raises even more fundamental questions: it is considered what 
Europeanisation of private law would mean for intra-UK conflict of laws. 
One particularly delicate issue for the conflicts scholar is the use of public policy, 
usually as a device to exclude foreign laws or judgments. Chapter Seven is 
therefore devoted to an analysis of public policy, which is categorised as 
underlying public policy, internal public policy and external public policy. It is 
the last which is utilised in international private law. However, firstly, the 
similarities and differences between underlying, and internal, public policy in 
Scotland and England are examined. This leads to the discussion of how far 
external public policy objections may be relied upon in Scotland at common law 
in respect of English laws or judgments. Furthermore, has the legislator sought to 
restrict, or widen, the availability of external public policy objections when 
placing certain areas of intra-UK international private law on a statutory footing? 
Lastly, the impact of devolution upon the use of external public policy by Scots 
courts in an intra-UK case is examined. 
Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter. In this, the matters discussed in the 
thesis are brought together. An opinion is expressed on the basic nature of the 
link between the constitution and international private law, as revealed by the 
study of the period prior to 1707. Upon the union of the Scottish and English 
Parliaments in 1707, and the establishment of a devolved Scottish Parliament in 
1999, rests the constitutional relationship between Scotland and England, and 
conclusions as to the effect of this on the Scottish approach to the resolution of 
Anglo-Scottish conflicts of laws are reached. The effect of entry into the (then) 
EEC on the international private law rules applying to intra-UK conflicts is also 
summarised. 
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A note on the use of terminology and authorities 
Terminology 
As this thesis concerns the constitutional relationship of Scotland with England, 
and conflicts arising as between these two jurisdictions, I have not sought to 
discuss the Welsh position. Since Wales is subject to English Common Law, and 
is part of the same jurisdiction as England, no conflicts can arise between England 
and Wales. The new National Assembly for Wales, which was established as part 
of the same broad reforms which produced the setting up of the Scottish 
Parliament, was not given primary legislative powers. 14 Strictly speaking, indeed, 
the English jurisdiction should properly be described as 'England and Wales'. 
Nairn is of the view that: 
" 'England-and-Wales' ... conveys a 
bare modicum of recognition with an 
associated stress on functional unity. Whatever gestures may be needed 
elsewhere, here we have two who are truly as one". 
15 
However, it is for the sake of convenience, rather than any other reason, that I 
have referred to 'England' throughout rather than 'England and Wales'. No slight 
is intended, and it is hoped that none will be perceived. 
Similarly, although Ireland was for a time part of the United Kingdom, and the 
province of Northern Ireland remains so, I have not attempted to extend this 
examination to include conflict of laws relations with Ireland. The law applying 
in Ireland, and now in Northern Ireland, is clearly part of the Common Law 
family. Furthermore, since the subject of study of the thesis is Scotland and 
England, it is better to restrict comments to that subject, than to confuse matters 
by considering other constitutional links. 
That being said, it is therefore necessary to say a few words about the use of the 
terms 'Britain' and 'United Kingdom' in this thesis. 'Britain' is sometimes used in 
the thesis in a general sense to refer to the main island comprising the territories 
14 See Government of Wales Act 1998, c. 38. 15 T. Nairn, After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland (Granta, 2000), p81. 
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of Scotland and England and the principality of Wales. Generally, however, it is 
used in its technical sense of Great Britain, as created by the parliamentary union 
in 1707 between Scotland and England (or indeed 'England-and-Wales'). The 
addition of Ireland in 1801 established the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland. 16 Following the gaining of independence by the Irish Republic in the 
twentieth century, the proper term is now the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. However, the terms 'UK and 'intra-UK are used somewhat 
more loosely in this thesis. Whereas 'British' may be more technically accurate 
for the period from 1707 to 1801, it is just as plainly incorrect for the period 
thereafter, up until the present day: the Parliament which sits at Westminster is a 
UK Parliament. I have taken the view that it would be clumsy, and potentially 
confusing, to refer always to 'intra-Britain and, after 1801, intra-UK'. 
Accordingly, in this thesis, 'UK and 'intra-UK' are sometimes used as descriptive 
of the general sweep of time since 1707. Furthermore, the term 'intra-UK' is 
sometimes used, without listing minutely the slight modifications which may have 
been made for Northern Ireland. It is submitted that England and Scotland are the 
major partners in the United Kingdom. Besides which, as has already been 
explained, the situation of Ireland falls outwith the scope of the present work. 
The focus of this thesis is quite deliberately on Scotland and England, and 
therefore it is the changing constitutional relationship between these two countries 
which is of interest. 'Intra-UK', or 'within the UK' serves well as a convenient 
shorthand signifying the opposite of 'international', and is used in that sense. 
17 
Authorities 
Finally, some explanation is necessary regarding the use of authorities. Lord 
President Clyde once bemoaned that: 
"we were referred to a number of English authorities. I do not think those 
authorities afford us any guidance, because we must decide this question 
according to the law of Scotland; and ... I cannot understand why 
the light 
16 Welsh records a use of the even more descriptive: "The United Kingdom of Great Britain, 
Ireland, the Dominion of Wales and the Town of Berwick on Tweed" (F. Welsh, The Four 
Nations: A History of the United Kingdom (Harper Collins, 2002), p. xxvi). 
17 The term 'politically foreign' is also used in the thesis to signify a foreign jurisdiction outwith 
the UK. 
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which the law of our own country sheds on a question ... should be 
deliberately hidden under a bushel of alien authority". 18 
For a variety of reasons, Scottish international private law texts often make 
reference to English, as well as Scottish, cases. I have tried not to do so without 
noting the English provenance of the case. Even then such cases are only referred 
to if it is clear that the principle has been accepted in Scots law, or if it is 
necessary for the purposes of the analysis to discuss the position in English law. 
Instead, I have attempted as far as possible to rely simply upon Scottish cases. 
This is because the thesis seeks to study the Scottish approach to conflicts of 
jurisdiction, or laws, with England, and also to the recognition of English 
judgments: it would therefore distort the analysis, it is submitted, if English cases 
were used as authority without murmur. Indeed, one of the subjects which merits 
examination is how far Scots and English international private law are the same. 
18 MacKintosh's Judicial Factor v Lord Advocate 1935 SC 406 at 409. 
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2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The constitutional relationship between Scotland and England has altered 
throughout Scottish history. A study of the effect of this constitutional situation 
on the Scottish rules of international private law which are applied when a factor, 
or factors, point to England, can only, it is argued, be valid if it contains some 
analysis of the historical interaction of constitution and international private law 
in Scotland. This chapter sets out to provide such an analysis. 
Necessary conditions for the development of international private law 
This raises a fundamental question: within which period of Scottish history can 
such an interaction between the Anglo-Scottish constitutional relationship and 
international private law meaningfully be said to start? It is contended that a 
certain factual, or factual-legal, matrix must be in existence before any link 
between constitution and international private law can be established. Thus, in 
the most basic and general terms, four distinct strands of history must come 
together. Firstly, there must be at least two geographical groupings which may be 
recognised as comprising what may be described as separate nations. There is, 
however, no need for the geographical boundaries between them to be finally 
determined in every particular. The nations should have some, at least 
rudimentary, form of government. Secondly, each of these nations must have 
some body of law, which is recognisable as being of application to that nation. 
This is not to insist upon a written constitutional document or code of laws. The 
third pre-requisite argued for, is that there must be some factual contact between 
the peoples of the two nations. The forms which this could take are as varied as 
the activities of human life itself. In earlier times, however, we might expect that 
such contact would take the form of trade, or of marriage, or perhaps of the 
ownership of property. The fourth historical fact contended for is less self- 
evident than the others. This is the existence of a central court. Whilst possibly 
not essential at the same fundamental level, it is still significant, particularly in 
questions of jurisdiction. For when jurisdiction is dispersed among a number of 
different courts, whether on a geographical, or hierarchical, basis, then it is 
10 
submitted that there will be less distinction between international, and internal, 
jurisdictional clashes: if a court has a limited jurisdiction within a country, it is of 
little consequence whether a person hails from another area of the nation, or from 
a different nation altogether, if both fall outwith the court's jurisdiction. 
Similarly, jurisdictional wrangles are just as likely to emerge between courts from 
different systems within the nation, than between courts from different nations. 
Conversely, once a central court is in existence, with a jurisdiction which is 
largely nationwide, it throws into much sharper relief the question of whether a 
court of that nation has jurisdiction when a case apparently contains some foreign 
element. 
When do these historical facts, or legal facts, which will allow an interaction 
between the constitution and international private law, come into existence in 
terms of Scotland's relationship with England? 
The establishment of early recognisable nations out of more diverse groupings of 
peoples often took place imperceptibly over time, and the development of 
Scotland was no different. In selecting one particular point in time in history, 
there is always an element of arbitrariness, often informed by retrospection. Thus 
an event which, with hindsight, proved decisive in national history, may at the 
time have been seen as having only uncertain or temporary effect. Subject to 
these caveats, however, it is submitted that it is defensible to select the early 
eleventh century as a time when a Scottish nation can be identified, for the 
purposes of this thesis. By 1018, the kingdoms of the Picts and the Scots had all 
become vested in a Scottish king, whilst that of Strathclyde had passed to the 
king's heir. ' Equally important was the result of Malcolm II's victory at the Battle 
of Carham in 1018. This brought what is now South-East Scotland under his 
control, and settled the River Tweed as the boundary between Scotland and 
Northumbria. Whilst at the time, Scots viewed this as merely one further step in 
the effort to control the Northumbrian area, 2 they did not meet with any long-term 
success in pushing the border southwards. The Tweed now became a changeable 
M. Lynch, Scotland: A New History (Pimlico, 1992), ch 4; I. D. Whyte, Scotland Before the 
Industrial Revolution: An Economic and Social History c1050-1750 (Longman, 1995), pp7-8; 
W. Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England: A Survey to 1707 (Saltire Society, 1994), p9. 
2 Lynch, Scotland: A New History, p47. 
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"frontier zone" 3 between Scotland and her southern neighbour. Admittedly, the 
Scottish kingdom's northern and north-western boundaries were not definitively 
set until much later. 4 However, since it is the Scottish legal attitude to England 
and her peoples which is key to this thesis, it is submitted that the fixing of an 
approximate southern boundary is of more significance for present purposes. 
South of this border, an English nation can also be identified by the eleventh 
century. 5 
When did this Scottish nation develop a recognisable body of law? It is clear that 
in the territorial area which would become Scotland, rules of Celtic law, and also 
Anglo-Saxon law, had relevance prior to Scoto-Norman times. Information on 
the detail of such rules is still relatively sparse, and often resort is had to the 
similar systems prevailing in Ireland and England respectively. 6 The Leges inter 
Brettos et Scotos, a Scottish Celtic legal document, indicates that there was a 
recognition of status as shaped by rank. It has been argued that under Anglo- 
Saxon laws there was similar acceptance of rank as an important factor in 
determining compensation for injury. 7 Under the Celtic law prevailing in Ireland 
there is some legal regulation of the "deorad" or "outsider". 
8 However, there is no 
strong proof in Scotland of Celtic or Anglo-Saxon laws distinguishing between 
peoples of different nations. 
A body of law applicable throughout most of the Scottish kingdom can arguably 
be identified in Norman times, but there is disagreement as to how far this 
Norman law was simply rather neatly superimposed on the pre-existing systems 
of law. 9 An important issue in the context of this thesis is how far this Scoto- 
3 Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England, p10. 
4 These were settled by 1266, with the exception of Orkney and Shetland, which were acquired 
in 1472. For some discussion of the relationship between the udal tenure of Orkney and 
Shetland, and Scots Law see D. McGlashan, "Udal law and coastal land ownership" 2002 JR 
251. 
5 O. F. Robinson, et al., European Legal History, 3`d edn. (Butterworths, 2000), paras 8.2.1-8.2.6. 
6 Ibid., para 9.1.2; J. Cameron, "Celtic law", in Various authors, An Introductory Survey of the 
Sources and Literature of Scots Law (Stair Society, Vol 1,1936), p333 at 336; J. C. Gardner, 
"An historical survey of the law in Scotland prior to the reign of David I" 1945,57 JR 34 at 65. 
7 Gardner, "An historical survey of the law in Scotland prior to the reign of David I", 65-66. 
8 F. Kelly, A Guide to Early Iris/i Law (Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1988), pp5-6. 
9 Gardner, "An historical survey of the law in Scotland prior to the reign of David I", 79; J. 
Girvan, "Feudal law", in Various authors, An Introductory Survey of the Sources and 
Literature of Scots Law (Stair Society, Vol 1,1936), p193 at 194. 
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Norman law, established in the twelfth century, was markedly Scottish in 
comparison to Anglo-Norman law, with the consequent potential that this would 
have for legal clashes between the two systems. In fact, there are a number of 
similarities. The Regiani Majestatem of the fourteenth century is an adaptation of 
the English work Glanvill. 10 In the late thirteenth century there are instances of 
Scots arguing that a Scots property law rule was the exact mirror of its English 
counterpart, and of a jury in Ireland finding in an action that a Scotsman was in 
the habit of relying upon English law. I l Furthermore, Cairns has argued that: 
"there can be little doubt that great landowning families, such as the Bruces 
and Balliols, saw their holdings north and south of the border as subject to 
much the same rules and their rights as enforced by a similar mechanism - the 
brieve or writ. " 12 
This is not to suggest that Scoto-Norman law was merely a carbon copy of Anglo- 
Norman law in every particular: it was not. 
13 However, it is submitted that the 
result of a high degree of similarity between the two systems was that there was 
no pressing need for Scottish legal rules to deal with the conflict of laws at that 
time. When do Scottish and English law begin more sharply to diverge? There is 
a political break beginning with what are now generally referred to as the Wars of 
Independence, and continuing with intermittent outbreaks of open hostility in the 
centuries thereafter. It is arguably then that Scots law starts in earnest its long 
journey to the distinctive system of the present day. It eventually begins to be 
distinguished by the actors within it, as demonstrably different from the laws of 
other nations. Thus by the late sixteenth century the Scottish Mary Queen of 
Scots argued, in respect of her forthcoming trial in England, that "For myself I do 
10 A. Harding, "Regiam Majestatem amongst medieval law-books" 1984 JR 97; H. L. MacQueen, 
"Glanvill resarcinate: Sir John Skene and Regianm Majestateni" in A. A. MacDonald, et al. 
(eds)., The Renaissance in Scotland: Studies in Literature, Religion, History and Culture 
Offered to John Durkan (E. J. Brill, 1994), p385. 
G. W. S Barrow, The Anglo-Norman Era in Scottish History (Oxford University Press, 1980), 
p119. 
12 J. W. Cairns, "Historical introduction" in K. Reid, & R. Zimmermann, (eds), A History of 
Private Law in Scotland (Oxford University Press, 2000), Vol 1, p14 at 32. 
13 Ibid., p32; Lord Cooper, "David Ito Bruce, 1124-1329: the Scoto-Norman law" in Various 
authors, An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society, Vol 20,1958), p3 at 12; 
Harding, "Regiam Majestatem amongst medieval law-books"; Robinson, European Legal 
History, para 9.2.2. 
13 
not recognize the Laws of England nor do I know or understand them". 14 The 
"proper lawis of this kingdome" could, by 1611, be contrasted with the "foreyne 
lawis" which had pertained in Orkney and Shetland up until that point. 15 Levack 
records that "the substantive laws of the two kingdoms has grown so far apart by 
the seventeenth century that the subjects of each could freely admit that they were 
ignorant of the law of the other". 16 
Of significance to both future constitutional law and international private law is 
the manner in which, as it develops, Scots law comes to be defined by reference 
to its sovereign ruler. In the mid-fifteenth century Scotland was said to "haif bot a 
king and a lawe universale throu out the Realme" 
17. The link between king and 
the kingdom's laws becomes more explicit in later legislation. Thus, an Act of 
Parliament of 1503 states: 
"That all our soverane lords lieges beand under his obesance ... be Reulit 
be 
our soverane lords avne lawis and the comon lawis of the Realme And be nai 
other lawis". 18 
An Act of 1579 complains of Scots residing in the Staple but choosing to rely on 
their foreign residence as it suited them and "foirsaiking the obedience to the 
kingis majestie his lawis and officiar". 19 By the turn of the seventeenth century, 
Stair explained the development of law in all nations (including Scotland) as a 
process whereby peoples begin to approach their sovereigns to decide their 
disputes, and defined civil law as "The law of each society of people under the 
same sovereign authority". 20 Thus sovereignty dictated that the King's laws ran in 
his kingdom: not to abide by Scots law was not to obey the Scottish sovereign. It 
is submitted that the key concept of status was not, therefore, nationality, but the 
fact of being a subject of a certain monarch. 
14 A. Fraser, Mary Queen of Scots (Panther, 1970), p596. 
15 Quoted in Cairns, "Historical introduction", p93. 
16 B. P. Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the Union 1603- 
1707 (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp92-3. 
17 APS, II, 50 (c. 18)(1458) - the context is an introduction of uniform measures. 
18 APS, II, 244 (c. 27)(1503). 
19 APS, III, 152 (c. 34)(1579). 
20 Stair, Inst., I, i, 12; and see also ibid., I, i, 16. 
14 
It has been argued that the third strand of the matrix necessary for an interaction 
in Scotland between the constitution and international private law as regards 
England, is the existence of factual contact, with the consequent potential for 
legal contact, between the peoples of the two nations. The period of Norman 
influence in Scotland was characterised by high-level contacts, in terms of 
marriage and land-holding, to the extent that Lynch has posited the existence of 
an "Anglo-Scottish aristocracy". 21 In the period leading up to the Wars of 
Independence these ties began to wane, in line with a greater assertion of a 
Scottish identity. 22 The open hostilities of the years which follow, and their effect 
on popular feeling in both Scotland and England, are not conducive to contact 
between the two countries occurring on a large scale. 
23 The fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries saw numerous statutory attempts to prevent the import of 
certain goods from, or export of particular goods to, England. 
24 However, even in 
the teeth of such measures trade between Scotland and England did take place: a 
statute of 1585 records that previous prohibitions on the export of certain animals 
and commodities to England "daylie ar Contravenit". 
25 Indeed for Riley, "by the 
end of the seventeenth century the Scots, ... 
had drifted into a dangerous 
dependence on the English market". 26 Furthermore, it became increasingly clear 
that the language of lowland Scots was very similar to that of their southern 
neighbours. There were also some examples of regal inter-marriage, indeed the 
marriage of James IV to the daughter of Henry VII led to a Union of the Crowns 
one hundred years later in 1603. 
21 Lynch, Scotland: A New History, p58. 
22 Ibid., p91. 
23 Ibid., Chaps 9-10; Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England, pp40-41 & 84; M. 
Prestwich, "Colonial Scotland: the English in Scotland under Edward I" in R. A. Mason, (cd. ), 
Scotland and England 1286-1815 (John Donald, 1987), p6 at 13. 
24 For example: APS, II, 24 (c. 9)(1436); APS, II, 24 (c. 10)(1436); APS, II, 105 (c. 15)(1473); 
APS, II, 346 (c. 25)(1535); APS, III, 426 (1585). 
25 APS, III, 426 (1585); and see too A. Stevenson, "Trade with the South, 1070-1513" in M. 
Lynch, et al. (eds), The Scottish Medieval Town (John Donald, 1988), p180 at 193. 
26 P. W. J. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland: A study in Anglo-Scottish politics of the 
eighteenth century (Manchester University Press, 1978), p201; and see also Whyte, Scotland 
Before the Industrial Revolution: An Economic and Social History c1050-1750, pp273 & 275; 
C. Rose, England in the 1690s: Revolution, Religion and Mar (Blackwell, 1999), pp233-234; 
T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union 1660-1707 (Oliver & Boyd, 1963), pp26-27 & 
148. 
15 
In order to gain some impression of the scale of the contact between the two 
nations, however, it is necessary to place it within the wider context of Scotland's 
foreign links between 1018 and 1707. Politically, the most significant bond was 
with France. This 'Auld Alliance' saw not just royal marriages, but also 
naturalisation of certain of the other country's subjects. 27 Trade forged strong 
links between Scotland and the Low Countries. 28 There was a Scottish Staple 
town at various towns in succession in the Low Countries from the fourteenth or 
fifteenth century until after the Union of the Scottish and English Parliaments in 
1707. Substantial trade also flowed between Scotland and the Baltic, especially 
with the town of Danzig. 29 Mercantile links can also be traced between Scotland 
and Spain, France and Italy. 30 Interestingly, when trading in the Baltic, various 
currencies appear to have been used by Scots, including their own, but also 
English currency, or local currency. 31 Scots also journeyed to the continent for 
their law studies, to towns such as Paris, Orleans and Cologne. 32 Levack has 
argued that this was crucial in shaping the Scottish legal profession in a different 
mould from that of its southern neighbour. 
33 
The last, and most tentative, of the elements of the necessary factual, or factual- 
legal, matrix posited at the outset of this chapter was the existence of a central 
court. Legal cases could be taken to the Scottish Parliament or the King's 
Council, or groups of certain nominated members. By the beginning of the 
sixteenth century the emergence of a Scottish central civil court can be seen, and 
27 A. C. Evans, "Nationality law in pre-union Scotland" 1983 JR 36 at 41; APS, II, 507 
(c. 6)(1558); J. Davidson & A. Gray, The Scottish Staple at Veere: A Study in the Economic 
History of Scotland (Longmans, 1909), p103. 
28 Davidson & Gray, The Scottish Staple at Veere: A Study in the Economic History of Scotland; 
Stevenson, "Trade with the South, 1070-1513". 
29 D. Ditchburn, "Trade with Northern Europe, 1297-1540" in M. Lynch, et al. (eds), The 
Scottish Medieval Town (John Donald, 1988), p161 at pp 166 & 169. 
30 Stevenson, "Trade with the South, 1070-1513". 
31 Ditchburn, "Trade with Northern Europe, 1297-1540", p171. Earlier, in the thirteenth century, 
it seems that merchants in Scotland were reluctant to take currency from continental nations in 
payment, but would accept English money. By the fourteenth century, English, Flemish, 
French and Leon currency could be accepted in Scotland (Stevenson, "Trade with the South, 
1070-1513", pp184 & 193). 
32 Robinson, European Legal History, paras 14.1.7-14.1.8. 
33 Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the Union: 1603-1707, 
pp95-96. 
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the Court of Session duly was established: the traditional date of its founding is 
taken as 1532.3a 
Supra-national law as a barrier to international private law 
Even once the factual, or factual-legal, conditions existed which might allow the 
development of rules of what we now understand to be international private law, a 
significant barrier was raised by the nature of legal thinking: specifically, the 
existence of supra-national bodies of law. 
By the late 1100s the disposal of certain legal matters fell uniquely to Officials in 
the Church Courts, or Archdeacons. In these years, and in the beginning of the 
following century, "the Scottish Church was fully integrated into the jurisdictional 
structure of Western Christendom". 35 The remit of the Church Courts was wide, 
including marriage, legitimacy, wills, moveable succession, defamation, and cases 
regarding contracts where an oath had been sworn. 
36 Castel makes the basic, but 
crucial, point that the Church Courts applied a single standard which reflected the 
Christian position, and thus there was no room for a conflict of laws between 
Christian countries on, for example, marriage. 
37 Mattingly goes so far as to state 
that "for medieval Europe canon law supplied, in large part, the need for a code of 
private international law". 38 This is true only insofar as it is understood that the 
existence of a body of law with such universalist claims acts to remove the need 
for conflict of laws rules in those subjects within its jurisdiction. Rules of canon 
law did not have the same aim as our modern rules of international private law. 
It must be borne in mind too that the influence of canon law is only part of the 
phenomenon of the jus commune, that is to say, the reliance, to greater or lesser 
34 Robinson, European Legal History, paras 9.7.4-9.7.8; and for the consolidation of its 
jurisdiction see ibid., para 14.3.7. 
35 Cairns, "Historical introduction", p29. 
36 Ibid., p30; D. B. Smith, "Canon law", in Various authors, An Introductory Survey of the 
Sources and Literature of Scots Law (Stair Society, Vol 1,1936), p183 at 185; The Laws of 
Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol 22, para 511; Stair, Inst., I, i, 14. 
31 J. -G. Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, 4t' edn. (Butterworths Canada, 2002), p132. 38 G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Penguin, 1955), p20. 
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extent, by lawyers across Europe on a mixture of canon, roman, and feudal, law 
principles, which persisted in Scotland until the 1600s. 39 
In the world of commerce too, supra-national rules of law played a part. Again it 
has been claimed that there were rules which dispensed with the requirement for 
any concept of international private law. Thus, Dewar Gibb notes that the "Law 
Merchant has been called, with some show of justification, the International 
40 Private Law of the Middle Ages". As late as 1695 a Scottish Court refused to 
rely upon a Scottish prescription period to bar a claim by English merchants on 
the grounds that: 
"what was furnished to gentlemen and others, that were not actual trafficking 
merchants, ... the prescription as to the manner of probation would meet these 
debts, if not insisted for within the three years; but as to merchants, it was 
against the faith and credit of the nation, to obtrude that particular law against 
strangers ignorant thereof; and so by a plurality, seven against six, they found 
the prescription could not be obtruded against these pursuers, it being in re 
mercatoria, and between merchants, and done in England". 
41 
At sea, it seems that general rules of maritime law existed. The modern 
experience of this area of law as a topic of marginal importance, should not lead 
us to underestimate its significance in earlier times. Some Scots chose to travel 
by sea to England, and there was no choice in journeys to the continent and 
further afield. Even in the latter case, bad weather might cause Scottish ships to 42 
anchor temporarily at English ports: although Ditchburn describes one such 
fourteenth century visit which ended in the arrestment of a Scottish ship at 
Newcastle. 43 Finlay has argued that the significance of maritime trade in Scotland 
resulted in maritime law being of particular relevance. Indeed, he suggests that 
39 Robinson, European Legal History, paras 14.2.2-14.2.8; and see Cairns, "Historical 
introduction", pp46-47 & 71-74. 
40 A. D. Gibb, "International Private Law in Scotland in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" 
1927,39 JR 369 at 380. See also L. E. Trakman, "From the medieval law merchant to e- 
merchant law" (2003) 53 U Toronto LJ 265 at 265-266 & 270-283. 
41 Philips & Short v Stmnfield (1695) Mor 4503. 
42 D. Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe: The Medieval Kingdom and its Contacts with 
Christendom, c. 1215-1545 (Tuckwell Press, 2001), Vol 1, p2. 43 Ibid., ppl5-16. 
18 
maritime trade disputes accounted for most of the sixteenth century cases before 
the College of Justice featuring foreigners. 44 Balfour includes in his Practicks a 
section on the "Sea lawis, betwixt Scotland and Ingland" 45 These included rules 
to prevent shipwrecked goods being arrested, or taken from their owners. In 
1656, in the case of Hog v Jack46 it was argued that maritime law only applied on 
voyages outwith Scotland. However, in Mason v Fleming, 47 it was argued for the 
defender that maritime law should apply in a dispute over the powers of an agent. 
The latter had entered into a complex agreement involving hypothec of a ship, 
with the pursuer, who was a factor from La Rochelle. Interestingly, the pursuer's 
claim was for "L. 3600, at 24s. the livre". 48 
With the works of the Institutional writers, a clearer picture of a distinctive body 
of Scots law began to emerge: a body of law which drew on, but was not part of, 
supra-national legal rules. However, crucially, particularly around the time of the 
early Institutional writers, disputes between the subjects of different nations were 
often still not seen as decided by Scots law, but rather to be decided in accordance 
with universal rules. Thus, Balfour cites the case of Ane Frenchman v ane 
Englishman as authority for the proposition that whilst the Court of Session 
judges may hear an action between foreigners, they "should decern and judge 
thairanent conform to the commoun law, and not efter the municipal law of this 
realme" 49 It is submitted that by the common law what is meant is the law of 
nations, or as it was also known the ius gentium. 50 For Craig, the law of nations 
determined domestic contract disputes, but also "applied without exception to all 
dealings with foreigners, no matter how little it may accord with the established 
as J. Finlay, "Foreign litigants before the College of Justice in the Sixteenth Century" in Various 
authors, Miscellany Four (Stair Society, Vol 49,2002), p37 at pp37 & 47. 
as P. G. B. McNeill, (ed. ) The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich (Stair Society, Vol 
21,1962 & Vol 22,1963), 642-4. 
46 (1656) Dec Usurp 31. 
a' (1656) Dec Usurp 31. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Balfour, Practicks, 269, c. x. 
so Stair, Inst., I, i, 11; see also E. B. Crawford, International Private Law (W. Green/Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1998), para 2.08, although cf Finlay, "Foreign litigants before the College of Justice 
in the Sixteenth Century", p43; Anton suggests this was a reference to the law merchant (A. E. 
Anton with P. R. Beaumont, Private International Law: A Treatise fron: the Standpoint of 
Scots Law, 2nd edn. (W. Green, 1990), p10. 
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law of the land". 51 In a 1739 case, involving an English debt in a Scottish 
succession, it was averred that "we follow the law of nations". 52 Bankton 
analyses the need for what we would now recognise as public international law, 
such as rules between nations as to wars and prisoners, and develops sound 
reasoning as to why these matters should be regulated by the law of nations. 
53 He 
does not, however, analyse the more subtle question of the body of rules which 
should apply as between the private citizens of different nations. Karnes does 
grapple with this problem. However, his reasoning is that in respect of the 
jurisdiction of the King and council, and subsequently the Court of Session, over 
foreigners: 
"The ordinary courts are confined to common law but with respect to foreign 
matters this law can be no rule, for the reason above given, that it regulates 
nothing extra territoriumn. The King and council accordingly, judging of 
foreign matters, could not be governed by the common law of any country: the 
common law of Britain regulates not foreign matters; and the law of a foreign 
country hath no authority here. Whence it follows, that foreign matters must 
be governed by the rules of common justice, to which all men are subjected, or 
iure gentium, as commonly expressed". 
54 
He is witheringly scornful of the different, English, practice of proceeding upon a 
fiction that the matters giving rise to the action took place in England. 
55 
Mercantile matters between traders of different nations were still referred by Bell 
to the law merchant, which he regarded as merely a component of the law of 
nations. 56 For this reason W. Galbraith Miller concluded that the rules of what 
was, in his time, the newly designated university subject of International Private 
51 J. A. Clyde, (transl. ), The Jus Feudale by Sir Thomas Craig of Riccarton (William Hodge & 
Co., 1934), 1,8,8. 
52 Kinloch v Fullerton (1739) Mor 4456. 
53 Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland (Kincaid & Donaldson, 1751), I, i, 30. 
54 Karnes, Principles of Equity 4`h edn. (Bell & Bradfute & Creech, 1800), III, viii. 
ss Ibid. 
56 Bell, Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, 3`d edn. (Archibald Constable & Co., 1816), 
Preface to 2nd edn., xi. 
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Law, had been treated as part of "the law of nature and nations" until the early 
1800's. 57 
Before passing from the subject of these general, supra-national laws, one related 
matter must also be discussed: the existence of any special rules or arrangements 
between Scotland and England solely, which transcended their general bodies of 
law. The only significant example of this is the March Laws. 
Traditionally the Scottish Marches stretched from the border with England to just 
beyond Peebles, taking in towns such as Kelso, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, and in the 
west, Dumfries. The English Marches reached as far south as Kendal and 
Newcastle. Whilst the roots can be traced to earlier dates, it has been 
convincingly argued that by the mid-thirteenth century, something approaching a 
code of laws applicable only in the Marches had been established, and the 
separate nature of March jurisdiction confirmed. 
58 In the early fourteenth century, 
Wardens were established in each country, and eventually, in each March. Whilst 
in place, the March Laws comprised three layers: agreed rules between Scotland 
and England; agreements between individual wardens; and laws applying only to 
the Scottish, or English, border lands. Pollock and Maitland described the system 
as "a true international law". 59 Dewar Gibb, however, dismisses them as "largely 
rules of war, and struck out under the severe stress of very peculiar 
circumstances", 60 and thus of little importance in a study of international private 
law. It is submitted that a brief examination of the March Laws is of relevance 
and interest in this thesis. 
In the early times, when the movement of persons was more limited, the land 
border with England would be one of the few areas where there was regular 
57 W. G. Miller, The Law of Nature and Nations in Scotland (W. Green & Sons, 1896), p102. 
Miller lectured in inter alia international private law from 1878 to 1904 (D. M. Walker, A 
History of the School of Law, the University of Glasgow (University of Glasgow, 1990), pp64- 
66). 
S$ W. W. Scott, "The March Laws reconsidered" in A. Grant, & K. J. Stringer, (eds), Medieval 
Scotland, Crown, Lordship and Conununity: essays presented to G. W. S. Barrow (Edinburgh 
University Press, 1993), p114 at 123; D. L. W. Tough, The Last Years of a Frontier: A History 
of the Borders During the Reign of Elizabeth (Oxford University Press, 1928), p97. 
59 Sir F. Pollock, & F. W. Maitland, The History of English Law before the time of Edward, 2nd 
edn. (Cambridge University Press, 1898), Vol I, p222. 
60 Gibb, "International Private Law in Scotland in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", 372. 
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contact between the two countries. The March Laws demonstrates a recognition 
that cross-border difficulties in this area might best be resolved by special rules, 
which took into account the English elements in a Scottish case, and vice versa. 
Thus in 1248 it was decided that a question between Scots and English borderers 
must be tried at the March, and not in the ordinary English courts. 61 For Balfour, 
jurisdiction generally fell to the Warden of the March where the pursuer resided. 62 
It seems also that certain crimes were punishable in Scotland although committed 
in England, and the reverse. Importantly, it is implicit in the March Laws that the 
outcome of March cases would be recognised on both sides of the border. 
Initially, it was possible to poind goods across the border. 
63 In 1562 there is 
recorded a dispute as to whether damages should be payable in Scottish, or in 
English, currency, 64 and Rae has argued that an agreed exchange rate was in 
place. 65 
The system of March Laws came to an end with the Union of the Crowns. The 
Laws were formally abolished in 1607, but Tough has bluntly stated that after 
1603, "there is really no more Border history". 
66 
Effect of seventeenth century constitutional changes 
Over the centuries, therefore, factual conditions, legal conditions and legal 
thinking, combined to create the conditions in which rules of Scots international 
private law might develop with regard to subjects of the English nation, but also 
to raise barriers to the development of such a legal concept. Before turning to the 
actual instances of conflict rules which eventually became accepted in Scotland in 
cases containing an English element, however, one final factor must be examined. 
This is the quite remarkable lack of impact upon the development of conflict 
61 Scott, "The March Laws reconsidered", pI21. 
62 Balfour, Practicks, 602, c. xv. 
63 T. I. Rae, (ed. ), "George Neilson: The March Laws; Part II: The March Laws", in Various 
authors, Miscellany One (Stair Society, Vol 26,1971), pl l at 22. 
64 T. I. Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier 1513: 1603 (Edinburgh University Press, 
1966), p52. 
65 Ibid., p53. 
66 Tough, The Last Years of a Frontier: A History of the Borders During the Reign of Elizabeth, 
p277. However, Morison's Dictionary contains references to seventeenth and eighteenth 
century cases of cross-border arrestments, and border warrants, for example: Robertson v Bell 
(1676) Mor 4827; Potts & Hunter v Mitchelson & Robson (1705) Mar 4828; Hardie v Liddel 
(1759) Mor 4830. See also on border warrants: Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, 
ist edn., (ed. ) D. Erskine (John Bell, 1773), I, ii, 21. 
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rules, of the constitutional upheavals in the relationship between the two countries 
in the seventeenth century. Both the Union of the Crowns in 1603, and the 
Cromwellian occupation later in the century, had the potential to alter forever the 
legal relationship between subjects of Scotland and England: but, as will be 
explained, it was a potential largely unfulfilled. 
Union of the Crowns, 1603 
On 24 March 1603, Elizabeth I of England died, and the English laws of 
succession identified as her heir, James VI of Scotland, who became the monarch 
of the two kingdoms. In itself, this had no theoretical effect on Scottish, or 
English, independence. In theory, it did not signal the union of the separate 
bodies of law which had been developing in each nation over time. Indeed, 
different rules of royal succession north and south of the border did not even 
guarantee that the dynastic union would continue. 
67 
In practice, however, the potential consequences were great. It must be 
remembered that nationality was not at this time defined by allegiance to the 
Scottish country, but by a person's status as a subject of the monarch. The 
implications were not lost on James VI & I: 
"In the royall persone of his maist excellent majestic ... the Inhabitantis of this 
haill Ile ar equaly subiect to his sacred persone and lawes". 
68 
This was soon borne out by Calvin's Case, 69 an action essentially engineered by 
James to decide the rights of those born after 1603 (the post-nati). Land in 
London was acquired in the name of a two year old Scots boy. A case was then 
raised in the Kings Bench claiming that he had been ejected from the land and, it 
seems, a succession point was raised in Chancery. The defendants argued that the 
boy was born within the allegiance of King James of Scotland, but outwith the 
allegiance of King James of England, and thus was an alien in England, unable to 
avail himself of the rights contained in English law. However, the competing, 
67 See Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England, p97. 
68 APS, IV, 285 (c. 4)(1606). 
69 (1608) 7 Co Rep in. 
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and ultimately successful, argument was that allegiance to James could not be 
divided, and all Scots and English people were subject to him. Thus a Scottish 
subject of James could raise an action in respect of English land. It seems that 
English law and taxes, however, would apply in respect of that land. 
For James then, there had been a "partition wall which ... in my blood is rent 
asunder". 70 He desired an even closer union: designs for a flag of the two nations 
united were produced, and new coins were issued with images of union, which 
were legal tender on both sides of the border. 71 Perhaps most significant of all 
was James' perseverance in his desire to use the term Great Britain. 72 Jonson 
picked up on the literary theme of union as marriage, and spoke of: 
"... the priest a king, 
73 The spoused pair two realms .... 
Open, parliamentary, moves were also made towards a closer union. As early as 
1604 an Anglo-Scottish Union Conference was set up, although its 
recommendations ultimately foundered. There was, however, much concern and 
hostility in both countries as to the effects of the Union of the Crowns. 
74 
In these conditions, it is submitted that there were five possible approaches to the 
regulation of the interaction of the Scottish and English systems of law: legal 
union; anglicisation; scotticisation; harmonisation of substance; or the use of 
fledgling rules of international private law. Whilst there were supporters of, or 
attempts to create, each of the first four options, it will be seen from an 
examination of each in turn, that none succeeded. 
70 G. P. V. Akrigg, (ed. ), Letters of King James VI &I (University of California Press, 1984), 
letter 104. 
'1 B. Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland 1603-1608 (John Donald, 1986), pp82-83 & 
60; M. Lee, Government by Pen: Scotland under Janes VI and I (University of Illinois Press, 
1980), p30. 
72 R. Lockyer, James VI and I (Longman, 1998), pp5 1,54-55 & 58. 
73 G. Parfitt, (ed. ), Ben Jonson: The Complete Poems (Penguin Education, 1975), p35; and see 
also S. Orgel, (ed. ), Ben Jonson: The Complete Masques (Yale University Press, 1969), p142. 
74 Lee, Government by Pen: Scotland under James VI and I, p35; Lynch, Scotland: A New 
History, pp239-240; K. M. Brown, Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 
1603-1715 (Macmillan, 1992), p87. 
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Firstly, a possible legal union. There were those, most notably Craig, who tried to 
stress what they saw as fundamental similarities between the Scottish and English 
systems of law. 5 James himself pressed this point on occasion, 76 but he 
acknowledged that there were differences between the Scottish and English legal 
systems. 77 James' goal, it seems was legal union: "one uniformity in laws". 78 
Concrete steps were taken. Bacon drafted his Preparation toward the Union of 
the Laws of England and Scotland. Interestingly, however, both Bacon, and the 
subsequent Conference on the same subject, basically envisaged a union of the 
two nations' public laws, and not private laws. In any event the project failed, 
doomed by general hostility to union, and a feeling that the laws were too 
disparate to unite. One pamphleteer argued that: 
"also the situation of the place is to be respected, for lawes are lyke to 
medecynes and must be quallefyed with sharpe or mylde inflictions as the 
conditions of the people and the situation of the place shall require and 
therefore yt is allmost impossible for the reasons aforesaide, to make one lawe 
to be hollsome for dyvers nations lyvinge in sundrye regions". 79 
For those in Scotland, the line between legal union, and anglicisation may have 
been blurred: it was felt that, over time, the first would have led to the second. 
80 
There were those in England who argued that the English Common Law should 
simply be introduced into Scotland. 81 Politically this had little chance of success, 
and was not supported by James. 82 Whilst some English measures were 
introduced in Scotland during his reign, these suggest more the adoption of 
75 Most notably in de Unione Regnorum Britanniae Tractatus, published in 1604. See generally 
A. Wijfells, "A British his commune? A Debate on the Union of the Laws of Scotland and 
England during the First Years of James VI/I's English Reign", (2002) 6 EdinLR 315 at 332- 
337. 
76 A. H. Williamson, Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI. the Apocalypse, 
the Union and the Shaping of Scotland's Public Culture (John Donald, 1979), p149. 
77 Lockyer, James VI and 1, p43. 
78 Quoted ibid., p53. 
79 Quoted in Wijfells, "A British his commune? ", 325. 
80 B. P. Levack, "The proposed union of English law and Scots law in the seventeenth century", 
1975 JR 97 at 110; B. P. Levack, "English law, Scots law and the Union, 1603-1707" in 
Harding, A. (ed. ), Law-Making and Law-Makers in British History (Royal Historical Society, 
1980), p105 at 110. 
81 Levack, "English law, Scots law and the Union, 1603-1707", p106. 
82 T. B. Smith, "British Justice: A Jacobean Phantasma" 1982 SLT 157 at 159. 
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similar solutions to comparable problems, rather than a deliberate policy of 
anglicisation. 
To modem eyes the possibility of the reverse process occurring, i. e., scotticisation 
of English law, seems quite improbable. However, there was initial support for 
legal union from the minority group of English civil lawyers for the reason that, it 
was hoped, the civilian influence in English law would thereby be strengthened. 83 
Common Lawyers feared the accession of James would mean the introduction of 
civil law, or at least the adulteration of the Common Law by civil law elements. 84 
Although great concern was caused when a Court of Session judge was appointed 
Master of the Rolls by James, 85 in the long run the Common Lawyers fears were, 
unsurprisingly, unfounded. 
There were a number of measures which can very loosely be classified as 
harmonising attempts. The so-called hostile laws were abolished: these were a 
number of Scottish and English Acts of Parliament which forbade contact 
between the subjects of the two countries, or were in some way discriminatory to 
subjects of the neighbouring country. Galloway has argued that these had, in any 
event, been largely disregarded except at times when the relationship between the 
nations had reached a particular nadir. 86 Thus their abolition in his view was 
mere gesture politics. Some more effective attempts at harmonisation can, 
however, be identified. Prior to 1603, a Scottish Act of Parliament had 
prohibited, under pain of conviction of theft, the fishing of particular types of fish, 
or fishing at particular times of year. However, the Rivers Tweed and Annan had 
been excepted, since unless fishing was similarly regulated on the English side, 
there would be no effect on the preservation of fish stocks. In 1606 this exception 
was repealed, 87 presumably since appropriate measures had now been, or could 
be, taken in England. Some attempt was also made at harmonisation in the 
83 Levack, "The proposed union of English law and Scots law in the seventeenth century", 
pp103-104; Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the Union 
1603-1707, pp8l-82. 
84 Levack, "The proposed union of English law and Scots law in the seventeenth century", p101; 
Brown, Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 1603-1715, p81; Lockyer, 
James VI and I, p43. 
85 Lee, Government by Pen: Scotland under James VI and I, p36. 
86 Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland 1603-1608, p65. 87 APS, IV, 285 (c. 4)(1606). 
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bringing in of navigation rules in England in 1615, and Scotland in 1616.88 In the 
long term, however, they were not particularly well-used. Lastly, there were 
changes in certain rules on taxation and customs duties. By the middle of 1603, a 
Scottish court had found that an English merchant, as a subject of King James VI 
& I, was not liable to pay the export tax which foreigners were then required to 
pay. 89 A further 25 per cent tax applied in England to imports by foreigners, was 
lifted in respect of Scottish items by 1605.90 On the King's authority, no customs 
were applied within Great Britain. This was on the condition, however, that duty 
free goods were not then exported out of the country: a stricture distinctly more 
unpopular with merchants than the previous arrangements. 
91 By the end of the 
first decade of the seventeenth century, Anglo-Scottish customs were regulated on 
the same basis as Anglo-Irish trade and, as the years progressed, any concessions 
merchants had enjoyed in Anglo-Scottish trading seem to have disappeared 
entirely. 92 
The Cromwellian era 
Fundamental constitutional change of a very different type came in the mid- 
seventeenth century. With the execution of Charles I in 1649, the regal union was 
abruptly severed. The defeat of Scottish royalist forces at Dunbar in 1650 and, 
one year later, at Worcester, plunged Scotland, constitutionally at least, into 
anarchy: from the summer of 1651 there was no central authority controlling 
events in Scotland. 93 The lack of an executive power was mirrored by the lack of 
a judicial body: the Court of Session rose on 28 February 1650, and would not sit 
again until after the Restoration. 94 
Cromwell's control over Scotland, however, increased, although an intention to 
pass an Act declaring Scotland essentially to be an English possession came to 
88 Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland 1603-1608, p14I. 
89 Lee, Government by Pen: Scotland tinder Jahres VI and I, p31. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland 1603-1608, p141. 
92 Ibid. 
93 W. C. Dickinson, & G. Donaldson, (eds), A Source Book of Scottish History, 2"d edn. (Thomas 
Nelson & Sons, 1961), Vol 3, p146. 
9' G. Brunton, & D. Haig, A Historical Account of the Senators of the College of Justice front its 
Institution in 1532 (Thomas Clark, 1832), pp345-346. 
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nothing. 95 Eventually, in April 1654 an Ordinance was passed establishing a legal 
union between Scotland and England. The establishment of this Commonwealth 
had in no way been an aim of the Civil War. Union was simply something which 
was dictated by events, and indeed was necessary to allow Cromwell's 
government in England to survive. 96 The terms of the Ordinance, prima facie, 
seem to represent Anglo-Scottish agreement. In reality, for Scotland it was an 
incorporating union only in the sense of "when the poor bird is embodied into the 
hawk that hath eaten it up" 97 There was now a common Parliament, which 
included inter alia English and Scottish members. Seven Commissioners for the 
Administration of Justice for Scotland were appointed in 1652, and initially 
Englishmen were in the majority of these appointments. 98 In the eyes of the 
republican authorities, harmonisation of the two legal systems, or anglicisation of 
the Scottish system, was desirable. 
As early as 1651 the Commonwealth Parliament felt it could competently 
legislate regarding Scotland. 99 A Protectorate Act was applied by the 
Commissioners in the 1655 case of Scot v Teniants, 100 and the right of the 
Commonwealth to property was recognised a year later in Carmichael v Muir & 
c. 101 However, the initial aims of the Commonwealth authorities were a great 
deal more far-reaching. An active desire to anglicise the Scottish legal system is 
clear from the Instructions given to the Executive Commissioners dispatched to 
Scotland to take up their posts. All statutes which did not accord with the policies 
of the Commonwealth were to be repealed, and "the Lawes of England as to 
matter of government be put in Execution in Scotland". 102 It might, however, be 
questioned from the form of wording whether only what is now classed as public 
law, was to be affected. 103 Further instructions in 1655 were more blunt: the 
95 F. D. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland 1651-1660 (John Donald, 1979), p30. 
96 Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England, p137. 
97 Quoted ibid., p137. 
98 And were paid more! See: Dow, Cronuwellian Scotland 1651-1660, p55 
99 See the 1651 Declaration of the English Parliament concerning Scotland, and the 1652 
Explanation and addition relating to the foregoing Declaration (reproduced in part in 
Dickinson & Donaldson, A Source Book of Scottish History, Vol 3, pp148-149). 
loo (1655) Dec Usurp 2. 
101 (1656) Dec Usurp 36. 
102 Quoted in Dow, Cromwellian Scotland 1651-1660, p33. 
103 See Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the Union 1603- 
1707, p74. 
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Council was to "promote the union by having the proceedings in courts of 
judicature conducted agreeably to the laws of England, as far as the rules of the 
court will permit". 104 In addition, only English Justice Commissioners were 
allowed to sit on criminal cases, which no doubt were seen as more politically 
explosive. 105 
English debt laws were enforced, although this was used to weaken enemies in 
Scotland. 106 It has also been suggested that English Justice Commissioners 
attempted to use equity in their decisions. 107 However, given that this is a concept 
woven into Scots law, it is perhaps difficult to see how this would lead to any 
different practical results. Decided cases from this period may, however, bear 
some traces of an anglicisation policy. Thus an allegedly established Scottish 
practice was not followed in the purely domestic case of Lord Brechin v 
Tenants. 108 This could, of course, have been due to the practice contended for 
being controversial. However, in Rutherford v Master of Rollo, 109 which again 
had no apparent foreign element, an Act of the Scottish Parliament seems to have 
been ignored. In Hastie v Mariners, 110 an English advocate appeared, and a 
Scottish mode of proof was not allowed. 
The mode of this anglicisation programme is perhaps unusual, in that it was not a 
product of parliamentary act, but was to be judicially driven. However, whatever 
the initial intentions of the Commonwealth, or the chosen means of 
implementation, it was a failure, with little impact in either the short-term or the 
long-term. Thus the case reports of the time contain terminology and references 
one would expect in Scots law. l l' Although in Sydserf v. Mani & c112 the English 
judges heard argument on a point of English law as being within their field of 
expertise, in other respects the case proceeded as one might expect a modern 
104 Quoted in Dow, Cromwellian Scotland 1651-1660, p166. 
105 Ibid., p55. 
106 Ibid., pp57 & 61. 
107 Ibid., p177. 
108 (1655) Dec Usurp 8. 
109 (1655) Dec Usurp 7. 
110 (1656) Dec Usurp 30. The pursuer, however, was described as an inn-dweller, and the action 
arose out of a theft which had occurred on an internal Scottish voyage. 11, Thus they make reference, for example, to Craig and Skene, and discuss mails and duties, and 
terce: see generally The Decisions of the English Judges During the Usurpation. 
112 (1657) Dec Usurp 68. 
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international private law case: an argument was put forward that the granter of 
the bond at issue being Scottish, and the bond being capable of registration in 
Scotland, Scots law should apply, whilst the defender successfully founded on the 
granting of the bond in England, and the fact that the creditors were English, in 
arguing that English law was applicable. In fact, it is generally agreed that debt 
law was very much the exception, and that otherwise Scots law continued to be 
applied throughout the Commonwealth period. 113 
The survival of Scots law in the face of stated intentions to impose English law 
can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, there was in reality little drive 
towards anglicisation from the central authorities. "4 Indeed, latterly Broghil 
made it clear that Scots law should be respected. 115 Secondly, Scottish legal 
personnel remained important in the operation of the justice system. The 
advocates appearing before the Commissioners were almost entirely Scots, used 
to presenting Scots legal arguments. 116 Whilst the Scotsmen appointed as Justice 
Commissioners were those who marked themselves out as supporters of the 
Republic, it is remarkable how many of them had already held legal posts before 
the Cromwellian era, and were connected with prominent Scots lawyers. A 
number had been Lords Ordinary; 117 and Johnstone of Warriston had also served 
as King's Advocate, and was a grandson of Craig. 
118 Later in the Cromwellian 
period, James Dalrymple, later Viscount Stair, was appointed a Justice 
Commissioner. There was, therefore, no real break from the established order. 
Thirdly, there appears to have been a feeling, as there had been after the Union of 
the Crowns, that the legal systems of Scotland and England were simply too 
different to be successfully united. Thus this seemed to cause initial problems in 
the Commonwealth's establishment of an Exchequer Court in Scotland. 
"9 
113 Levack, "The proposed union of English law and Scots law in the seventeenth century", 
pp112-113; T. M. Cooper, "Cromwell's judges and their influence on Scots law" 1946,58 JR 
20 at 22-23. 
114 R. Hutton, The British Republic 1649-1660 (Macmillan, 1990), p105; Dow, Crontwellian 
Scotland 1651-1660, p166. 
11s Dow, Cronuwellian Scotland 1651-1660, p175. 
116 Ibid., p55; Cooper, "Cromwell's judges and their influence on Scots law", 22. 
117 Brunton & Haig, A Historical Account of the Senators of the College of Justice from its 
Institution in 1532, pp277,289-290,306-310,338-339 & 343-344. 
1)8 Ibid., pp308 & 306-307. 
119 Dow, Cromtivellian Scotland 1651-1660, pp174-175. 
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After the Restoration, with the Court of Session sitting once more, provision was 
made for the decisions of the Cromwellian Justice Commissioners to be appealed, 
although they were not simply overturned by statute. 120 Cooper notes that none of 
their decisions appear in any of the Scottish Institutional works. 121 In his eloquent 
phrase, the time under Cromwell, for Scots law, "were years which the locusts 
had eaten". 122 
The development of Scottish international private law rules, particularly as 
regards England 
From as early as Scoto-Norman times there was recognition within the Scots rules 
of law, of the existence of 'strangers'. For example, the Leges Quatuor Burgorum 
refer to ships "of athir strange kynrykis", 
123 and a statute of William I speaks of 
It 124 strangear merchand of quhatsumever nation". Most of the provisions, 
however, were in reality attempts to control foreign merchants. 
125 Interestingly, 
there is, however, an assertion of Scottish royal jurisdiction. Thus, if ships 
arrived in Scotland from foreign parts, and there were dealings with locals, then 
the "kyngis bailzeis sail halde rycht betuen thaim" in all complaints. 
126 
Furthermore, an Act of William I warned that any foreign merchant trading 
outwith the burghs was to be "apprehendit ... and ... punischit as ane 
brekar of 
the Kingis protection". 127 
Throughout the following centuries Scottish courts continued to be content to hear 
cases, even although there might be a foreign element. Thus a burgh court in 
Aberdeen entertained a claim for money by a Danzig sailor in 1475.128 A case 
was heard in 1491 by the Lords of Council which concerned goods purchased by 
120 Cooper, "Cromwell's judges and their influence on Scots law", 23. 
121 Ibid., 24. 
122 Ibid., 25. 
123 c. xxv (APS, I, 25). 
124 APS, I, 61 (c. xli)(William). 
125 See Hudson's argument, in reference to Norman England, that "There was a considerable fear 
of outsiders, of those for whom no one would answer. They had either to be prevented from 
entering the community for any length of time, or to find people to answer for them" (J. 
Hudson, The Formation of the English Common Law: Law and Society in England from the 
Norman Conquest to the Magna Carta (Addison Wesley Longman, 1996), p62. An interesting 
modern parallel is the practice of sisting a mandatory, discussed at p93 below. 
126 Leges Quatuor Burgonan, c. xxv (APS, I, 25). 
127 APS, 1,61 (c. xli)(William). 
128 Ditchburn, "Trade with Northern Europe, 1297-1540", p173. 
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Scottish merchants in Danzig. 129 In King v Moffat, 130 on the pursuer's non- 
appearance, the Lord Conservator of Scottish privileges in the Low Countries 
(against whom the action had been raised), indicated that he now wished to 
proceed against the pursuer for injury caused by defamation in Scotland and in 
the Low Countries. In a passage from Balfour already cited, he asserted that the 
Lords of Council could hear all civil cases between foreigners, even although the 
actings took place outwith Scotland. 131 What connection with Scotland was 
required? Balfour embarks on a discussion under the heading that a party should 
only "be "summoundit ... within 
his awin jurisdictioun". 132 However, in the 1564 
case of An Englishman v Angelo an Italian, 133 there is no indication that Angelo 
had any connection with Scotland other than his presence there. By 1657, 
however, in Tackit and Mein v Gilchrist, 134 it was a matter of concession that 
there was no jurisdiction over an Englishman, born and resident there, simply by 
virtue of his presence in Scotland. It was also accepted that a Scottish court had 
jurisdiction if the action impinged on Scots heritage, and possibly moveables in 
Scotland. In a case of 1624, a Scots court had been content to take jurisdiction 
over an English defender, because the heritable property which was the subject of 
the dispute was in Edinburgh. 135 The Court, however, clearly distinguished from 
such a case, personal actions, in which jurisdiction would not have been taken. 
By the later half of the eighteenth century, Erskine reasoned that in a dispute over 
immoveable property: 
"the judge of the territory where it is situated is the sole judge competent, ... 
for things that are immoveable, are incapable of shifting places, and must 
therefore be restored in that place where they lie, and by the warrant of that 
judge whose jurisdiction reacheth over them". 136 
129 Ibid., p174. 
130 I. H. Shearer, (ed. ), Selected Cases fron: Acta Dominorun: Goncilii et Sessions (Stair Society, 
vol14,1951), 170. 
131 Balfour, Practicks, 269, c. x. 
132 Ibid., 306, c. xvi. 
133 (1564) Mor 4825. 
134 (1657) Dec Usurp 90. 
135 Lamb v Heath (1624) Mor 4812. 
136 Erskine, Inst., I, ii, 17. He also notes that if the defender is foreign, the action must be raised in 
the Court of Session: Ibid., I, ii, 18. 
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He was clear, however, that this did not entail acceptance of any idea that 
personal jurisdiction could be taken over a foreign defender by a Scots judge, 
simply because heritage was owned in Scotland. 137 Nor did the existence of 
moveables in Scotland in itself confer jurisdiction, unless the property had been 
attached. 138 
Whilst Scottish courts would, then, take jurisdiction, Balfour states that the action 
of a foreign pursuer "sould be heard summarlie upon a simpill supplicatioun, 
without the rigorous observatioun of the form and ordour of uther process". 
139 it 
is clear from the cases which he cites as authority for this proposition that English 
pursuers were also encompassed in this rule. At one time a special day was set 
aside for cases with a foreign element. 
140 However, the authority cited by Balfour 
would seem to suggest that English and other foreign defenders were required to 
provide caution. 141 
The next question is, once a Scots court heard a case involving a foreigner, would 
Scots law always be applied, or was there recognition that another law might be 
applied to the case? The case of De-La-Sause v Haddington142 seems to 
indicate 
application of a territoriality principle. The defender sought to rely on a decision 
of the Paris Parlement which divorced the pursuer, and also dealt with consequent 
property ownership issues. The pursuer argued that "the acts of the parliament of 
Paris cannot reach beyond the limits of France, no more than our laws can reach 
to them". '43 
There are instances, however, where it seems to have been accepted that foreign 
law had a role in the decision of a case. In the seventeenth century, there are 
recorded cases before Scottish courts where there was a dispute over whether 
137 Erskine, Inst., I, ii, 18. 
138 Ibid., I, ii, 19. Times change: by modern thinking this is an exorbitant jurisdiction. 
139 Balfour, Practicks, 292, c. xiv. 
140 Ibid., 272, c. xvii; Finlay, "Foreign Litigants before the College of Justice in the Sixteenth 
Century", p42. 
141 Balfour, Practicks, 192, c. iv. Finlay suggests that caution also had to be provided by foreign 
pursuers (Finlay, "Foreign Litigants before the College of Justice in the Sixteenth Century", 
p40). 
142 (1657) Dec Usurp 54. 
143 Ibid. 
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Scots or English law should be applied to a bond, or bill of exchange. 144 As has 
been seen, it seems that the application of English law was countenanced, for 
example, where a bond was granted in England, in respect of English creditors. '45 
In Laird of Balbirizie v Laird ofArkhill and Relltrees146 it was held that an English 
bond, between English people, should be proved under an English mode of proof. 
Similarly, it was later held that the English method of proof on oath was sufficient 
to prove that a debt had been discharged, even when the debtor was a Scot who 
was merely resident in England. 147 This case, however, seems then to have run 
into practical problems, since the cedent was a quaker "and would not swear at 
all" ! 148 Stair felt confident enough to assert as a general principle that 
subscription, and the manner of proof, was a question for the law of the place, 
presumably meaning the place of subscription. 
149 An attempt to argue that an 
exception should be made to the rule that form was governed by the place of 
contracting (meaning, it seems, the place where the bond was granted: in this 
case England), where the bond was to be executed (in the sense of registration of 
the bond) in Scotland, met with no success-150 Similarly, the Court rejected the 
suggestion that an assignation between two Scotsman regarding Scottish debts 
required to be formally valid by Scots law, rather than the law of England, which 
was where the assignation had been made-151 A somewhat unusual case is that of 
Gib v Ballantyne. 152 The pursuer, an English soldier claimed that the defender 
had promised him £100 for "saving of his life at the battle of Worchester (sic)". 
153 
Under Scots law such a promise had to be proved by writ or oath, whereas in 
England promises up to £1000 sterling were provable by witnesses. It seems that 
the contract had been entered into in England, and English law was applied. Stair 
144 For example: Sydserf v Adam & c., (1657) Dec Usurp 68; Craig v Traquair (1656) Dec Usurp 
33; Tackit and Mein v Gilchrist, (1657) Dec Usurp 90; McMorland v Melvill (1666) Mor 
4447. 
º45 Sydserf v Adam & c., supra, and see Fortoun v Shewan (1610) Mor 4429, in which it is stated 
that a bond will be valid if in accordance with the form of the place of granting. 
146 (1633) Mor 4446. 
147 McMorland v Melvill, supra. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Stair, Inst. I, i, 16. Note, however, the case of Chatto v Ord (1702) Mor 4447, in which the 
Court allowed some flexibility as to the manner of proof of an English bond, for reasons of 
practicality. 
150 Junquet La Pine v Creditors of Lord Semple (1721) Mor 4451. 
15, Sinclair v Murray (1636) Mor 4501. It was noted that the cedent was resident in England at 
the relevant time. 
152 (1655) Dec Usurp 1. 
153 Ibid. 
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notes that "the law of England and other foreign nations being matter of fact to us 
tsa Success of an argument that a claim had prescribed under English law is 
also recorded. 155 However, the English prescription period was ignored in respect 
of a bond in Scots form, where all parties were Scotsmen, even although certain 
of the parties had been resident in England at the time when the bond was 
granted. 156 The conflict rules in this area were thus beginning to emerge in a 
reasonably consistent, though fledgling, form. 
In matters of succession Stair was plain that Scots law applied, even to Scotsmen 
who were resident abroad, and then died in that foreign country. A form of 
testament, valid in a country where a Scotsman is "residing aninio remarzendi" 
and later dies, but invalid in Scotland, would not regulate the Scottish 
succession. 157 His authority is the case of Schaw v Lewens, in which the deceased 
had made a nuncupative will in England. Stair also stresses that: 
"The effect of testaments is no greater, though made in England, the testator 
residing there, and so extends not to an heritable sum due in Scotland, left in 
legacy by the testator, being a Scotsman, July 3,1634, Melvil contra 
Drummond; Hope, Testaments, Purves contra Chisholm; Executors of 
Colonel Henrison, ibid". 158 
From the context of this passage, it seems clear that Stair is discussing formal 
validity. 159 Conversely, a Scottish executor to the estate of a deceased who had 
died in Scotland did not need to confirm to debts in England or any other foreign 
154 Stair, Inst. I, i, 16. For a view from the other side of the border, see the complaint from an 
English merchant (who was said, however, to be Scottish! ) contesting Scottish jurisdiction, 
that "he can no more be supposed acquainted with the laws and customs of it, than of any other 
country in Europe" (Anderson v Hodgson & Ornziston (1747) Mor 4779). 
iss Mosely v Harper (1656) Dec Usurp 45; Bicliie v Harper (1657) Dec Usurp 61. 
156 Graden v Ramsay (1664) Mor 4503. 
157 Stair, Inst., I, i, 16; IIl, viii, 35. 
158 Ibid., III, viii, 35. 
159 Interestingly, however, an examination of the report in Morison's Dictionary suggests that one 
of the cases upon which Stair relies is perhaps more concerned with essential validity. In 
Colonel Henderson's Children v Murray (1623) Mor 4481, the deceased had attempted to 
dispose of heritage amongst his children, as was permitted in the Low Countries, where he 
died. In Scotland, however, heritage was not carried by will until the coming into force of the 
Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 (31 & 32 Viet), c. 101. 
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countries. 160 An English pursuer was allowed to rely upon confirmation in an 
English form, in an action for payment under an English bond in Lawson v 
Ke11o. 161 Legatars were not, however, allowed to proceed on the basis of an 
English confirmation of a Scottish will, where the deceased had died in England, 
but the (Scottish) executor was now wishing to renounce his office. 162 
However, of particular interest in Stair's discussion of succession where the 
deceased died abroad, is his reference to the concept of residence abroad aniino 
rennanendi. Stair does not explicitly discuss domicile, but arguably the seeds of 
the concept are already there-'63 In 1711, an argument was advanced that a 
planter who had set out for Darien, but died in Scottish waters, should be held 
either to have a domicile in Darien, or to have had no domicile. 164 In reply, it was 
argued that, to acquire a domicile in Darien, the deceased would require to have 
"settled", and decided to stay, there. The Court ultimately found the deceased to 
be domiciled in Scotland. By the later Institutional works of Erskine and Karnes, 
there is explicit reference to the rule that forty days residence leads to the 
acquisition of a domicile for the purposes of jurisdiction. 
165 Erskine also states, 
rather strikingly: 
"those who are born within the kingdom, though they should be afterwards 
settled abroad, without an intention of returning home, cannot shake 
themselves loose from the obligations naturally due by them, either to the laws 
or to the courts of their mother-country". 166 
160 Archbishop of Glasgow v Bruntsfield (1683) Mor 4449. It was later suggested that an executor 
would usually only require to account to the court from which his powers were derived: White 
v Skene (1732) Mor 4844. 
62 (1627) Mor 4497. 
62 Rob v French (1637) Mor 4497. Interestingly, this case was not thought, in its circumstances, 
to establish a "consuetude" in the later case of Brown & Duff v Bizet (1666) Mor 4498. 
163 See the reference to "domicils" in Brown & Duff v Bizet, supra; and see also Vernor v Elvies 
(1610) Mor 4788; Douglas v Cunninghame (1642) Mor 4816; McMorland v Melvill (1666) 
Mor 4447. 
164 Cordiner v Glassels (1711) Mor 4852. 
165 Erskine, Inst., I, ii, 16; Karnes, Equity, IIl, viii. 
166 Erskine, Inst., I, ii, 19. 
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Lastly, it is of interest to note that by 1745, a Scots court can be seen criticising an 
English court for lack of comity in not recognising a Scottish decree. 167 
Conclusion 
As the centuries progressed therefore, factual and legal conditions combined to 
bring the subjects of Scotland and England, into contact with each other. The 
development of different nations, each with its own body of law, on either side of 
the border meant that such contact also brought potential clashes between the two 
systems of law. Constitutional development therefore had a role in creating the 
setting in which conflict of laws could arise as between Scotland and England. 
Whilst there was eventually an appreciation that such cases were different from 
straight-forward domestic cases, resort was often had to special rules, or supra- 
national bodies of law, such as the lure gentiuin. Morison dedicated a section of 
his Dictionary to "Foreign" cases and, indeed, examination of case law eventually 
reveals (particularly in the seventeenth century) an increasingly sophisticated 
approach to questions of jurisdiction, together with a recognition that sometimes 
the law of another country, for example, England, ought more appropriately to be 
applied. Rules of what we would now class as international private law are 
dispersed through the Scottish Institutional writings, although generally not 
gathered together into a comprehensive analysis of the subject. Although 
constitutional changes in the seventeenth century could have removed altogether 
the need for rules to govern Anglo-Scottish conflicts of laws, for a variety of 
reasons these alterations in the two countries' constitutional relationship did not 
have this effect. 
As a postscript, it should be noted that by 1832, an advocate editing a new edition 
of Stair had added a Notes section, which contains a section headed "International 
Law", with the sub-headings one would expect to find today in an international 
private law text. 168 In the late nineteenth century, however, as we have seen, 
international private law was still a relatively recent addition to the University of 
Glasgow's courses on Scottish law. 169 
167 Dodds v 6Vestconnb (1745) Mor 4793. 
168 Stair, Inst., 5`h edn., (cd. ) More, J. S. (Bell & Bradfute, 1832). 
169 Miller, The Law of Nature and Nations in Scotland, p102. 
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3 CONSTITUTIONALISING CONFLICTS 
Defining the constitutionalising of conflicts 
The phrase 'constitutionalising conflicts' is used as a shorthand description of a 
relatively recent phenomenon. It describes the view that, within a nation, the 
legal issues traditionally solved by the application of rules of jurisdiction, choice 
of law and recognition of judgments should, instead, be governed by 
constitutional rules. A brief foray into Canadian and Australian law provides 
some examples of this school of thought. ' 
In the case of Tolofson v Jensen, 2 La Forest J referred to the "Canadian 
constitutional imperativesi' which in his opinion had been left out of 
consideration in the application of an international private law rule to an 
interprovincial delictual matter. Earlier, in the case of Morguard Investments Ltd 
v De Savoye, 4 he had argued that treating Canadian provinces as different 
countries in a conflict of laws context seemed "to fly in the face of the obvious 
intention of the Constitution to create a single country", 
5 and further that "the 
rules of comity or private international law as they apply between the provinces 
must be shaped to conform to the federal structure of the Constitution". 
6 Hogg 
has complained that: 
"The conflicts law of each Canadian province has developed with little regard 
for the idea that there are constitutional limits on provincial extraterritorial 
I Indeed, in terms of nomenclature, I am indebted to Castel, who uses the term 
"constitutionalization" (Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p21). See also its use in the 
title of a recent Scots article: Lord Reed, "The constitutionalisation of private law in Scotland" 
2002 JR 65. 
2 (1994) 120 DLR (4t') 289. 
3 Ibid. at 301; see also the reference by Kirby J to "constitutional imperatives" in the Australian 
case of John Pfeffer Pty Limited v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36 at para 120. ° [1990] 3 SCR 1077. 
S Ibid. at 1099. 
6 Ibid. at 1101. 
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competence, or the idea that, within a federal state, conflicts law rules might 
require modification upon constitutional grounds". 7 
As Blom has observed "[i]f the solutions are constitutionally required, private 
international law becomes a branch of constitutional law". 8 Indeed, taken to its 
extreme, this argument entails the jettisoning of rules of international private law 
within a sovereign state, even although it may comprise a number of jurisdictions 
(whether these be states, provinces, or separate legal jurisdictions). Such a radical 
approach is perhaps best demonstrated by the opinions rendered in interstate cases 
by a number of Australian judges, in particular Deane J. In Breavington v 
Godleman, 9 Deane J expressed the view that: 
"to apply private international law principles to resolve competition or 
inconsistency between the laws of the Australian States seems to me, however, 
to be objectionable on three overlapping grounds. It ignores the significance 
of the federation of the former Colonies into one nation. It frustrates the 
manifest intention of the Constitution to create a unitary national system of 
law. It discounts the completeness of the Constitution which, by the national 
legal structure which it establishes and by its own provisions, itself either 
precludes or provides the means of resolving competition and inconsistency 
between the laws of different States". '° 
Thus, for Deane J, if Australian states were to treat sister-states as if they were a 
foreign country in conflicts of law terms, then "the national law would provide for 
its own disunity". i' Gaudron J was similarly blunt in McKain v R. W. Miller and 
Company (South Australia) Pty Limited: 
"The constitutional solution operates at two stages. At the first stage, it 
eliminates 'conflict of laws'. More precisely, it brings about a situation such 
7 P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Student Edition 2002 (Carswell, 2002), para 
13.5(a). 
$ J. Blom, "Private international law in a globalizing age: the quiet Canadian revolution" (2002) 
4 YPIL 83 at 115. 
9 (1988) 169 CLR 41. 
10 Ibid. at 124-125. 
11 Ibid. at 127. 
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that, as between the States, the Territories and the Commonwealth, there is 
only one body of law which applies to any given set of facts. ... The second 
stage of the constitutional solution eliminates 'choice of law'. The Constitution 
does not permit of the possibility that the legal consequences attaching to a set 
of facts occurring in Australia might be determined other than by application 
of the body of law governing those facts". 12 
Those attracted to such views have argued that a constitutional dimension informs 
all the main areas normally associated with international private law. 13 
In Canada this school of thought has had a practical impact. In Australia, it was 
the opinion of certain of the judges in Breavington v Godleman14 and McKain v 
R. W. Miller and Company (South Australia) Pty Linzited, 15 that the section of the 
Australian constitution16 which directed that "full faith and credit" be given to 
laws and judgments of other states operated so as to remove the need for rules of 
international private law. There is no such explicit clause in the Canadian 
constitution. However, an implicit concept of "full faith and credit" was, in 
effect, read into the constitution in Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye. 
'7 
Consequently it was held that Canadian provinces should recognise judgments 
emanating from sister-provinces provided that jurisdiction had been properly 
taken by the original court. 18 The test for taking jurisdiction of "real and 
substantial connection", has also been said to have a constitutional basis. 
19 Courts 
12 (1992) 174 CLR I at 55. 
13 J. Swan, "The Canadian Constitution, federalism and the conflict of laws" (1985) 63 Can Bar 
Rev 271. 
14 (1988) 169 CLR41. 
15 (1992) 174 CLR 1. 
16 s118. 
17 [1990] 3 SCR 1077 per La Forest J at 1100. Tetley suggests that this concept has also now 
had some influence in international cases; however, it is difficult to see how the cases which 
he discusses bear this out: W. Tetley, "Current developments in Canadian private international 
law" (1999) 78 Can Bar Rev 152 at 198. 
1s See also Hunt v 7'&N plc [1993] 4 SCR 289 per La Forest J at 321: "the courts must consider 
appropriate policy in relation to recognition and enforcement of judgments issued in other 
provinces in light of the legal interdependence under the scheme of confederation established 
in 1867". 
19 Spar Aerospace Ltd v American Mobile Satellite Corp. 2002 SCC 78 per LeBel J at para 51; 
and see too Muscutt v Courcelles (2002) 213 DLR (4'h) 577 per Sharpe JA at 608: "The 
decisions in Morguard, Tolofson and Hunt suggest that the assumption of jurisdiction is more 
easily justified in interprovincial cases than in international cases. The jurisdictional standards 
developed in Morguard and Hunt were strongly influenced by the need to adapt the rules of 
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in Canada can now determine that legislation from other provinces is 
unconstitutional, and thus should not be applied. 20 I will argue in a later chapter 
that this is tantamount to a constitutional substitute for a public policy 
exception. 21 The application of different choice of law rules in an interprovincial 
context also sprang from the adoption of this constitutional perspective. 22 For 
Tetley, there is now a preliminary classification issue arising in Canada, namely 
whether constitutional law or conflict of laws is to be applied. 23 Castel fears that 
before long there will be two different bodies of law dealing with interprovincial 
and international conflicts. 24 
Interestingly, it is clear that the proponents of the constitutionalising of conflicts 
feel that, despite the existence of different legal jurisdictions within one political 
state, the experience of the UK had nothing to teach Canada or Australia. 
25 But is 
this correct? Have traditional international private law problems between 
Scotland and England ever been subject instead to a constitutional analysis? 
Further, might the use of a constitutional, rather than a conflict of laws, approach 
increase with the advent of the Scottish Parliament? 
private international law to the demands of the Canadian federation. " But see Blom, "The 
quiet Canadian revolution", 94. He notes that although the "Supreme Court laid heavy 
emphasis on a constitutional rationale in interprovincial cases ... the non-constitutional side of 
its reasoning has proved sufficiently compelling on its own that lower courts, with surprisingly 
little qualification, have applied the same solutions to international as to interprovincial cases" 
(Blom, "The quiet Canadian revolution", 114). 
20 Hunt v T&Nplc [1993] 4 SCR 289. 
21 See pp202-205 below. 
22 Tolofson v Jensen, (1994) 120 DLR (4`h) 289; and see too Leonard v Houle (1997) 154 DLR 
(0) 640; and Michalski v Olson (1997) 123 Man R (2d) 101, (1997) 32 MVR (3d) 9 (Man Ct 
App) discussed in Tetley, "Current developments", p160. Castel argues that the flexible 
exception disapproved of in the interprovincial context by the majority in Tolofson has in fact 
now been utilised by a provincial court in a case involving two provinces (Castel, Introduction 
to Conflict of Laws, p212). In Australia a different rule existed for interstate torts as a result of 
Breavington v Godleman, (1988) 169 CLR 41; McKain v R. W. Miller and Company (South 
Australia) Pty Limited, (1992) 174 CLR 1; and John Pfeffer Pry Limited v Rogerson, [2000] 
HCA 36; cf P. Nygh, "Choice of law in torts in Australia" (2000) 2 YPIL 55. Eventually, 
however, the international rule was harmonised so that the lex loci delicti also applied in these 
situations, although opinion was reserved upon whether the boundary between substantive and 
procedural matters should be drawn differently in international cases: Regie National des 
Usines Renault SA v Zhang [2002] HCA 10. 
23 W. Tetley, "The on-going saga of Canada's conflict of law revolution - theory and practice" 
http: //tetley. law. mcgill. ca/conflicts/confsaga. pdf (1998-2001) p4. 
24 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Lativs, pp2l-22. 
25 See, for example, Morguard Investments Ltd V De Savoye [ 1990] 3 SCR 1077 per La Forest J 
at 1101. 
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Constitutionalising conflicts in the period 1707 to 1999? 
The constitutional status of the Acts of Union of 1707 & 1706 
The creation of the kingdom of Great Britain, and the framework of the new state, 
are in fact to be found in legislation emanating from its predecessor Parliaments: 
the Scottish Parliament's Union with England Act 1707, and the English 
Parliament's Union with Scotland Act 1706.26 In terms of Article III, one 
Parliament was to represent the new nation, and that was the Parliament of Great 
Britain. Two provisions of the Acts of Union are critical in the development of 
the legal relationship between Scotland and England within Great Britain. Article 
XVIII directed the harmonisation of "the Laws concerning Regulation of Trade, 
Customs and such Excises to which Scotland is by virtue of this Treaty to be 
lyable". However: 
"all other Lawes in use within the Kingdom of Scotland do after the Union and 
notwithstanding thereof remain in the same force as before (except such as are 
contrary to or inconsistent with this Treaty) but alterable by the Parliament of 
Great Britain With this difference betwixt the Laws concerning publick Right 
Policy and Civil Government may be made the same throughout the whole 
United Kingdom but that no alteration be made in Laws which concern private 
Right except for evident utility of the subjects within Scotland". 
By virtue of Article XIX, the existence of the Court of Session and the Court of 
Justiciary are protected. Furthermore: 
"no Causes in Scotland be cognoscible by the Courts of Chancery, Queens- 
Bench, Common-Pleas or any other Court in Westminster-hall And that the 
said Courts or any other of the like nature after the Unions shall have no power 
to Cognosce Review or Alter the Acts or Sentences of the Judicatures within 
Scotland or stop the Execution of the same". 
26 1707, c. 7; (6 Anne), c. 11; respectively. The apparent discrepancy in date is due to the 
continuing use of the Julian calendar in England at this date: Lord Gray's Motion 2000 SC 
(HL) 46 per Lord Hope of Craighead at 56. 
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Thus the Acts of Union preserve a separate body of Scots law, although allowing 
harmonisation in matters broadly coincident with modern-day public law. In also 
keeping clearly separate the jurisdictions of the Scottish and English courts, the 
Acts of Union created a legal landscape where clashes of jurisdiction, and of laws, 
could arise within one political country. There are no provisions setting out 
detailed guidance on the allocation of jurisdiction between Scotland and England, 
or laying down rules on the recognition of judgments. This is not to be critical. 
In the context of the Acts of Union, and given the stage of development which 
rules of international private law had reached at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, 27 it would probably be surprising were it otherwise. However, are there 
areas where the effect of the Acts of Union is the imposition of a constitutional, 
rather than a conflicts, approach to such issues? Before exploring this, it is 
necessary to briefly examine the constitutional status of the Acts of Union 
themselves. 
This has been a matter of great controversy over many years. It is an issue which 
has received greater attention in Scotland, than in England, however, this may not 
be particularly surprising. The in-built protections which the Acts of Union 
purport to contain are largely attempts to protect Scottish institutions, as the 
nation had entered into a union with a larger neighbour, of greater wealth and 
influence. It will clearly always be of more interest to the weaker party in such a 
relationship whether these protections can, in fact, be utilised. 
At the most basic level, it seems intuitively correct that the two documents which 
set up a new nation, with a new Parliament, and contain certain protections for 
existing Scottish institutions for "all time coming", 28 should be regarded as the 
founding constitutional document of Great Britain. 29 Indeed, in the recent English 
case of Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, 30 Laws LJ compiled a list of 
constitutional statutes, and within this included the Union with Scotland Act 
27 See Chap. 2. 
28 Acts of Union, Art XIX (regarding the Court of Session). 
29 See C. M. G. Himsworth & C. M. O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution: Law & Practice 
(LexisNexisUK, 2003), pp152-153; C. Ashton & V. Finch, Constitutional Law in Scotland 
(W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), para 4.34. 
30 [2003] QB 151. 
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1706.31 The normal corollary to this statement would be that the Acts of Union 
therefore limit the power of the (now) UK Parliament such that it may only act 
compatibly with the Acts of Union. However, such a theory has been thought to 
be incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus Laws LJ 
makes it plain that the only consequence of the Union with Scotland Act being a 
constitutional statute is that it may not be impliedly repealed: there is, for him, no 
question that Parliament may not expressly legislate in breach of the Acts of 
Union. 32 Lord President Cooper spoke out strongly against the assumption that 
the British Parliament inherited from the old English Parliament a doctrine which 
was not a feature of the Scottish Parliament. 33 His opinion was that the UK 
Parliament could not pass legislation which breached the Acts of Union. 34 
However, thus far no Scottish court has identified a method by which such a limit 
on parliamentary powers could be enforced by the courts, although unwilling to 
rule out that such a mechanism might exist. In MacCormick v Lord Advocate 
Lord President Cooper did not think the particular issue before him, as a matter of 
public right, was justiciable, but appeared to reserve his position insofar as private 
right was concerned. 35 In the Outer House case of Gibson v Lord Advocate36 
Lord Keith reserved his position on the ability of the Westminster Parliament to 
abolish the Court of Session, or indeed, Scots law itself, but expressed the obiter 
view that whether a measure was for the evident utility of the Scots was not 
justiciable. 37 This latter was not accepted by the sheriff in Stewart v Henry; 
38 
however, uncertainty over the ability successfully to challenge Acts of the UK 
Parliament continued unresolved in Murray v Rogers, 
39 and Fraser v 
MacCorquodale 40 The matter was recently canvassed once more in Lord Gray's 
Motion, 41 in which Lord Hope reached the conclusion that "the argument that the 
31 Ibid. at 186. 
32 Ibid. at 186-187. 
33 MacCormick v Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396 at 411. 
34 Ibid. at 411-412. 
35 Ibid. at 412, although see the dicta at 413. Lord Russell clearly reserves his position on this 
issue (ibid. at 417). 
36 1975 SC 136. 
37 Ibid. at 144. 
38 1989 SLT (Sh Ct) 34 at 38. 
39 1992 SLT 221 per Lord President Hope at 226; per Lord Kirkwood at 228. 40 1992 SLT 229 per Lord President Hope at 230. It was, however, clear that such a challenge 
could not be mounted by way of a petition to the nobile offici ni: Pringle, Petitioner 1991 
SLT 330. 
41 2000 SC (HL) 46. 
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legislative powers of the new Parliament of Great Britain were subject to the 
restrictions expressed in the Union Agreement by which it was constituted cannot 
42 be dismissed as entirely fanciful". Whilst he did not consider that the House of 
Lords Committee for Privileges could advise that a government bill was ultra 
vires in that it breached the Acts of Union, he expressed no view on whether a 
court could do so. 43 
It is submitted that the Acts of Union do have a special status within both Scots 
and English law. The precise consequences of that special status, however, 
remain unclear. Levack has argued that: 
"The Treaty of Union of 1707 guaranteed that a union of English law and 
Scots law would not take place. It did not, however, fully protect the integrity 
of Scots law or the autonomy of the Scottish judicial system". 44 
The existence of a single UK Parliament, and the powers invested in that 
Parliament to harmonise or reform, have had a significant impact on Scots law. 
However, the unwillingness of the Scottish courts to enforce that measure of 
protection which was inserted into the Acts of Union has prevented the latter from 
being successfully drawn upon by Scottish citizens in the manner that one might 
expect of a constitutional document. Despite this, it is submitted that there has 
been a constitutional impact, albeit limited, on the rules of international private 
law. This can be seen in two particular areas, which will be examined in turn. 
The geographical reach of statutes within the United Kingdom 
It is generally assumed that a country may not legislate extra-territorially. One 
consequence of this is the argument that foreign legislation generally cannot be 
relied upon in the Scottish courts. Thus, for example, the case of Government of 
the Republic of Spain v National Bank of Scotland45 suggests that foreign 
42 Ibid. at 59. 
43 Ibid. at 62 cf the opinions expressed by Lord Slynn of Hadley (ibid. at 49). as Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the Union 1603-1707, 
p98. 
45 1939 SC 413. 
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legislation will have no effect over property in Scotland. 46 Lord Wark quoted 
Dicey to the effect that: 
"A State's authority in the eyes of other States and the Courts that represent 
them is speaking very generally coincident with, and limited by, its power. It 
is territorial. It may legislate for, and give judgments affecting, things and 
persons within its territory. It has no authority to legislate for, or adjudicate 
upon, things or persons (unless they are its subjects) not within its territory". 7 
The last phrase in parenthesis indicates that there are some limited exceptions to 
the principle of extra-territoriality, such as legislation as to the status and capacity 
of a state's domiciliaries. 48 
It is submitted, however, that the question of the application in Scotland of 
English legislation must be analysed, and answered, quite differently. The key 
lies in the political framework of the UK state and constitutional doctrines, rather 
than any concept of extra-territoriality. The UK Parliament has the power to 
legislate within its own territory. Indeed, it lays claim to the ability to legislate 
outwith its territory: in the oft-quoted example, Parliament could pass legislation 
to ban smoking in Paris. 49 Whilst French courts are clearly under no obligation to 
enforce such a statute, 50 it would be effective in respect of those offenders who 
were under the jurisdiction of a Scottish or English court, despite the extra- 
territorial nature of the legislation. When confining its legislative attention to the 
UK, the Westminster Parliament legislates in four modes: solely for the Scottish, 
English and Welsh, or Northern Irish legal systems, or for a combination of any 
of them. Whether a statute may be relied upon in Scotland is a question of 
46 Ibid. per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison at 426-427; per Lord Mackay at 434; per Lord Wark at 
438. 
47 Ibid. at 438. 
48 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p94. For a criticism of the territoriality 
approach see R. D. Leslie, "The applicability of domestic law in cases with a foreign element" 
in D. L. C. Miller & D. W. Meyers, Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute 
to Professor Sir Thomas Smith QC (Butterworths/The Law Society of Scotland, 1992), p57; 
and see the English case of Re Cohn [ 1945] 1 Ch 5. 
49 Sir W. I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 50' edn. (University of London Press, 1959), 
p170. The UK Parliament has passed extra-territorial legislation, e. g., War Crimes Act 1991, 
c. 13. 
50 Indeed, this was Jennings' point (ibid., pp170-171). 
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statutory interpretation, not of territoriality. Thus in Rv Treacy, 51 in considering 
the reach of an English criminal statute, Lord Diplock remarked "I can leave aside 
the question of territorial limitation as between the different jurisdictions 
(England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, etc. ) within the United 
Kingdom, for this depends on constitutional practice, not on international 
comity". 52 
Accordingly, a Scottish court will only be bound by statutes which apply to 
Scotland alone, or Scotland together with other parts of the UK. This is a 
question of interpretation for the courts, although by no means always an easy 
one. Confusingly, the practice for long was that, whilst statutes applying only to 
Scotland would contain the word 'Scotland' in parenthesis in the short title of the 
Act, statutes applying only to England and Wales, as well as those applying to the 
whole of the UK, were not qualified in the short title. 53 Fortunately, the end of 
the twentieth century saw some erosion of this practice. 54 There is also a 
presumption that statutes of the Westminster Parliament extend to all parts of the 
UK. 55 In the past when construing statutes to discover their extent, Scottish 
courts gave great weight to the existence of express words including Scotland. 
Much significance was also attached to a lack of express words excluding 
Scotland in the legislation. A statute which contained words suggesting that it 
applied to the whole of the UK, has been held to cover Scotland, even although 
the earlier legislation which it was amending had applied only in England . 
56 The 
use of an English term in a statutory provision did not prevent that section from 
being applied to Scotland by the court in Murray v Comptroller-General of 
s' [1971] AC 537. 
52 Ibid. at 564; endorsed in Clements v HMA 1991 JC 62 per Lord Justice-General Hope at 69. 
In the early case of Grove v Gordon (1740) Mor. 4510, although the ratio is unclear, there 
were arguments addressed to territoriality. However, it is not clear whether the English 
limitation statute in question pre-dated the Union of 1707 and, in any event, the case seems to 
be more concerned with the distinction between rules of substance and procedure, and the 
effects thereof. 
53 The rare exceptions are the Census (England and Wales) Act 1890 (53 & 54 Viet), c. 61, and 
the Import of Live Fish (England and Wales) Act 1980, c. 27. 
54 In 1986 the Pensions Appeal Tribunals (England and Wales) (Amendment) Rules 1986, SI 
1986/366 were passed, and since then a number of statutory instruments applying to England 
and Wales only have been so qualified in the short title. 
55 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p95. 56 Bridges v Fordyce (1844) 6D 968. This was an opinion of the Full Court (the original Bench 
being equally divided), with the issues clearly being ones of statutory construction rather than 
extra-territoriality. 
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Patents. 57 With more modern statutes it may only be necessary to make reference 
to the commencement and extent provisions of the statute. The important point, 
however, is that it is rules of statutory interpretation which are relevant, not any 
principles of international private law. This is well illustrated by the recent case 
of Atlantic Computing Services (UK) Ltd v Burns Express Freight Ltd. 58 The 
defenders had contracted with the pursuers to take goods from England to 
Glasgow. Whilst on the London Orbital, disaster struck: the lorry carrying the 
goods caught fire. In the subsequent action for the loss suffered by the pursuers 
due to the damage occasioned to the goods, the pursuers sought to rely upon the 
Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856.59 Section 17 imposed liability 
for accidental fire on "[a]ll carriers for hire of goods within Scotland". The 1856 
Act was stated only to apply to Scotland. In the lower court, and in the Inner 
House, both parties largely approached the case as an international private law 
problem. However, the Division made it clear that this was a wholly incorrect 
approach. Rather, it was simply a matter of how section 17 was to be construed. 
The correct interpretation of the statute was that it only came into play if goods 
were damaged by fire whilst in carriage in Scotland, and thus it had no application 
to the facts of the case before them. 
The revenue, penal and other public laws exception 
Traditionally the Scottish courts will not enforce certain laws of other countries, 
such as revenue and penal laws. The scope of, and rationale for, this rule must be 
examined, before its applicability within the UK can be assessed. 
It has often been said that the unwillingness to give effect to foreign revenue laws 
is simply part of a general rule against the enforcement of the penal laws of 
another country. 60 The penal and revenue law exceptions are either stated 
expressly, or can be inferred, to be driven by the same rationale. The roots of the 
rule that English and Scottish courts will not enforce the tax laws of another state 
S' 1932 SC 726. See also Perth Water Commissioners v McDonald (1879) 6R 1050. 
58 2004 SLT 132. 
59 1856 (19 & 20 Viet), c. 60. 
60 The Attorney-General for Canada v William Schulze & Co. (1901) 9 SLT 4; Municipal 
Council of Sydney v Bull [ 1909] 1 KB 7 per Grantham J at 12; Government of India v Taylor 
[1955] AC 491 per Viscount Simonds at 506-507; Peter Buchanan Ltd and Macharg v McVey 
[1955] AC 516 per Kingsmill Moore J in the High Court of Justice at 526. 
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are not clear. 61 However, its existence was accepted in a case which is seminal in 
both countries: the decision of the House of Lords in Government of India v 
Taylor. 62 There seem to be two bases for the rule, and both are set out in the 
judgment of Lord Keith of Avonholm. Firstly, it is argued that a foreign country's 
attempt at "enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign 
power which imposed the taxes", 63 and so cannot be maintained in the UK. A 
contrast is drawn with actions between private persons which simply draw upon 
foreign laws. Another facet of this rationale is to view revenue laws as part of a 
foreign state's administration. 64 Secondly, it can be argued that public policy 
issues dictate the non-enforcement of revenue laws. 65 An example of this 
reasoning is found in the judgment of Kingsmill Moore J in the lower court, in the 
Irish case of Peter Buchanan Ltd and Macharg v McVey. 
66 The defendant in that 
case was a director of a company registered in Scotland, who moved to Ireland as 
part of a scheme to avoid (retro-active) tax legislation which had been introduced 
in Scotland. Kingsmill Moore J was of the view that revenue laws did not 
measure against a moral standard, but were dictated by political expediency, and 
accordingly could be designed to help effect policies repugnant to Irish citizens. 
The Irish court therefore should not enforce any revenue laws, since to only 
enforce some would be "publicly to censure the behaviour of a foreign State, a 
procedure dangerous and possibly arrogant". 67 The difficulty with this reasoning 
is that many other rules, such as family and property laws, could be used to 
pursue government programmes. Refusing to recognise a foreign divorce may be 
equally offensive to the other nation involved, as would be non-enforcement of its 
revenue laws. It is therefore submitted that the first argument, as to sovereignty, 
is the more convincing of these analyses. It certainly seems to inform the 
reasoning of the modem cases of Re State of Norway's Applications (Nos 1 and 
2), 68 and Lord Advocate v Tursi, 69 and it appears to be preferred by the editors of 
61 See the arguments put forward by the ultimately unsuccessful party (represented by, inter alia, 
J. H. C. Morris) in Government of Lidia v Taylor, supra. 
62 [1955] AC 491. This was an English House of Lords decision. 
63 Ibid. per Lord Keith of Avonholm at 511. 
64 Ibid. per Lord Somervell of Harrow at 514. 
65 Ibid, per Lord Keith of Avonholm at 511. 
66 [1955] AC 516 at 529. 
67 Ibid. at 530. 
68 [1989] 1 All ER 745. 
69 1998 SLT 1035. 
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Dicey & Morris, 70 and by Anton. 71 In sum, such rules are held to be internal and 
limited by the bounds of the state which enacted them. Consequently, it is 
contended that the exception can be said to be wider than penal and revenue laws, 
extending also to what Lord Denning described as "other public laws". 72 If the 
rationale behind the rule is that foreign states cannot assert sovereign powers 
within the UK, then logically the rule must strike at all direct actions by a state 
against its citizens, such as administrative law provisions. 73 
Are the Scottish courts bound by the revenue, penal and other public laws 
exception when confronted with an English revenue, penal or other public law? 
In Government of India v Taylor it was irrelevant in the question as to 
enforcement of an Indian revenue law, that India was still a member of the 
Commonwealth. 4 Earlier, at the turn of the century, it was held that Canadian 
revenue laws would not be enforced by a Scottish court, despite that fact that 
Canada was part of the British Empire. 75 Lord Stormonth-Darling remarked: 
"It is no doubt rather anomalous that the King through his Courts in Scotland, 
should refuse to recognise a debt due to himself in Canada, merely because it 
arises out of the execution of a Revenue Statute. But it was not maintained, 
and I think is not maintainable, that in the sense of international law, the 
mother country and herself-governing (sic) colonies stand in different 
relationship from that which exists between two foreign states". 
76 
The key lies in the existence within the UK (prior to 1999) of one parliament. 
The ties binding the monarch to his subjects, be they ties of Empire or 
Commonwealth, were irrelevant in the face of the existence of separate law- 
making parliamentary bodies in Canada and India at the relevant times. In 
70 L. Collins (gen. ed. ), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 13th edn. (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2000), pp89-90 & 94-100. 
71 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Lawv, pp103-105. 
72 Attorney General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1982] 3 All ER 432, CA, per Lord Denning MR at 
455-460, and see also Collins, Dicey and Morris, paras 5R-018 & 5-030 to 5-037; A. Briggs, 
The Conflict of Lawvs (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp43-44. 
73 CfAnton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p 106. 
74 [1955] AC 491, per Viscount Simonds at 507-508; per Lord Somervell of Harrow at 515. 75 The Attorney-General for Canada v William Schulze & Co. (1901) 9 SLT 4. 
76 Ibid. at 5. 
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contrast (and despite Lord Cooper's criticisms), the sovereignty of the UK 
Parliament extends to the whole of the UK. In Government of India v Taylor, 
Viscount Simonds, and Lords Keith and Somervell observed that the situation 
may be different in a federal country, 77 a model which is more comparable to the 
political situation of the UK. It is submitted that this points towards the answer 
thrown up by the logical application of principle. Since the UK Parliament can 
legislate for, and thus its sovereignty extends over, the whole of the UK, it cannot 
be said to be an extra-territorial assertion of sovereignty to enforce the revenue 
laws of the UK state in Scotland, even if it concerns a tax-payer most closely 
connected with England. 78 Thus it is submitted that the UK government could, 
for example, make a claim in a Scottish multiple-poinding for contributions due 
by the owner under a provision confined solely in its application to England. 79 
The same logic applies to statutes enacted by the UK Parliament which could be 
characterised as penal, or as falling under the heading of 'other public laws'. 
Similarly, in Canada, it has become increasingly clear that the concept of 
sovereignty is the key to understanding the revenue law exception. 80 In the past, 
provinces have tended to be content to enforce, in effect, revenue laws of sister- 
provinces. The Quebec courts in theory will not enforce any rights arising from 81 
such rules of other provinces, but in reality, recognition and enforcement is 
afforded on a reciprocal basis. 82 However, it has now been argued that the 
Canadian constitution might require interprovincial recognition and enforcement 
of revenue laws and judgments. 83 
77 [1955] AC 491 per Viscount Simonds at 507; per Lord Somervell of Harrow at 515; per Lord 
Keith of Avonholm at 511-512. 
78 This accords with Crawford's view (Crawford, International Private Law in Scotland, para 
3.06 (footnote)); and see also Lord Advocate v Tursi 1998 SLT 1035 per Lord Penrose at 
1044. Note too, the ability to take action in Scotland for duty owing elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom in terms of the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act 1856 (19 & 20 Viet), c. 56, s40. 
79 Such were the facts of Metal Industries (Salvage) Ltd v Owners of the S. T. "Narle" 1962 SLT 
114, which involved a claim by the French Government in a Scottish multiple-poinding of a 
French ship. 
80 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, pp62-63. 81 Ibid., p63. 
82 Civil Code of Quebec, LQ 1991, c. 64, arts 3155,3162. 83 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p63; and see J. Blom, "Public policy in private international law and its evolution in time" 2003 NILR 373 at 379. 
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Constitutionalising conflicts in a devolved Scotland? 
The Scotland Act 1998 as a constitution? 
The Scotland Act 199884 which established a form of devolution for Scotland was 
not intended to form a new, and written, constitution for Scotland. 85 Initially, 
moreover, it was accepted that it did not do so. The Scotland Act was not itself, it 
must be remembered, even the product of a Scottish Parliament, but simply "a 
single piece of technical legislation emanating from a still-sovereign UK 
Parliament". 86 However, Canada, for example, has fashioned a concept of a 
'Canadian constitution', from the starting-point of the British North America Act, 
which was passed by the Westminster Parliament in 1867,87 and is: "a strictly 
business-like document. It contains no metaphysics, no political philosophy ... "$g 
It is submitted that, in any event, the initial view of the Scotland Act is changing. 
Himsworth and O'Neill now take the approach that "although this terminology is 
not widely used, that Act [the Scotland Act] can quite reasonably be described as 
a constitution for Scotland". 89 Significantly, it sets justiciable limits on the 
Scottish Executive and on the Scottish Parliament. Neither can act incompatibly 
with European Convention rights, nor European Community law, and both are 
bound by the terms of the devolution settlement set out in the Act. 
90 It is the 
method by which were incorporated in the devolution settlement the human rights 
guarantees, which have attracted most attention in the early years of the devolved 
84 1998, c. 46. 
85 Ashton & Finch, Constitutional Law in Scotland, para 8.05; S. Veitch, "Transitional 
jurisprudence in the UK: a very Scottish coup? " in L. Farmer & S. Veitch (eds), The State of 
Scots Law: Law and Government after the Devolution Settlement (Butterworths, 2001), p121 
at 126-127. 
86 Veitch, "Transitional jurisprudence in the UK", p127. 
87 Now officially the Constitution Act 1867. The Act arose from confederation conferences 
between, and drafts by, representatives of the components of the then Province of Canada (J-F. 
Cardin, A History of the Canadian Constitution from 1864 to the Present, transl. D. Halfpenny 
(Global Vision, 1996), ppl-3). A comparison might be made with the influence of the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention on the Scotland Act (for which, see A. Myles, "Scotland's 
Parliament White Paper", and A. Myles, "The Scotland Bill and Act", both in G. Hassan (ed. ), 
A Guide to the Scottish Parliament: The Shape of Things to Corte (The Stationery Office, 
1999) at p31 and p37 respectively). The Canadian Constitution is now also comprised of, inter 
alia, the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (also passed by the Westminster Parliament), and the 
Constitution Act 1982 (Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, paras 1.2-1.4). $$ W. I. Jennings, "Constitutional interpretation: the experience of Canada" (1937) 51 Harv LR I 
at 1. 
89 Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, p20. 90 Scotland Act 1998, ss29,57(2), 53-54 & 63. 
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settlement. In this field, the case of Rv HMA91 pointed up most sharply the 
differing effect of human rights north and south of the border: 
The conclusion must therefore be that, whenever a member of the Scottish 
Executive does an act which is incompatible with Convention rights, the result 
produced by all the relevant legislation is not just that his act is unlawful under 
section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act. That would be the position if the 
Scotland Act did not apply. When section 57(2) is taken into account, 
however, the result is that, so far as his act is incompatible with Convention 
rights, the member of the Executive is doing something which he has no power 
to do: his "act" is, to that extent, merely a purported act and is invalid, a 
nullity. In this respect Parliament has quite deliberately treated the acts of 
members of the Scottish Executive differently from the acts of Ministers of the 
Crown". 92 
Thus, in contrast to the uncertain possibilities of challenge to Westminster 
legislation under the Acts of Union, the Scottish courts clearly have the power to 
strike down Acts of the Scottish Parliament, and actings of the Scottish Executive, 
on a number of grounds, including contravention of human rights guarantees, and 
straying into powers reserved to Westminster. 93 It was argued that this was a role 
more appropriately filled by judges, rather than politicians. 
4 However, even as 
the Scotland Bill was launched, it was reported that "Scottish judges are 
apparently concerned that ... the whole emphasis of the work of 
the courts will 
change so that, in reality, we will have a constitutional court interpreting a written 
91 2003 SC (PC) 21. 
92 Ibid. per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at 63-64. Interestingly, in this case the division of opinion 
was on somewhat national lines, with the three Scottish judges forming the majority, and 
Lords Walker of Gestingthorpe and Steyn dissenting. 
93 For Lord Reed, "this is the first time (other than in areas governed by European Community 
law) that we have had fundamental rights given a special status in our law" (Lord Reed, "The 
constitutionalisation of private law", 67). 
94 C. Boyd, "Parliaments and Courts: Powers and Dispute Resolution" in T. StJ. N. Bates (ed. ), 
Devolution to Scotland: The Legal Aspects: Contemplating the Imponderable (T&T Clark, 
1997), p21 at 25. 
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constitution". 95 Later, O'Neill foresaw a development along the lines of the 
United States' Supreme Court: 
"Possible conflict between the Westminster Parliament and the Holyrood 
Parliament on claims that the new body is exceeding its limited powers is thus 
made into a juridical rather than a nakedly political matter. The danger is, of 
course, that in giving the task of policing the Scottish Parliament to the courts, 
the judges come to be seen or to be presented as acting in a broadly political 
role, holding the ring between the demands of the Westminster Parliament and 
the expectations of the Holyrood Parliament. The juridicalisation of what is 
essentially political conflict will, it is suggested, inevitably lead to a perception 
of the politicisation of the judiciary". 96 
Whether it is to be welcomed, or feared, it is submitted that Scottish judges have 
indeed been entrusted by the Scotland Act with powers akin to those exercised by 
courts, such as the United States Supreme Court, 
97 in the interpretation of written 
constitutions. 
A review of the major cases since these powers were bestowed on the courts 
reveals a similar shift of opinion as to the constitutional nature, or otherwise, of 
the Scotland Act. Initially, it was stated explicitly that the Scottish Parliament 
was simply a creature of statute, and not a sovereign body. 
98 Conversely, this 
meant that the courts could, and should, intervene if the Parliament overstepped 
its powers, 99 and a specific comparison was made to the many other parliamentary 
democracies where courts wielded this power. '°° Whilst the courts have not 
foresworn this latter duty to intervene, subsequent cases do, it is submitted, 
95 B. McKain, "A green and fertile field for the lawyers", The Herald, 19 December 1997. See 
also H. L. MacQueen, "Quis custodies?: the Scotland Bill, human rights and the judges" (1998) 
Scotland Forum (Issue 1) 8 at 9; Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, p465. 
96 A. O'Neill, "The Scotland Act and the government of judges" 1999 SLT (News) 61 at 61-62. 
For a contrary view see Veitch, "Transitional jurisprudence in the UK", p 128. 
97 And also the Supreme Court of Canada, which can strike down laws that are not consistent 
with the Constitution, with a great number of cases being brought in respect of alleged 
breaches of the Charter of Rights (Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 5.5(a)). 98 Whaley v Lord Watson 2000 SC 340 per Lord President Rodger at 348-350; per Lord Prosser 
at 357-358. 
99 Ibid. per Lord President Rodger at 348-350; per Lord Prosser at 357-358. 100 Ibid. per Lord President Rodger at 349. 
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indicate recognition of the Scottish Parliament as having a different status from 
other bodies subject to the Court of Session's power of review. Thus in Av The 
Scottish Ministers, 101 Lord President Rodger considered it "right that the court 
should give due deference to the assessment which the democratically elected 
legislature has made of the policy issues involved". 102 This was built upon in 
Adams v Advocate General, 103 in which the Lord Ordinary considered that it was 
"appropriate for this court to defer to a greater rather than to a lesser extent to the 
Scottish Parliament in respect of legislation such as the Protection of Wild 
Mammals Act" . 
104 Even more significantly, the Lord Ordinary was of the view 
that "despite the reference in the Human Rights Act to Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament being subordinate legislation, such Acts have in my opinion far more 
in common with public general statutes of the United Kingdom Parliament than 
with subordinate legislation as it is more commonly understood", 
105 and also 
noted that "the Scotland Act is clearly intended to provide a comprehensive 
scheme, not only for the Parliament itself, but also for the relationship between 
the courts and the Parliament". 106 By the time of the decision in Whaley v Lord 
Advocate107 in the summer of 2003, Lord Brodie agreed that one of the petitioners 
was: 
"correct to say that the Scottish Parliament is governed by what is, in effect, a 
mini-constitution. By that I took him to mean that, in the Scotland Act, the 
Convention and Community law, there are written sources of law which have 
primacy over what the Scottish Parliament may purport to enact. In other 
systems, that of the United States, for example, the primary source of law is 
the written Constitution. In such systems, statutes may be held by the courts to 
be invalid, as being contrary to the Constitution. By his use of the expression 
'mini-constitution', I understood [the petitioner] to be drawing an analogy as 
10,2001 SC 1. 
102 Ibid. at 21. 
103 2003 SC 171. 
104 Ibid. per Lord Nimmo Smith at 211. 
io5 Ibid. per Lord Nimmo Smith at 201. 
106 Ibid. per Lord Nimmo Smith at 201. 
107 2004 SLT 425. 
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between the Scotland Act and the Convention, on the one hand, and such a 
written Constitution, on the other". 108 
Similarly, the Northern Ireland Act 1998109 has been described in a House of 
Lords judgment as a constitution for Northern Ireland. ' 10 Scottish courts have not 
shrunk from using their powers to strike down actings of the Lord Advocate (as a 
member of the Scottish Executive), on human rights grounds. Indeed on a 
number of occasions, the High Court of Justiciary has taken a more radical stance 
than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) ultimately took on 
appeal. 111 
The Scotland Act may not be a constitution in the traditional sense. Furthermore, 
whilst it allows the policing of the boundaries between devolved and reserved 
matters, once a matter is adjudged to be reserved, the constitutional rules of 
Westminster come into play. Despite this, it is submitted that academics and 
judges are correct to sense that the Scotland Act has a constitution-like quality. 
The Scotland Act puts the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK 
on a constitutional footing, 112 and this is particularly significant in the context of 
the subject-matter of this thesis. Territorial controls are also placed on the 
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. 113 The Acts of Union and the 
Scotland Act are written documents, about which a constitutional structure for 
Scotland could be built. Whilst uncertainty about the justiciability of the Acts of 
Union may continue, the Scotland Act has clearly put in place a mechanism for 
the courts to enforce constitutional controls, including human rights guarantees, 
against the Scottish government of the day. 
i° Ibid. at 438. 
109 1998, c. 47. 
110 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32 per Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill at para 11; per Lord Hoffmann at para 25. 
11, Brown v Stott 2001 SC (PC) 43; McIntosh, Petitioner 2001 SC (PC) 89; Dyer v Watson 2002 
SC (PC) 89. In cases which have not progressed to the JCPC or the House of Lords, Scottish 
courts have also sounded the death knell for temporary sheriffs (Starrs v Ruxton: 2000 JC 208) 
and automatic warrants in writs for diligence on the dependence (Advocate General for 
Scotland v Taylor 2003 SLT 1340). 
1)2 Note also the disappearance of the Scotland Office and the Wales Office into a Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, p257). 113 Scotland Act 1998, ss29(l), (2) & 126. 
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The thistle and the maple leaf 
From an Act of the Westminster Parliament in the late nineteenth century, the 
Canadians have constructed a Canadian constitution, to the extent that by the end 
of the twentieth century, it was suggested that issues between the provinces 
traditionally adjudicated through conflict rules, were in fact more properly dealt 
with by constitutional rules. It has been suggested above that the Scotland Act 
has qualities akin to a constitution, particularly in terms of Scotland's relations 
with England. This raises two questions. Could issues of jurisdiction, choice of 
law, or recognition now be resolved through the application of constitutional 
rules? This will be the subject of the present section. A number of justifications 
which have been advanced in Canada for adopting a constitutional approach will 
be examined, to see if they remain valid and feasible in the context of the legal 
relations between Scotland and England. Only then can the second question, 
whether such an approach would be desirable, be answered. 
Common laws 
One of the factors which was said to make the adoption of a strict lex loci delicti 
rule between the Canadian provinces constitutionally appropriate was the 
similarity of the domestic content of the various provincial legal systems. 
114 
Firstly, only the federal Canadian Parliament may legislate in the fields of 
interprovincial trade, criminal law, marriage and divorce, and thus the law on 
these subjects can be made the same across Canada. 115 The powers of the 
provincial legislatures are confined to matters of property and civil rights, 
although this is accepted to encompass most areas of private law, such as contract, 
tort, property, much commercial law and labour law. 116 All but one of the 
Canadian provinces have a legal system based on the Common Law, and among 
these provinces the differences in private law rules are not great. 117 The 
exception is, of course, the province of Quebec. As New France, the area had 
been governed by the law of their colonial masters. After the British conquest in 
the eighteenth century, there was a brief spell where English law was supposed to 
114 Tolofsan v Jensen (1994) 120 DLR (4a') 289 per La Forest J at 312-313 & 315-316; see also Hunt v TdNplc [1993] 4 SCR 289 per La Forest J at 328. "S Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 5.1(g); J. Willis, "Securing uniformity of law in a 
116 
federal system - Canada" (1943-44) 5U Toronto LJ 352 at 361-362. 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 5.1(g). 117 Tolofson vJensen, supra at 312-313; Willis, "Securing uniformity", 352. 
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be applied. However, as early as 1774, it was allowed that French law might 
apply in matters of property and civil rights! 18 English law was still to supply the 
rules of criminal law, and as we have seen, today this is a matter for the federal 
Parliament. Quebec's separate legal system, meanwhile, survived through 
confederation with the other provinces, and all that has followed. In modem 
times, the law of Quebec province is generally classed, like Scots law, as a mixed 
legal system. l t9 In the 1940's, when Montreal was, in many ways, the 
commercial centre of Canada, the existence of a different Quebecois legal system 
was thought by some to be problematic. 
120 The intervening years, however, have 
seen a change in the economic geography of Canada, with the rise of Toronto. 
Furthermore, in Tolofsoni v Jensen, La Forest J questioned how far Quebec law 
does in truth diverge from that of the common law provinces. 121 Brady has 
described Quebec as "a cultural island within the nation, but an island now with 
numerous bridges that diminish its isolation", 
122 and it is submitted that this 
analogy assists in understanding how the situation of Scotland and England within 
the UK differs from that of Canada in this regard. With nine common law 
provinces, there is a high degree of legal uniformity within Canada: Quebec is an 
exception, an island. 123 This is reinforced by the reservation of important topics 
such as marriage, divorce, and criminal law to the federal Parliament. It might 
also be questioned whether language is now more important than law in 
distinguishing Quebec from the rest of Canada. 124 In contrast, the UK really 
consists solely of two, differing, legal systems125 albeit with a degree of legal 
118 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 2.3(b); H. P. Glenn, "Quebec: mixite and monism" 
in E. Örücü et al. (eds), Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed and Mixing (Kluwer, 1996) p1; J-G. 
Castel, The Civil Law System of the Province of Quebec: Notes, Cases, and Materials 
(Butterworths, 1962), pp20-22. 
119 Reeves J, "The Quebec Legal System" in G. L. Gall, The Canadian Legal System (Carswell, 
1990), p165 at 165. 
120 Willis, "Securing uniformity", p367. 
121 (1994) 120 DLR (4t') 289 at 316, cf Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p22- 
122 A. Brady, "Quebec and Canadian Federalism" in J. P. Meekison (ed. ), Canadian Federalism: 
Myth or Reality (Methven, 1968) p337 at 341-342. 
123 This pattern is reflected in the conflict of laws: "[a]lthough in strict theory the system of 
private international law could ... differ from province to province, 
in reality there are only 
two systems, that of Quebec and the common law system that applies everywhere else" (Blom, 
"The quiet Canadian revolution", 85). 
124 M. Richler, Oh Canada! Oh Quebec! Requiem for a Divided Country (Chatto & Windus, 
1992), p8; S. M. Arnopoulos & D. Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, 2°d edn. (McGill- 
Queen's University Press, 1984), p51; R. Levesque, An Option for Quebec (McClelland and 
Stewart, 1968), p14. 
125 Leaving aside, for the moment, the position of Northern Ireland. 
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inter-dependence. There is thus no general legal uniformity within the 
jurisdictions of the UK to which Scotland is an exception, and so this factor is not 
as relevant as it is in Canada. 
Common legal education 
A related factor is one identified in a United States context by von Mehren: the 
great similarities in legal education across all states, and the existence of nation- 
wide professional bodies. 126 This is also relevant in Canada, where problems of 
movement of lawyers across provincial boundaries are easing, 127 lawyers may be 
qualified in the law of a number of provinces, 128 and there is a nation-wide ethical 
code. 129 Once again, this factor is less relevant in the UK, 130 partly as a 
consequence of the separate legal systems therein. The protection of the Scottish 
education system by the Acts of Union also contributes to the differing structures, 
and lengths, of law degrees in Scotland and England. The professional bodies 
governing solicitors, and advocates or barristers, in Scotland and England are also 
distinct from each other. '3' 
The Supreme Court 
A crucial factor in the application of constitutional rules within Canada is "the 
essentially unitary nature of Canada's court system", 132 with the Supreme Court of 
Canada at its apex. The Supreme Court hears all Canadian appeals. 
'33 
126 A. T. von Mehren, "Recognition and enforcement of sister-state judgments: reflections on 
general theory and current practice in the European Economic Community and the United 
States" (1981) 81 Columbia LR 1044 at 1046. 
127 J. van Rhijn, "Multi-jurisdictional practice for in-house counsel" 2001 (June) Canadian 
Lawyer 13. 
128 Tolofson v Jensen (1994) 120 DLR (4`h) 289 per La Forest J at 313; Morguard Investments 
Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077 per La Forest J at 1100. See, however, on the need to 
qualify in civil law to practise at the Quebec Bar, Reeves, "The Quebec Legal System", pp180- 
181. 
129 Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, supra, per La Forest J at 1100. 
130 T. Weir, "Divergent legal systems in a single member state" (1998) 6 ZeuP 564 at 572. 
131 Ibid., 573. However, the Clementi review, which was confined to the subject of the regulation 
of lawyers in England and Wales has triggered an investigation of the position in Scotland (see 
Consultation Paper on the Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England 
and Wales, March 2004; D. Mill, "New model army" (2004) 49 ASS no 4,20). 132 Tolofson v Jensen, (1994) DLR (0) 289 per La Forest J at 315; see also Morguard 
Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077 per La Forest J at 1100; Swan, "The 
Canadian Constitution, federalism and the conflict of laws" p310. 133 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 8.5(a). 
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Legislation ensures that three of the nine judges are drawn from Quebec. 134 By 
convention, Ontario contributes three judges, the Western provinces two, and the 
Atlantic provinces, one. 135 It is a strongly unifying body: 
"The Supreme Court of Canada does not tolerate divergences in the common 
law from province to province, or even divergences in the interpretation of 
similar provincial statutes. Such divergences do develop from time to time, of 
course, but they are eventually eliminated by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The assumption of the Court, which is shared by the Canadian bar, is that, 
wherever variations can be avoided, Canadian law, whether federal or 
provincial, should be uniform". 136 
The existence of the Supreme Court ensures that there can be no doubts as to what 
might be termed natural justice guarantees within Canada. 137 
In the past this has resulted in the introduction of a number of concepts by the 
Supreme Court, including the 'double rule' in tort, which have had to be reversed 
or altered by the Quebec provincial legislature, in order to cohere with the law of 
Quebec. 138 For a time, "il s'agissait d'une harmonisation unidirectionelle: la 
solution de la common law etait toujours imposee au droit quebecois, jamais 
l'inverse". 139 Jobin, however, is convinced that this time has passed, and sees the 
Supreme Court now as a more benign influence. too It may be that the unifying 
goal of the Supreme Court is pursued with rather less vigour where the law of 
134 Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, s6. A certain level of Quebecois representation has always 
135 
been required (Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 8.3). 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 8.3. 
136 Ibid., para 8.5(a). See also Hunt v T&N plc [1993) 4 SCR 289 per La Forest J at 318; Willis, 
"Securing uniformity" 356; D. Greschner, "The Supreme Court, federalism and metaphors of 
moderation" (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 47 at 69. 137 Morguard brvestm ents Ltd v De Savoye, [1990) 3 SCR 1077 per La Forest J at 1099-1100. 138 P-G Jobin, "La Cour Supreme et la reforme du Code Civil" (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 27 at 38- 
40. 
139 Ibid., pp42-43. 
140 He notes, for example, the willingness of the Supreme Court to look at jurisprudence from 
civilian, or civilian influenced, systems, such as France, Belgium and Scotland (ibid., p45). 
Bogart, however, detected the emergence of a less sympathetic approach to Quebec by the 
Supreme Court in recent times (W. A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation 
and the Social and Political Life of Canada (Oxford University Press, 1994), pp224-225 & 245-248). 
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Quebec is involved. 141 However, for example, the judgment in Hunt v T&Nplc'42 
held a Quebec statute, which would have prevented the removal of documents on 
the order of a court of another province, to be constitutionally inapplicable. 
For many years the closest analogy to a Supreme Court in the UK was the House 
of Lords. However, unlike the Supreme Court of Canada, the House of Lords was 
not a final court of appeal for the whole country. Although it acquired 
jurisdiction over Scottish civil appeals (in somewhat controversial 
circumstances), 143 there is no appeal from Scotland to the House of Lords in 
criminal matters. Moreover, on the introduction of devolution, it was decided that 
devolution issues should be heard not by the House of Lords, but by the JCPC. 144 
In theory, another difference from the Supreme Court of Canada is that the House 
of Lords is not avowedly a unifying, or harmonising court. When sitting for a 
Scottish appeal, Scots law must be applied: the law of England and Wales will be 
applied in an appeal from that jurisdiction. A decision of the House of Lords in 
an English appeal is unlikely to be binding on a Scottish court, unlike its decision 
in a Scottish appeal. 145 A House of Lords decision in an English case may, 
however, be found to be persuasive. 146 In certain periods of its history, the 
position in practice has borne rather more resemblance to Jobin's 'harmonisation 
unidirectionelle'. Initially, after the jurisdiction in civil appeals had been 
established, Scottish appeals were dealt with by English judges, or Scots judges 
trained solely in English law, and indeed might have been argued by English 
barristers. Judges often sought to equiparate a Scots law concept with its 'match' 
in English law, or relied on English authority to the exclusion of relevant Scottish 
141 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 8.5(a) 
142 [1993] 4 SCR 289. 
143 See generally, A. D. Gibb, Law from over the Border: a short account of a strange jurisdiction 
(W. Green & Son, 1950). 
144 Scotland Act 1998, Sch. 6. 
145 Dalgleisli v Glasgow Corporation 1976 SC 32 per Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley at 51-53; 
Glasgow Corporation v Central Land Board 1956 Sc (HL) I per Lord Normand at 16-17. 
146 See Robertson v Watt & Co. (4 July 1995, unreported) IH; and Holmes v Bank of Scotland 
2002 SLT 545, preferring the reasoning and result of the English appeal of White v Jones 
[1995] 2 AC 207 to the much earlier Scottish House of Lords decision of Robertson v Fleming 
(1861) 4 Macq 167. In Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v Large 1977 SC 375, the Inner 
House agreed with criticism, expressed in the English House of Lords decision of Miliangos v 
George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443, of dicta from an earlier Scottish House of Lords 
case. For contrasting views of the effect of the Miliangos case on Scots law, compare A. D. M. 
Forte, "Questions of general jurisprudence: a case in point" (1977) 22 JLSS 377; and E. A. 
Marshall, "Decrees in foreign currency: a need for reform? " 1977 SLT (News) 230. 
61 
cases. It was sometimes assumed that English law applied, that the laws of the 
two countries "must be the same", 147 or that it would be unfortunate were that not 
so. This arguably resulted in cases which were decided erroneously, or the 
introduction of foreign concepts into Scots law. 148 Whilst matters improved with 
the introduction of Scots judges from the late nineteenth century, the arrangement 
is still beset with certain difficulties. Some modern judgments might be argued to 
be the result of a belief that it would be inequitable if things were done differently 
on either side of the border. 149 However, as Jobin had observed in the context of 
Quebec, such equity rarely seems to demand the imposition of a Scottish solution 
in England, but rather the reverse-150 Harmonisation by the introduction of 
English concepts is a challenge to the structure and consistency of Scots law. 
Furthermore, it has been correctly observed that the idea that "it is appropriate to 
have a UK wide court with the power to impose uniformity where lower courts 
are unwilling ... 
is wholly inconsistent with the devolution settlement". 
'5' 
Perhaps most radically, it has now been suggested that the current composition of 
the House of Lords, involving as it does judges not qualified in Scots law sitting 
in Scots appeals, is a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 152 Put so bluntly, it is hard to argue with the proposition that such an 
arrangement is, at best, undesirable. 153 Perhaps fortunately, relatively few appeals 
are taken from Scotland to the House of Lords, and an even smaller number 
succeed. Weir is probably correct in his conclusion that: 
147 Gibb, Law frone over the Border, p57. 
14$ For example, Brand v Mackenzie (1710) Robertson 8; Bartonshill Coal Co. v Reid 3 MacQ 
278; Brand's Trustees v Brand's Trustees (1876) 3R (HL) 16. 
149 See, for example, Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66; Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SLT 
1061 per Lord Clyde at 1066 & 1067-1068. 
150 One of the few examples of the ultimate acceptance by the House of Lords of a gift from 
Scotland to England is in relation to the plea of forum non conveniens (Spiliada Maritime 
Corporation v Cansulex [1987] AC 460; and see earlier The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436; 
The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398. 
15, J. Chalmers, "Scottish appeals and the proposed Supreme Court" (2004) 8 EdinLR 4 at 24. 
152 R. G. Anderson, "Appeals to London and human rights" 2003 SLT (News) 297. 
153 Indeed, the Scottish National Party have proposed the abolition of Scottish appeals to the 
House of Lords (H. L. MacQueen, "Scotland and a Supreme Court for the UK? " 2003 SLT 
(News) 279). See also the thoughtful criticisms of the existence of this civil appellate 
jurisdiction in Chalmers, "Scottish appeals". 
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"It would be absurd to assert that the law of the two countries would not be 
more different if there were no common supreme court, still it can hardly be 
said that having one has produced very much common law". '54 
Another body which must now be considered is the JCPC, because of its role as 
an appeal court for devolution issues, which includes the power to strike down 
legislation of the Scottish Parliament or actings of the Scottish Executive. The 
JCPC hears cases from other Commonwealth countries, but has no appellate role 
for England and Wales, 155 although its decisions are binding on the House of 
Lords. 156 In fact, when dealing with devolution issues, the JCPC draws on largely 
the same personnel as the House of Lords. 157 There is also a commonality in the 
substance of the natural justice guarantees which are being adjudicated upon by 
the JCPC and the House of Lords, but as has been pointed out, the enforcement 
mechanisms are very different. 158 In all the circumstances, however, it is 
submitted that the combination of the House of Lords and the JCPC do not 
equiparate to the unifying function and role of the Supreme Court of Canada. The 
existence of such a court therefore, whilst such a strong factor in Canada, is not of 
the same force as far as Scotland and England are concerned. 
Could this change? The current UK Government is proposing the establishment 
of a Supreme Court in the UK, which would have jurisdiction over Scottish civil 
appeals, devolution issues, and all civil and criminal appeals from England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. 159 It has been stressed that such a court would not be 
modelled on the United States Supreme Court, or a continental constitutional 
court. 160 It is noted in the consultation paper that the distinctiveness of the Scots 
legal system is guaranteed, 16 1 and there has been some suggestion that it would sit 
154 Weir, "Divergent legal systems in a single member state", 569. 
155 Unless a devolution issue arises in a court in England and Wales. 
156 Scotland Act 1998, s103(1). 
I" However, judges from the Inner House can also sit on the JCPC, and thus a majority of Scots 
judges may sit (Scotland Act 1998, s103(2), and see Rv HMA 2003 SC (PC) 21). 
158 Scotland Act 1998; Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42; and see pp52-53 above. 159 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdom, Consultation Paper, July 2003. 
160 Ibid., paras 22-23. 
161 Ibid., para 60. 
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as a Scots court in determining Scots appeals, as at present. 162 Despite such 
apparently reassuring words, however, there are very worrying aspects to this 
reform. The Supreme Court would be "a single apex to the UK's judicial system", 
and prevent conflict between the House of Lords and the JCPC. 163 It is suggested 
that the President of such a court might eventually become a spokesperson for all 
judges in the UK. 164 Concerns have been raised about the naming of judges, 
funding, and location, of the proposed court, with the fear in all cases being 
integration into the English judicial system, contrary to the Acts of Union. 165 it 
will be necessary, of course, to scrutinise the final proposals if they come to 
fruition. It would appear that currently (2004) the pace at which this proposed 
development is to proceed has slowed. At present, it is submitted that the doubts 
and concerns expressed by Scottish judges and legal practitioners are well- 
founded. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is enough to remark that any 
development of a unifying Supreme Court in the UK such as that which exists in 
Canada, may also have the unexpected result of an altered approach to conflict 
issues within the UK, on the Canadian model. 
Need for certainty 
The Supreme Court of Canada has also opined that the Canadian constitutional 
arrangements require there to be a high degree of certainty within Canada, 
meaning for example that a lex loci delicti rule should be applied in questions of 
choice of law in tort arising as between its provinces. 166 Similarly, Australian 
judges have also argued that certainty is a more desirable result in conflict of laws 
issues arising within a country, than it is if such issues involve foreign 
countries. 167 Certainty has sometimes been used as a justification for introducing 
162 C. MacLeod & L. Adams, "Why the time has come for change", The Herald, 12 February 
2004; Inaugural Falconer Lecture, "Constitutional reform: strengthening rights and 
democracy", given by Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Edinburgh, 20 February 2004. 
163 Constitutional Reform, Consultation Paper, para 20. 
164 Ibid., para 62. 
165 Faculty of Advocates, Response to the Consultation Paper by the Secretary of State for 
Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor: Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the 
United Kingdo, n, November 2003; F. Gibb, "New court must adhere to 1707 union, says law 
lord" The Times, 19 June 2003; J. Rozenberg, "Law lords give thumbs down to Supreme 
Court", The Telegraph, 5 November 2003; R. C. Connal, "For the United Kingdom? " (2004) 
49 JLSS no 3,9. 
166 Tolofson v Jensen (1994) 120 DLR (4th) 289 per La Forest J at 315 & 307-308. 167 Breavington v Godlentan (1988) 169 CLR 41 per Dawson J at 147-148; McKain v R. TV. Miller 
and Company (South Australia) Pty Limited (1992) 174 CLR I per Brennan, Dawson, Toohey 
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different international private law rules within the UK, instead of those which 
would otherwise apply. 168 Of course, if taken to extremes, this principle changes 
from a laudable aim of providing litigants with certainty, to the injustice of 
imposing a completely inflexible rule on parties to the court process. 169 The more 
fundamental criticism, however, is that it is hard to understand why litigants in 
cases with a foreign element should not be just as desirous, and deserving, of 
certainty in their actions. Even if it were accepted that certainty was a more 
important goal in respect of jurisdictions with a high degree of contact, this 
rationale is not confined to jurisdictions within a political state. Castel questions, 
it is submitted correctly, whether it is proper for the Supreme Court of Canada to 
take this type of differential approach. 170 
Movement of persons 
Another factor which has been cited in the Canadian context, but which does not 
seem to have such great force, is the high degree of movement of persons within 
Canada. 171 It can, of course, be imagined that within a country there will be much 
movement of its citizens. However, it is submitted that this simply creates a need 
for rules of international private laws, or results in the frequent use of such rules. 
It does not require that these rules are constitutionally prescribed. Furthermore, 
as has already been argued, the level of contact between jurisdictions is a factual 
matter, which does not necessarily follow legal boundaries: in Canadian 
provinces which border with the United States, there may be as high a degree of 
contact with citizens of the US, as with those of other Canadian provinces. 
172 
There could, therefore, be equal justification for a modification of the conflict 
rules in a particular international, as in an interprovincial, situation. 
and McHugh JJ at 38; John Pfeffer Pty Limited v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36 per Kirby J at 
para 123. 
168 For example the system of obligatory and discretionary stays in England in divorce actions 
(the equivalent of Scottish mandatory and discretionary sists): Law Com. No 48, Report on 
Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes (1972), para 82. 
169 See, for example, the doubts expressed in J. Walker, "Choice of law in tort: the Supreme 
Court of Canada enters the fray" [1995] 111 LQR 397; Blom, "The quiet Canadian 
revolution", 113. 
170 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p22. 
171 Tolofson v Jensen, (1994) 120 DLR (4t') 289 per La Forest J at 315; Morguard Investments 
Ltd v De Savoye [ 1990] 3 SCR 1077 per La Forest J at 1099. 
172 One such incidence resulted in Babcock VJackson [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep 286. 
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The political factor: conflict rules a threat to union? 
Perhaps, however, the most important factor in the drive to constitutionalise 
conflicts is one which is not always explicitly stated: the political factor. This 
underlies sentiments such as that of La Forest J, already quoted, that "the English 
rules seem to me to fly in the face of the obvious intention of the Constitution to 
create a single country", 173 or that: 
"It is inconceivable that in devising a scheme of union comprising a common 
market stretching from sea to sea, the Fathers of Confederation would have 
contemplated a situation where citizens would be effectively deprived of 
access to the ordinary courts in their jurisdiction in respect of transactions 
flowing from the existence of that common market". 174 
Similarly, in the Australian cases earlier cited, reference is made to the aim of the 
Australian Constitution being to create one nation from the various colonies. 175 it 
was argued by Deane J that this is threatened by the application of rules of 
international private law. 176 In the field of delict, these were rules which were 
"adopted to resolve competition between the tort laws of different independent 
nations and which are the antithesis of a single system of law". 
177 Kirby J, in 
discussing the treatment of states as foreign countries in international private law, 
opines that "the whole purpose, character and organisation of a federation (at least 
one such as Australia) is inconsistent with such an approach". 178 
This political factor can be more precisely defined as the elevation of political 
unity over legal diversity. It is seen to be of more significance that the country is 
a political whole, than that it is made up of different legal jurisdictions, and thus 
the latter fact must be played down. This may also be allied with a centralising 
tendency. It is submitted that this political factor is significant in Canada. As a 
former dominion, which has moved into statehood in its own right, it is important 
173 Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 at 1099 174 Hunt v T&N plc [1993] 4 SCR 289 per La Forest J at 330. 
175 Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41 at 121-122. 
176 Ibid. at 124-125. 
"' McKain v R. W. Miller and Company (South Australia) Pty Limited (1992) 174 CLR 1 per 
Deane J at 45. 
178 John Pfeiffer Pty Limited v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36 per Kirby J at para 121. 
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to cement a common (Canadian) identity, separate from the old mother- 
country. 179 This can be seen in the "patriation of the Constitution", which is to 
say "bringing it home to Canada". 180 In the wider context, it is also evident in the 
adoption of the (now distinctive) maple leaf flag, and perhaps, in marketing terms, 
the creation of a Canadian 'brand'. Furthermore, against this background it is 
important not only to underline the political unity of Canada by minimising the 
differences between the provinces, but also to be able to provide apparently 
distinctively Canadian solutions which spring from the machinery of the 
Canadian state itself, i. e., the Constitution. 181 This is not to ignore the separatist 
movement in Quebec. However, even here, referenda have failed so far to 
produce a majority for separation. 182 In any event, insofar as Quebec is an 
exception, 183 it is submitted that Brady's above-mentioned characterisation of the 
province as an island within the Canadian nation is apposite. 184 Moreover, it is 
significant that the Supreme Court of Canada posited the existence of a 
constitutional solution for this problem, viz., that the Canadian constitution would 
not allow Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada. '85 
In the past, sentiments have been expressed within the UK which might appear to 
value political unity over the legal diversity of its jurisdictions. This is arguably 
at least a factor in expressed desires for uniformity, 186 and certainly in the feeling 
that "conflicts between different law districts of the British Isles are ... when they 
occur, more embarrassing judicially than conflicts between English and foreign 
proceedings". 187 It is submitted, however, that whatever validity this political 
factor might once have had in the UK, it is of much less significance in the 
context of the present constitutional set-up. The advent of devolution was for 
Scotland the culmination of a process of the shifting of power away from the 
centre. Scotland's existence as a separate legal jurisdiction is buttressed by the 
179 See C. B. Picker, " 'A Light unto the Nations' - the new British federalism, the Scottish 
Parliament, and constitutional lessons for multiethnic states" (2002) 77 Tulane Law Rev, no 1, 
1 at 79. 
180 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, para 3.5. 
181 It is submitted that this also broadly describes the Australian situation. 182 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, pars 5.7(a). 
183 See Greschner, "The Supreme Court, federalism and metaphors of moderation", p72. 
184 See p58 above. 
185 Reference re Secession of Quebec [ 1998] 2 SCR 217. 
186 For example, Law Com. No 48, Report on Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes (1972), para 81. 1B7 Ibid., para 82. 
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creation of a Scottish legislative body. There may, as a result, be a strengthening 
of a separate Scottish identity in the wider context, and indeed the concept of a 
'Scottish constitution' may simply be part of this. In very broad terms, the current 
constitutional developments in Scotland are almost the reverse of the Canadian 
situation. It is therefore submitted that the political factor, so significant in 
Canada, is of much less importance in the UK. 
Conclusion 
Of the various reasons which may lie behind the constitutionalising of conflicts in 
Canada, the most significant seem to be the political dimension, the relative 
commonality of law across the provinces, and the existence of an avowedly 
unifying Supreme Court. It is submitted that, for the reasons outlined above in 
respect of each of these points, these factors have much less force as between 
Scotland and England. Thus, despite the growing acceptance of there being to 
some extent a Scottish constitution, it is not thought that the conditions are ripe 
for such a constitution to usurp the functions of international private law in 
Scotland. 
The undesirability of the constitutionalising of conflicts in Scotland 
If the conditions are indeed not ripe for the constitutionalising of conflicts in 
Scotland, this is not, it is submitted, a cause for concern: quite the reverse. It is 
contended that the constitutionalising approach is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the purpose, and effect, of international private law rules. 
International private law rules do not create conflicts of law within a country. It 
is an inevitable consequence of the existence of different legal jurisdictions within 
a country that issues of jurisdiction, choice of law and recognition of judgments, 
will arise. Conflict rules simply acknowledge that these conflicts do exist, and 
provide tools whereby they may be resolved. The term 'conflict of laws' is not a 
rallying call to foment conflict: the aim is rather to make an enlightened choice 
between the claims of contending laws. Whilst the traditional nomenclature of 
the topic in Scotland speaks of an international dimension, the tools provided by 
conflict rules are in no way inherently unsuitable for intra-UK jurisdiction, 
recognition, or choice of law issues. On the other hand, constitutional rules are 
rarely drafted to incorporate specific rules on clashes of jurisdiction or laws, and 
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attempting to bring such issues under rules designed for different purposes would 
seem generally undesirable. Ultimately, if it is thought that a diversity of legal 
jurisdictions within one political nation is a hindrance, then the solution is total 
harmonisation, not the abolition of international private law rules in intra-UK 
situations. 
Such criticisms have also been advanced by those in Canada, and Australia, who 
are unconvinced by the drive to constitutionalise conflicts. Thus Castel sees no 
justification for having different sets of rules for interprovincial and international 
cases. The rules which have been developed in cases such as Tolofson vJensen 
188 
"can stand on their own merits" and "do not require the support of the 
Constitution"! 89 Blom fears that in its reliance on the Constitution, "the Supreme 
Court ... may have gone 
further than it needed to, and further than is 
desirable". 190 In Australia, in discussing the suggestion that the doctrine of 'full, 
faith and credit' had a role in choice of law questions, Dawson J noted that: 
"the requirement that full faith and credit be given to the laws of a State, 
statutory or otherwise, throughout the Commonwealth, affords no assistance 
where there is a choice to be made between conflicting laws ... The conflict 
rules ... unlike the full faith and credit requirement, provide a 
basis upon 
which the selection can be made". 191 
Furthermore, in concurring with Brennan, Toohey and McHugh, JJ, in McKain v 
R. W. Miller and Company (South Australia) Pty Limited, he recognised that 
differing legal results within Australia "may or may not be thought to be 
desirable, but it is the hallmark of a federation as distinct from a union", 
192 and 
that it was the common law and not the Constitution which determined which law 
was to be applied. 
188 (1994) 120 DLR (4`s) 289. 
1ß9 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p22. 
190 Blom "The quiet Canadian revolution" 115. 
19, Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41 at 150. 
192 (1992) 174 CLR 1 at 36-37. 
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It has been contended that the factors which were said to justify the 
constitutionalising of conflicts in Canada do not have the same force in the 
Scottish context. More importantly, it is submitted, this whole approach is 
fundamentally misconceived. It is not a path which Scotland should seek to 
follow. 
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4 INTERNALISING CONFLICTS 
Defining the internalising of conflicts 
It was submitted in the previous chapter that there has not been, in the UK, a 
constitutionalising of conflicts on any significant scale, and also that such a 
development would not be beneficial. However, there has been much evidence of 
another phenomenon, which can be described as 'internalising' conflicts. 
The most obvious examples of internalising conflicts are the use of legislation by 
the Westminster Parliament in one of two ways. Firstly, statute can be used to 
remove a conflict altogether by changing one, or both, of the rules which cause a 
cross-border conflict between Scotland and England. Secondly, statutes may be 
passed which regulate an area of law in the UK, and contain rules providing for 
certain cross-border consequences, rather than leaving the matter to be dealt with 
by way of (usually common law) international private law rules. Such an 
approach is well illustrated by the remarks of the erstwhile Commissary Court 
judge, James Fergusson: 
"In the relative situation also of Scotland to the sister kingdoms, it is obvious, 
that the delicacy, difficulty, and importance, of those legal questions which 
have been under review, are infinitely augmented by the complete political 
incorporation of all their subjects as one people, while the municipal law of 
their country, as well as that of England, is, by its national compact of union, 
maintained in perfect sovereignty and independence. But the same 
arrangement has bestowed a Parliament common to the whole, which can, by 
statute, remove collision, and reconcile their different interests, whenever the 
slow and still feeble operation of international law, the sole mediator between 
the conflicting jurisdictions of unconnected States, is found to be insufficient 
for that purpose". 
J. Fergusson, Reports of some Recent Decisions by the Consistorial Court of Scotland in 
actions of divorce concluding for dissolution of marriages celebrated under the English law 
(Archibald Constable & Co., 1817), pp20-21. 
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"I am going to Gretna Green, and if you cannot guess with who, ... ,2 
The so-called "runaway marriages"3 provide a relatively early example of an 
internalising approach to a cross-border conflict of laws between Scotland and 
England. One of the effects of the Acts of Union was to leave the laws of 
marriage in England and Scotland un-harmonised. In 1753, the Act for the better 
preventing of clandestine Marriages, 4 more commonly known as Lord 
Hardwicke's Act, was passed, and prevented marriages in England taking place 
other than in a church, or without pronouncement of banns or a licence of 
marriage. 5 Furthermore, parental consent was required in England in a marriage 
by licence if one of the parties was under twenty-one. 6 Marriages celebrated in 
contravention of the Act were void. 7 In comparison, irregular marriages remained 
possible in Scotland, one type of marriage requiring only simple consent, without 
the necessity of a religious celebrant being present. There was no need in Scots 
law for parental consent. The differences in the law between the two countries, 
together with the increasing ease of travel within Britain, made elopement to 
Scotland seem an attractive proposition to certain young English couples, and 
Gretna Green achieved notoriety. 8 
For international private lawyers, such marriages raise difficult questions: were 
such unions valid notwithstanding the lack of a true Scots domicile, the use of a 
form of ceremony impermissible in the country of true domicile, and a possible 
lack of capacity by that law? The Scots courts of the time seem to have been 
content that such marriages were valid. Thus in actions of divorce, the granting 
2 J. Austen, Pride and Prejudice, edition used: T. Tanner (ed. ), (Penguin, 1972), p307. 
3 The term is used, for example, in the contributed article "Runaway marriages" 1954 SLT 
(News) 217; A. E. Anton and Ph. Francescakis, "Modern Scots 'runaway marriages' " 1958 JR 
253; and The Marriage Law of Scotland (Cmnd 4011) (1969) ("The Kilbrandon Report"), p25. 
° Clandestine Marriages Act 1753 (26 Geo II), c. 33. 
5 Ibid., ssl, 4&8 (subject to the special licence which could be granted by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury to hold the marriage in any place: s6). 
6 Ibid., sl1. 
7 Ibid., ss8 & 11. 
Lamberton on the east coast was also the scene of runaway marriages (L. Wood, The 
Berwickshire Coast (Stenlake Publishing, 1998), p84), and it seems that Portpatrick was the 
equivalent for couples coming from Ireland (C. Norton, "A Letter to the Queen on Lord 
Chancellor Cranworth's Marriage and Divorce Bill" (1855) reproduced in M. M. Roberts and T. 
Mizuta (eds), The (fives: The Rights of Married Women (Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1994), 
p99, and see Butler v Forbes (1816) 19 Fac Coll 139). 
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of such a remedy presumes that a valid marriage was in existence. 9 Furthermore, 
in Gordon v Pye, 10 Lord Meadowbank explicitly suggested that a marriage 
between English domiciliaries, lacking capacity under English law, would be 
valid if celebrated in Scotland. " The English courts appear to have taken a 
similar view. In the 1769 case of Compton v Bearcroft, 12 the Court of Delegates 
refused to find a Gretna Green runaway marriage void as an attempt to 
circumvent Lord Hardwicke's Act. 13 By 1802, however, the case was interpreted 
by the Consistory Court in London as clear authority for the proposition that the 
validity of the marriage was determined by the lex loci celebration is. 14 Thus 
since the marriage was valid under Scots law, this sufficed, despite the prohibition 
on the marriage in England. '5 
A comparison can be drawn with the judgment in the later case of Brook v 
Brook, 16 which concerned the validity of a marriage in Denmark between an 
English domiciliary and his English-domiciled sister-in-law. The English court 
now drew a distinction between form and capacity, the latter being governed by 
the lex domicilii. Lord Hardwicke's Act was characterised as pertaining to matters 
of form, and thus the Gretna Green runaway marriages distinguished. '? It is 
submitted, however, that the significance of Lord Hardwicke's Act is downplayed, 
and there is no satisfactory explanation as to why the requisite parental consent 
can be said to be a matter of form. '8 For whatever reason, it might seem that the 
judges simply found such a marriage more objectionable than had their 
9 In Wyche v Blount (1801) Ferg Cons 263 a divorce was granted of a marriage between two 
English people which had taken place at Gretna, and Wilcox v Parry (1811) Ferg Cons 267 
was an undefended action of divorce of an irregular marriage at Annan between two English 
domiciliaries. 
10 (1815) Ferg Cons 276. 
11 Ibid. at 361-362. 
12 The case is incompletely reported, the report consisting of the libel and a note, incorporated 
within the report of the later case of Middleton v Janverin (1802) 2 Hagg Con 437 (at 444). 
13 Similarly in Harford v Morris (1776) 2 Hagg Con 423, a marriage on the continent was argued 
to be an attempt to circumvent English law, but was found not to be void. The judge did not, 
however, appear to apply the lex loci celebrationis. 
14 Middleton v Janverin (1802) 2 Hagg Con 437. 
15 Conversely a marriage illegal in France had been held to be null by the English courts in 
Scrimshire v Scrimshire (1752) 2 Hagg Con 395 (although it was also illegal in England). 16 (1861) 9 HL Cas 193. 
17 Ibid. per Lord Campbell LC at 214-215; per Lord Cranworth at 228-229. 18 Dicey and Morris describe the characterisation as "logically doubtful" (Collins, Dicey and 
Morris on the Conflict of Laws, para 17-015). 
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predecessors adjudicating on Gretna Green runaway marriages. 19 However, there 
were many in the mid-nineteenth century that disapproved of the practice of 
elopement to Gretna Green, and legislation was in fact drawn up to put an end to 
the practice 2° Thus, the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1856 was passed, which 
demanded that for a marriage in Scotland to be valid, at least one of the parties 
must have resided there for a minimum of twenty-one days. 21 Given that Brook v 
Brook was decided only a few years later in 1861, this may point to another 
reason for the willingness of the judges to characterise Lord Hardwicke's Act, and 
the Gretna Green runaway marriages in defiance of it, as relating to matters of 
form: the phenomenon of the Gretna Green runaway marriages having been 
diminished by the 1856 Act, there was now no need for judicial action on this 
score. The important point for this thesis, however, is the ability of the 
Westminster Parliament to use legislation to solve the perceived cross-border 
problem, rather than leaving the issue to be resolved by rules of international 
private law. 
Interestingly, the pattern of the Gretna Green runaway marriages was mirrored in 
the twentieth century. Once again, there was a spate of couples coming to 
Scotland to marry. 22 The Court of Session made it clear that it "never has 
regarded itself as bound or its decision foreclosed" by an order from the English 
Chancery Court, 23 for example forbidding marriage by an English domiciliary. 
However, the existence of such an order would be particularly persuasive in the 
19 Comments of Lord Campbell LC make clear the moral disapprobation: Brook v Brook (1861) 
9 HL Cas 193 per Lord Campbell LC at 212. Perhaps by way of comparison, both the English 
Lord Chancellors Eldon and Brougham married in Scotland after an elopement (T. P. R., 
"Gretna Green: a romantic retrospect" 1925 SLT (News) 214 at 215). Fawcett argues that 
there were not such powerful policy objections to the Gretna Green runaway marriages, as to 
marriages such as that in Brook v Brook, supra (J. J. Fawcett, "Evasion of law and mandatory 
rules in private international law" (1990) 49 CLI 44 at 45-46,50 & 54-55). 
20 See T. P. R., "Gretna Green"; and M. C. Meston's annotations to the Marriage (Scotland) Act 
1977; and note also the penalty of transportation for celebrants who solemnised English 
marriages in contravention of Lord Hardwicke's Act (Lord Hardwicke's Act, s8). 
21 1856, (19 & 20 Viet), c. 96, sl. Miller v Deakin 1912 SLT 253 is an example of a marriage 
contravening this requirement being declared null by the Court of Session. Ironically the Act 
was brought into force under the stewardship of Lord Brougham (see note 19 above). 
22 For example, in 1967 1,036 marriages took place in Scotland in which neither of the spouses 
were Scottish residents. One or more of the spouses were under 21 in around three-quarters of 
these marriages, and of these cases more brides came from England than from any other single 
country (The Kilbrandon Report, Appendix 6, p57). 
23 Hoy v Hoy 1968 SLT 413 per Lord President Clyde at 416; and see also Stuart v Moore 
(1861) 23 D 902 per Lord Campbell LC at 904. 
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decision to grant an interim interdict preventing marriage in Scotland, if one party 
was a Chancery ward who had been in England at the time of the making of the 
Chancery order. 24 It must be remembered, however, that the consideration of 
such cases in the context of the granting of an interim interdict necessitates the 
application of a different test by the court. These cases are not therefore authority 
for the proposition that such marriages are invalid, rather that it was not possible 
for the court at that stage to say that they were undoubtedly unobjectionable: 
therefore the balance of convenience favoured preventing the marriage taking 
place. Furthermore, in Bliersbach v MacEwe, i25 it had been held by the Court that 
lack of parental consent to marry was merely a prohibitive impediment, the effect 
of which was determined by the lex loci celebration is. By contrast, an irritant 
impediment by the law of the party's domicile would have resulted in that party 
lacking capacity to marry in Scotland. 
As was the case in the nineteenth century, however, sections of the public found 
the incidence of runaway marriages objectionable. Questions were asked in the 
House of Commons as to whether the government would take action, since there 
was a "general anxiety that Scotland is becoming a sort of inverted Reno to which 
young people from other parts of the world can come to evade their own laws". 
26 
The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland also pushed for changes in the 
law to prevent such marriages. 27 Accordingly, one of the aims of the Kilbrandon 
Committee was to reduce the number of couples coming to Scotland to marry 
without parental consent28 and the result was the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977.29 
24 Hoy v Hoy, supra; Pease v Pease 1967 SC 112. 
25 1959 SC 43. 
26 Mr G. M. Thomson, HC Debs vol 570, col 1008. 
27 Anton & Francescakis, "Modern Scots'runaway marriages"', 255-256. 
28 The Kilbrandon Report, pp 29-30 & 32. 
29 1977, c. 15. As well as dealing with the domestic law of marriage the Act also has provisions 
which touch upon international private law matters. It provides that no Scots domiciliary may 
marry, and no foreign domiciliary may marry in Scotland, if he or she is below a certain age or 
if the parties are within certain prohibited degrees of relationship (ibid., ssl & 2). A 
requirement is introduced for a certificate confirming capacity for those domiciled in a 
politically foreign country (ibid., s3(5)). It is also confirmed that a legal impediment to 
marriage in Scotland exists if such a marriage would be void ab initio by the law of a party to 
the marriage (that party being a foreign domiciliary) (s5(4)(f)). In fact, however, in 1969, the 
law in England was changed, so that parental consent was only needed up to the age of 18, 
rather than 21 (Family Law Reform Act 1969, c. 46, s2(1)(c)), and there were also changes to 
the requirement for parental consent in other jurisdictions, which eased the perceived problem 
(annotations by M. C. Meston to the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977). Indeed, a certificate 
confirming capacity to marry is not required if the party is domiciled in another part of the UK 
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Again, the Westminster Parliament had attempted to remove a problem from the 
sphere of international private law, to resolve it on its own terms. 
UK common market law 
Introduction and back rý ound 
One of the areas reserved to the UK Parliament at Westminster under the 
devolution settlement was the law relating to "Common markets for UK goods 
and services", 30 dubbed by MacQueen "common market lawi31 (an allusion to the 
UK, not the European, common market). This was said by the White Paper to 
encompass "the law on companies and business associations, insurance, corporate 
insolvency and intellectual property, regulation of financial institutions and 
financial services, competition policy ... consumer protection". 
32 It is submitted 
that the reservation of this area to the UK Parliament is significant, since this is 
also the area where the internalisation of conflicts has been most apparent. 
Whilst debates rage about the real importance of arguments based on trade in 
achieving the passing of the Acts of Union, 33 Lord Hope of Craighead records 
how the Union has been seen as a significant stage "in the long story of Scotland's 
absorption into a wider Britain, which created an Anglo-Scottish common market 
that was the biggest customs-free zone in Europe and gave Scotland access to one 
of the largest empires in the world". 34 Levack stresses how unusual such an 
arrangement was in Europe at that time. 35 In seventeenth century Great Britain, 
those in power believed that "trade and patriotism were inseparably linked". 
36 
Colley has explored the extent to which participation in the Empire by Scots was 
(Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s3(5)(d), and see E. M. Clive, "The Marriage (Scotland) Act 
1977" 1977 SLT (News) 213 & 225 at 229). 
30 "Scotland's Parliament", para 3.3. Note too in the Canadian case of Hunt v T&N plc, the 
reference to "the common market created by the union" (Hunt v T&N plc [1993] 4 SCR 289 
per La Forest J at 322 (and see also ibid. per La Forest J at 330). 
31 H. L. MacQueen, "The Scotland Bill and private law" 1998 Scotland Forum (Issue 2) 3. 
32 "Scotland's Parliament", para 3.3. 
33 See Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, Chap 6; Levack, The Formation of the British 
State: England, Scotland and the Union 1603-1707, Chap 5. 
34 Lord Gray's Motion 2000 SC (HL) 46 per Lord Hope of Craighead at 55-56; and see Levack, 
The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the Union 1603-1707, p138. 
35 Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the Union 1603-1707, 
pp167-168. 
36 L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837,2 °d Pimlico edn. (Pimlico, 2003), p120. 
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important in the development of a British identity. 37 The Empire, it should be 
noted, was always clearly described as British rather than English. 
38 Indeed, 
recent studies have convincingly argued that Scots were often at the forefront of 
the many manifestations of the Empire, and some have spoken of a Scottish 
Empire. 9 Colley concludes that "The Scots, in particular, ... became British after 
1707 in part because it paid such enormous commercial and imperial 
dividends". 40 
However, this close relationship for Scots between Britain, and commerce or 
trade, has had an effect on Scots law. Miller goes so far as to state that 
"in 
mercantile law the laws of the three countries have been so much assimilated that 
conflicts do not arise". 41 In the seventeenth century the English law of insurance 
became of great authority in Scotland, and English barristers would sometimes 
be 
consulted on this matter. 42 The succession of Companies Acts have governed, 
and govern, companies both in Scotland, and in England and 
Wales. 
Furthermore, it has been said that "it is clearly desirable that the construction of 
statutes which affect the United Kingdom should be the same both north and 
south of the border, particularly statutes such as the Companies Act". 
3 In such a 
scheme little room is left for the application of rules of international private 
law. 44 
It is interesting that both the growth of the company as a commercial 
institution, 
and legal regulation of such bodies, are features of the nineteenth century, 
45 which 
was also a time of industrial pre-eminence, and of Empire. The nineteenth 
century also saw the passing of the Partnership Act 1890,46 and the Sale of 
Goods 
Act 189347 (the latter area now governed by the Sale of Goods Act 1979,48 as 
3, Ibid., p130; see also D. W. Urwin, "Territorial Structures and Political Developments 
in the 
United Kingdom" in S. Rokkan & D. N. Urwin (cds), The Politics of Territorial Identity: 
Studies In European Regionalism (Sage Publications, 1982), p19 at 37. 
33 Colley, Britau, p130; "Death and the Reinvention of Scotland", lecture given 
by T. Devine, 
Glasgow, 9 April 2003. 
39 M. Fry, Tue Scottish Empire (Tuckwcll Press & Birlinn, 2001); T. Devine, Scotland's Empire 
1600-1815 (Penguin, 2003); Welsh, The Four Nations, p246. 
40 Colley, Britons, p374 cf Devine, Scotland's Empire, pp62-63. 
Aliller, The Law of Nature and Nations in Scotland, pp125-126. 
Cairns, "Historical introduction", ppl6l-162. 
43 Inland Revenue v Highland Engineering Ltd 1975 SLT 203 per Lord Grieve at 205. " Indeed international private law rules were not considered in the apparently UK cross-border 
case of Afacc Builders (Glasgow) Ltd v Lunn [ 1987] BCLC 55. 4sS. Griffin, Company Law: Fundamental Principles, 3`J cdn. (Longman, 2000), pp3-9. 
76 1890 (53 & 54 Viet), c. 39. 
47 1893 (56 & 57 Viet), c. 71. 
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amended). As a result, partnership law and the law of sale are, in effect, governed 
by statutory codes, which apply to the UK as a whole, and largely harmonise the 
substantive law of its jurisdictions. 49 The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 
distinguishes between inland (or UK) bills, and foreign bills, 50 and also between 
inland and foreign promissory notes, 51 although the distinction is of little 
consequence in practical terms. The major taxes, such as income tax, also apply 
in both Scotland and England. In the field of insolvency law, the Cork 
Committee argued that the insolvency systems within the UK were not 
sufficiently harmonised. S2 In the context of discussing the (then) European 
Economic Community, the Committee noted "we are convinced that the ultimate 
hannonisation of insolvency laws in a trading community is essential". 
53 In 
addition to Victorian, and British, ideals of free trade and expansive commerce, 
there is now a newer principle at work, which can be described as paternalistic, or 
consumerist. In the modern age of large multinational corporations, business can 
be characterised not as agreements between parties of equal bargaining power, but 
in terms of big business and consumers. In such a climate, governments 
formulate policies to protect the weaker party, for example, to prevent the 
imposition of unfair contracts, 54 or mis-selling of financial products, or to protect 
the public from unscrupulous traders. 55 It is difficult for a government with 
power over the UK as a whole to justify not extending consumer protection 
measures to all parts of the country, notwithstanding the different legal systems 
which obtain in its component parts. Indeed it has been argued that even on a 
global level, private international law "has proved inadequate for consumer 
56 laws". 
't 1979, c. 54. 
49 l lowevcr, harmonisation of the law of sale by nineteenth century legislation was at the expense 
of the old Scots rules (R. Brown, Treatise on the Sale of Goods, 2d cdn. (W. Green, 1911), 
so 
pp2-4). 
1882 (45 & 46 Viet), c. 61, s4. s2 Ibid., s83(4). 
s= Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558) (1982) ('The Cork Report"), paras 1903-1904. s' Ibid., para 1921. s' For example, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, in respect of exemption clauses. ss This could influence, for example, the rules on insolvency, and breach of directors' duties. 56 N. Cox, "The extraterritorial enforcement of consumer legislation and the challenge of the 
intcrnet" (20(4) 8 EdinLR 60 at 61. 
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In addition to actual harmonisation of substantive laws, however, it is submitted 
that there has also been much internalisation of conflicts in UK common market 
law, and some examples of this in the context of insolvency law will be examined 
in turn. 57 
Intenialising conflicts in IJK insolvency legislation 
Individual insolvency 
To take as a starting point the insolvency of an individual, an earlier consolidating 
statute, the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 provided that the notour bankruptcy 
of a person would be established in Scots law, inter alia, by the granting of a 
receiving order in England or Ireland. 58 In terms of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) 
Act 1985, apparent insolvency (which will trigger sequestration) will be 
constituted by, inter alia, the sequestration of the person's estate in England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland, or being adjudged bankrupt in one of these 
jurisdictions, 9 or the making of a receiving order against the person in England 
and Wales. G° The methods of taking the creditor's oath depend on whether or not 
he is within the UK. 6' A warrant may be obtained to arrest the debtor wherever 
he may be staying in the UK. 62 Furthermore, for the purposes of offences 
committed by debtors, a debtor includes a person who has been adjudged 
bankrupt in England and Wales. 63 Lastly, the discharge of the debtor operates so 
as to free him of all debts and obligations in the UK at the time that he was 
sequestrated: 64 an example, observes Fletcher, of "a special approach" arising 
from "the constitutional affinities between the three parts of the United 
Kingdom". 65 
37 Left aside, for the moment, in examining the terms of the insolvency legislation drawn up by 
the Westminster Parliament, is the effect of the new European Regulation on insolvency 
matters (Council Regulation 1346/2000) which will be dealt with in Chap. 6. 
1913(3&4GcoV), c. 20, s5. s' 1985, c. 66, s7(1)(a). 60 Ibid., s7(1)(c)(vi). 61 Ibid., sl l(2). 
62 Ibid., s46(l). 
63 Ibid., s67(10)(ii). This was not the case in some prior bankruptcy legislation (Kaye v HMA 
1957 JC 55). 
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s55(1). as I. F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law: National and International Approaches 
(Oxford University Press, 1999), p109; and see also P. StJ. Smart, Cross-Border Insolvency, 
2"d cdn. (Buttcrworths, 1998), pp142-143. 
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Corporate insolvency 
At base, it has been argued, there is a common approach towards the conflict rules 
of corporate insolvency, different from that on the continent. 66 Thus, for the 
Scottish and English courts, the domicile of the company equates with the place 
of registration, and dictates the law by which the company should be wound up. 
lt is of no moment that the company may latterly have been run from, or that 
those in charge of the company operate out of, a different jurisdiction. By 
contrast, the continental approach is more akin to a concept of habitual residence. 
The Insolvency Act 1986 provides that if an unregistered company has its 
principal place of business in Scotland, and England and Wales, the company is 
deemed to be registered in both jurisdictions for the purpose of its winding up. 
67 
There are also provisions concerning property situated in England and Wales, 
belonging to a company registered in Scotland. 
68 
In terms of section 72(l) of the Insolvency Act 1986: 
"A receiver appointed under the law of either part of Great Britain in respect of 
the whole or any part of any property or undertaking of a company and 
in 
consequence of the company having created a charge which, as created, was a 
floating charge may exercise his powers in the other part of Great Britain so 
far 
as their exercise is not inconsistent with the law applicable there". 
The wording of the section raises a number of questions for the conflicts 
lawyer. 
Does the reference to applicable law mean simply domestic law, or does 
it include 
the international private law rules? What is the term "not inconsistent with" 
intended to signify? The case of Gordon Anderson (Plant) Ltd v Cainpsie 
Construction Ltd & Anglo Scottish Plant Ltd69 concerned a forerunner of section 
72: section 15(4) of the Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) 
66 J. 13. St Clair & J. E. Drummond Young, The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland, 2"d edn. 
61 
(ßutcrworths, 1992), pp383-364. 
s221(3)(b). 
as Ibid., s128(2). 
69 1977 S LT 7. 
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Act 197270 However, section 15(4) restricted the powers of the receiver to "such 
part of that property as is attached". The case was therefore largely concerned 
with the argument (ultimately unsuccessful) that the appointment of a receiver to 
an English company did not cause the floating charge to attach to Scottish 
property. On this view, since the charge had not attached, the section could be of 
no assistance to the English receiver. At first instance, the sheriff did suggest that 
"[i]t may well be that some receivers to companies incorporated in England have 
powers in relation to property there which would be wholly inappropriate for 
them to have in relation to property in Scotland", 71 but he does not give examples 
of what such powers might be. Some light was eventually thrown on the matter 
by Norfolk House plc (in receivership) v Repsol Petroleum Ltd. 72 Giving an oral 
judgment from the Bench, Lord Penrose 
"said that the intent and effect of s. 72 of the 1986 Act was the same as the 
earlier statutory provision which had been discussed in the Gordon Anderson 
(Plant) Ltd. case, which was to see that cross border procedural problems in 
receivership were limited as much as possible. Section 72 bridged the 
transaction from the original creation of the floating charge to the appointment 
of the receiver in order to ensure that a receiver could exercise his powers 
under Sched. 1 to the 1986 Act in relation to Scottish property untrammelled 
by Scottish conveyancing and property law". 73 
Thus it would seem that, although referring to the applicable law, section 72 is 
concerned only with domestic law, and that the section simply sets out to 
establish a further special UK rule: in this instance to ease the cross-border use of 
powers by receivers. 
Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
A further provision of the Insolvency Act 1986, however, makes an explicit, if 
hard to fathom, reference to international private law. Section 426(1) provides for 
70 1972, c. 67. 71 1977SLT7at9. 
72 1992 SLT 235. 
71 Ibid. at 236-237 
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the automatic enforcement in the UK of orders regarding insolvency. 74 Smart 
argues convincingly that such enforcement must be through a court in the part of 
the UK where an order is sought to be put into effect. 75 Section 426(4) dictates 
that UK courts "shall assist the courts having the corresponding jurisdiction in any 
other part of the United Kingdom or any relevant country or territory". 76 In doing 
so, section 426(5) allows the court: 
"to apply ... the insolvency 
law which is applicable by either court in relation 
to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction. 
In exercising its discretion under this subsection, a court shall have regard 
in particular to the rules of private international law". 
A prior provision, section 117 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883,77 was not sufficient to 
assist an English House of Lords in Galbraith v Grimshaw. 78 In this case a 
Scottish money decree had been extended into England, and an appropriate order 
served by the holder of the decree on a firm who owed a sum of money to the 
debtor. Subsequently, the debtor was sequestrated in Scotland, and the entire 
estate of the debtor, wherever it may be, was purportedly vested in the trustee. A 
dispute then arose between the trustee and the holder of the decree: it was found 
that the latter had successfully attached the debt held by the English firm. It was 
acknowledged frankly that this would not have been the outcome if it had been an 
79 English bankruptcy, or if the attachment had been in Scotland. Furthermore, it 
was conceded that: 
"It may have been intended by the Legislature that bankruptcy in one part of 
the United Kingdom should produce the same consequences throughout the 
whole kingdom. But the Legislature has not said so. The Act does not say that 
74 There is an exception regarding heritage, and a power to make regulations to apply the general 
rule in this area has not been acted upon (s426(2), (3)); see Fletcher, Insolvency in Private 
International Law, pp64-65 & 100. 
75 Smart, Cross-Border Insolvency, pp213-215. 
76 Either in response to a request from the other court, or a claim to property submitted by a 
trustee or assignee (s426(6)). 
77 1883 (46 & 47 Viet), c. 52. This section allowed Scottish court orders in bankruptcy matters to 
be enforced in England, and vice versa. 
78 [1910] AC 508. 
79 Ibid. per Lord Macnaghten at 511. 
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a Scotch sequestration shall have effect in England as if it were an English 
bankruptcy of the same date. It only says that the Courts of the different parts 
of the United Kingdom shall severally act in aid of and be auxiliary to each 
other in all matters of bankruptcy". 80 
In Scotland, however, later courts have been prepared to offer far-reaching 
assistance under section 426, without such clarity of wording as Lord Macnaghten 
seemed to believe might be necessary. Thus a Scottish liquidator was appointed 
in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International case at the request of an 
English court, although no Scottish winding up was in existence. 
81 The Keeper of 
the Registers has been given authority to allow the cancelling out of a transaction 
concerning Scottish heritage at the behest of an English court. 
82 Indeed, Aird and 
Jamieson suggest that as far as the Scottish courts are concerned, "there are 
examples where the degree of assistance may have extended beyond the confines 
83 of established principle and authority" . 
But what of the exhortation to have regard to rules of private international law? 
The view of Aird and Jamieson is that the section "invites the court to make a 
choice of law in cross-border insolvencies". 84 However, Fletcher notes that whilst 
this may have been what was envisaged by the legislature, it is only one of two 
possible ways of reading section 426(5). 85 In practice, the English courts have 
applied Irish law on one occasion, since there was no mechanism for putting in 
place a particular scheme under English law. 86 However, in another case, an 
English court would not give effect to Australian law, because English law came 
80 Ibid. per Lord Macnaghten at 511-512. Lord Dunedin noted the ability of the Westminster 
Parliament to pass suitable legislation to remedy the situation (ibid. at 513). Both Fletcher and 
Smart are of the view that the wording of s426 would not necessitate the same result, were the 
case to be decided today (Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, p101; Smart, 
Cross-Border Insolvency, pp216-217). 
$t BCCI, unreported, 1991 & 1992, but noted in St Clair & Drummond Young, The Law of 
Corporate Insolvency in Scotland, p409. 
82 Carman, Petr, unreported, April 1995, but noted in R. E. Aird & J. N. StC. Jamieson, The Scots 
Dimension to Cross-Border Litigation (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), paras 21.42-21.43. 
83 Aird & Jamieson, The Scots Dimension to Cross-Border Litigation, para 21.42; and see also 
St Clair & Drummond Young, The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland, p410. 
84 Aird & Jamieson, The Scots Dimension to Cross-Border Litigation, para 21.44. 
85 Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, ppl94-195. 
86 Re Business City Express Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 510 (although see Smart, Cross-Border 
Insolvency, p415). 
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to a quite opposite result, based on reasons of policy. 87 However, it does not 
seem that these decisions as to which law to apply are the product of a strict 
application of rules of international private law. The fact that English law would 
have reached a different result, for example, should not necessarily prevent the 
application of English law. Dawson admits that the wording of the section is 
somewhat obscure. 88 The Cork Committee seemed to suggest that the immediate 
predecessor of section 426 was to be read in the context of private international 
law, thus transposing the revenue law exception into the statute. 89 It is submitted 
that once again section 426(4), (5) is intended to introduce a special rule between 
Scotland and England in insolvency law. 90 It attempts, for example, to iron out 
procedural differences between the two jurisdictions, by allowing the courts to 
take a very flexible approach, rather than be bound by the detailed rules of 
international private law. It is recognised, however, that some reference to the 
broad principles of the subject may assist a judge in deciding when it may be 
appropriate to turn to a foreign law to assist in the aims of the bankruptcy. 
91 This 
is supported, it is submitted, by the view of the English judge Rattee J. that: 
"this court should exercise its discretion in favour of giving the particular 
assistance requested ... unless there 
is some good reason for not doing so. As 
the concluding words of s426(5) make clear, one such reason could in some 
cases be found in the rules of private international law, " 
92 
The fate of property law principles under common market law 
The strength of the internalising drive in the field of common market law is, it is 
submitted, plain from the outcome when differing Scottish and English property 
87 Re J. N. Taylor Finance Ltd, England v Purves [1998] BPIR 347; and sec the criticisms in 
Smart, Cross-Border Insolvency, pp418-419. 
88 K. Dawson, "International co-operation under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986: recent 
developments" 1999 (4) Palmner's in company I at 3; sec also R. E. Aird, "Winding up across 
the legal borders of the United Kingdom - and beyond" 1997 SLT (News) 241 at 242. 
89 The Cork Report, para 1910 (discussing Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 &5 Geo V), c. 59, s122); and 
see Smart's suggestion that considerations of public policy, or the revenue law exception, as 
well as other factors, could influence the exercise of discretion under s426 (Smart, Cross- 
Border Insolvency, p417). 
90 The section can also be applied with respect to certain foreign countries specified in secondary 
legislation. 
91 Thus, an ability to take into account a number of matters, including international private law 
rules, in deciding which law is to be applied, is the second possible reading of s426(5) noted 
by Fletcher (Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, p195). 
92 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 9) [1994] 2 BCLC 636 at 657-658. 
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laws seem to create a friction in commercial transactions. These situations often 
involve security over property. Gretton has noted that the UK: 
"is a financial market with a high degree of unity but a lower degree of legal 
unity. If secured lending were to be substantially more difficult in Scotland 
than in England it is arguable that financial institutions would shift their 
lending from Scotland to England. Or they would lend in Scotland only at 
higher average interest levels, in order to compensate for the increased risk that 
a lower degree of security would entail ... Why should credit 
be more 
expensive to Scottish businesses than to English ones? ... One cannot treat 
the 
Scottish economy in isolation". 93 
It is submitted that such fears94 have been crucial in developing the law, when 
property law principles and commercial transactions overlap. Thus, as will be 
demonstrated by reference to the law relating to floating charges, retention of title 
clauses and security over moveable property, international private law solutions 
which protected the fabric of Scots property law have been rejected in favour of 
commercially-driven internalising solutions. 
Floating charges 
A floating charge is a form of security which, on the appointment of a receiver, 
will attach to all assets within its scope. The charges do not appear in the Register 
of Sasines or the Land Register. In the context of English property law, which 
recognises many unregistered rights, such a form of security is unremarkable. It 
was, however, an anathema to many Scots lawyers, and it was not possible to 
create such a charge in Scotland prior to 1961.95 The cross-border effect of a 
floating charge came before the First Division in the case of Carse v Coppen. 
96 A 
company registered in Scotland had purported to create a charge over its assets in 
93 G. L. Gretton, "The Reform of Moveable Security Law" 1999 SLT (News) 301 at 304. 
94 Although see J. Hamilton et al., Business Finance and Security over Moveable Property 
(Scottish Executive Central Research Unit, 2002), which suggests that these fears may not be 
justified, at least insofar as Small and Medium sized Scottish Enterprises are concerned. 
95 Collins characterises Scots law prior to 1961 as "positively hostile" to the concept of the 
floating charge (L. Collins, "Floating Charges, Receivers and Managers and the Conflict of 
Laws" in Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 
1996), p433 at 439). 
96 1951 SC 233. 
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Scotland and England. It was accepted at the outset that the floating charge was 
ineffective as regards the Scottish property. Lord Keith was of the view that the 
floating charge should be enforceable in England in respect of the assets there. 
97 
However, his opinion was a dissenting one, the majority opinion thus constituting 
one of the few occasions on which another law was preferred to the lex situs. 
98 
Lords Carmont and Russell queried whether there may be circumstances in which 
a Scottish company could create such a security over English assets, but were of 
the opinion that the charge in the instant case was ineffective 
99 Lord President 
Cooper, however, could not conceive of any such eventuality. He remarked 
obiter that "it is clear in principle and amply supported by authority that a floating 
charge is utterly repugnant to the principles of Scots law and is not recognised by 
us as creating a security at all". 100 However, commercial pressure led to the 
introduction of floating charges into Scots law under the Companies (Floating 
Charges) (Scotland) Act 1961.101 Rules of international private law could no 
longer be used as a barrier to the concept and effectiveness of a floating charge or, 
indeed, to provide any other solution to this clash between the different 
underlying principles of Scots and English property law. Arguably, however, the 
legislation which removed the problem of floating charges from the arena of 
international private law, simply transferred the friction between the charges and 
Scottish property law rules into a domestic setting. This came to somewhat of a 
head in the case of Sharp v Thon: son102 which, as Gordon comments, "illustrates 
clearly how unsatisfactory it was to introduce a form of security over land which 
becomes real without recording or registration as required for other heritable 
securities". 
103 
Retention of title clauses 
Under Scots domestic law it was clear that it was perfectly legitimate for a seller 
to insist on a simple retention of title clause, which meant that the buyer would 
97 Ibid. at 247. 
98 Crawford, International Private Lawv, para 14.11. 
99 Carse v Copper: 1951 SC 233 per Lord Carmont at 242-244; per Lord Russell at 244. 
ioo Ibid. at 239; for a criticism of Lord President Cooper's conclusion see Collins, "Floating 
Charges", pp442-443. 
101 1961, c. 46. 
102 1997 SC (HL) 66. 
103 W. M. Gordon, Scottish Land Law, 2 °d edn. (W. Green, 1999), para 20-206. 
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not become the owner of the property in question until he had paid for it. 
However, in other jurisdictions, including England, it was possible to insist upon 
a more far-reaching type of retention clause, by which the buyer did not become 
owner of the goods until he had paid all sums owing to the seller from any 
transactions between them (often therefore described as 'all sums' retention of title 
clauses). 104 Again this causes no difficulty of principle in England, but in 
Scotland was regarded as tantamount to allowing a security to be constituted over 
moveables without possession. For Smith, the concept was "contrary to the 
principles of Scots law". 105 Must such clauses be afforded recognition under the 
rules of international private law when purportedly imposed by a foreign seller? 
Many of the cases, which came before the courts in quick succession, involved 
German sellers. But the issue was no less thorny in a UK cross-border setting. In 
Emerald Stainless Steel Ltd v South Side Distribution Ltd106 there were no 
averments as to the content of English law, which was therefore presumed to be 
the same as Scots law. Consequently, Lord Ross found the 'all sums' retention of 
title clause to be "contrary to principle". 107 Averments as to West German law, 
under which such clauses were enforceable, were made in Hammer and Solute v 
HWTRealisations Ltd. 108 The sheriff, however, found that the issue was one for 
the lex situs, which he considered to be Scots law, and thus the clause did not 
have its intended effect. He appeared also to be mindful of considerations of 
public policy, referring to dicta that "an agreement which was opposed to a 
fundamental principle of the Law of Scotland founded on considerations of public 
policy could not be relied upon and insisted upon in the Courts of Scotland". 
109 It 
seemed that the Scottish courts were nearing the point where they might have to 
declare a clause, routine under English law, unenforceable in Scotland as contrary 
to public policy. Once more, however, the issue was removed from the sphere of 
international private law, by means of an apparent change in Scots domestic law, 
on this occasion effected by the House of Lords. In Armour v Thyssen 
104 For a discussion of the different types of Romalpa clauses sec M. Sweeney, "The 
rationalisation of the Romalpa clause within the framework of the Scottish law of property and 
obligations" 1987 JR 62. 
los T. B. Smith, "Retention of title: Lord Watson's legacy" 1983 SLT (News) 105 at 105. 
106 1982 SC 61. 
107 Ibid. at 64. 
108 1985 SLT (Sh Ct) 21. 
109 Ibid. at 23. 
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Edelstahlwerke AG11° their Lordships took the view that 'all sums' retention of 
title clauses did not constitute a security over moveables without possession. On 
a true construction of the contract, there could not be held to have been 
constituted a type of security unacceptable to Scots law: since property in the 
goods remained with the seller until all debts due to him had been paid, the buyer 
had merely possession and not ownership of the steel in question, and had no 
capacity to grant a security over it. "' Since the clauses then became effective 
domestically, the international private law dimension disappeared. For Miller 
"[t]he development seems to reflect the claimed interests of commerce leading but 
the law hesitating in its response because of concern to maintain the integrity of 
established principles of property". 112 
Security over incorporeal moveable property 
Commercial interests within the UK may be attracted to the English methods of 
creating a security over what would be described in Scotland as incorporeal 
moveable property. In England it may be possible to effect such a security 
without parting with ownership of the asset, nor intimation being required. By 
contrast, in Scotland, the main method of creating such a security remains the 
device of assignation. In this, once again, can be seen the importance attached in 
Scots law to public transparency, set against the flexible approach to property 
rights characteristic of the English system. In the field of intellectual property, 
Guthrie and Orr have sought to argue that an English company lending to a Scots 
firm could secure the investment by way of an English-style security over 
intellectual property. 113 They accept, however, that there is dissent as to how 
reliable such a security would be in the event of the Scottish firm going into 
receivership or liquidation. Similarly, Sellar has submitted that English forms of 
security could be used in certain situations in relation to patents, but admits that 
the position is unclear should the company become insolvent. 114 Recent research 
suggested that practitioners in Scotland would arrange for a particular incorporeal 
asset of a client to be domiciled in England, so that securities permitted under 
110 1990 SLT 891. 
I Ibid. per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 894. 
112 D. L. C. Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law (W. Green, 1991), p285. 
113 T. Guthrie & A. Orr, "Fixed security rights over intellectual property in Scotland" [1996] 11 
EIPR 597 at 600-601. 
114 D. P. Sellar, "Rights in security over'Scottish patents"' 1996 SLPQ 137. 
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English law could be utilised. "5 However, what is significant, it is submitted, is 
the commercial response to the situation. The Department of Trade and Industry 
produced a consultation paper, which argued for the introduction of a new type of 
fixed security into Scots law that did not result in ownership being transferred to 
the security-holder. 116 Thus far, the recommendations have not borne fruit. 
However, it would seem that in the future difficult cross-border issues regarding 
securities over moveables could well be resolved, not by the application of 
international private law rules, but through internalisation of the conflict whether 
by changes to Scots domestic law or the imposition of special cross-border rules. 
Conclusion 
In all three of the areas discussed above, the strength of the commercial concerns 
bound up in UK common market law, can be seen by the importance of the 
property law principles which were, however, subordinated to the drive to 
internalise cross-border conflicts within the UK in this field. 
Break downs in internalising rules in UK common market law 
Whilst, however, it is submitted that UK common market law is an area which 
has seen much internalisation of conflicts, such attempts have not always been 
wholly successful. 
Thus it was thought necessary to make all those residing outwith the Court of 
Session's jurisdiction ineligible to be appointed permanent trustee in a 
sequestration, "? and there are, it is submitted, good practical reasons for such a 
rule. There is no equivalent statutory provision in respect of liquidators, although 
an English liquidator was removed by the court in the case of Skinner (Hannah's 
Development and Finance Corporation Ltd). 118 Lord Stormonth Darling was of 
the view that "[t]he liquidator is truly the hand of the Court", ' 19 and thus it was 
1 15 Hamilton et al., Business Finance and Security over Moveable Property, para 4.27. 
116 Department of Trade and Industry, Security over Moveable Property in Scotland: A 
Consultation Paper (1994). See also A. L. Diamond, A Review of Security Interests in 
Property (1989) on the view that the law on security for moveable property should ideally be 
alike in Scotland and England. 
117 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s24(2)(d). 
I18 (1898) 6 SLT 388 
119 Ibid. at 388. 
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preferable that he should be in the court's jurisdiction. Whilst the appointment of 
an English liquidator has been allowed in some cases, 120 it was frowned upon, and 
indeed remains rare to this day. 121 
Furthermore, whatever the intention behind the rules, poor draughtsmanship can 
result in an, unintentional, survival of rules of international private law which are 
used, along with principles of statutory interpretation to make sense of the 
legislation. A good example of this is provided by the Insolvency Act 1986. The 
lack of clarity in the drafting of section 426 has already been noted. 
122 Smart has 
also raised concerns about the fact that Scottish and English insolvency law, as 
defined for the purposes of section 426, is limited to legislative measures, 
123 thus 
taking common law measures outwith the assistance provisions of section 426.124 
More generally, however, a Scottish, and an English, winding up are 
distinguished in the Act, but then different sections refer variously to those 
sections applying to Scotland, or to property or events in Scotland, or the winding 
up of a company registered in Scotland, or to winding up by the court in 
Scotland. 125 This sloppiness in the drafting of the Act has been the subject of, it is 
submitted, justified criticism. 126 One particularly troublesome issue is whether 
the provisions which are said to apply to Scotland in respect of gratuitous 
alienations and unfair preferences, could apply to a transaction entered into by an 
English company being wound up in England, or could cover a transaction 
entered into outside Scotland by a Scottish company being wound up in Scotland. 
In respect of the first, there seems agreement that the section in question is not 
habile to encompass this type of situation, 127 and this would seem to be the correct 
approach. The second matter, for this writer, must be resolved through the 
application of principles of statutory interpretation. This is no easy matter, and 
120 The Barberton Development Syndicate (1898) 25 R 654. 
121 St Clair & Drummond Young, The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland, p384. 
122 See pp81-84 above. 
123 Insolvency Act 1986, s426(10). 
124 Smart, Cross-Border Insolvency, pp412-413. 
125 See D. P. Sellar, "The Insolvency Act 1986 and cross-border winding up: which law applies 
and where" (1995) 40 JLSS 102. 
126 Ibid.; Aird & Jamieson, The Scots Dimension to Cross-Border Litigation, para 21.35; E. B. 
Crawford, "A question of jurisdiction in respect of sequestration: Reid v Randort Ltd, 1998 
GWD 20-1040 and 29-1504" 1999 JR 203 at 208. 
127 Sellar, "The Insolvency Act 1986 and cross-border winding up" at 103; Aird & Jamieson, The 
Scots Dimension to Cross-Border Litigation, para 21.35. 
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the case of Reid v Ramlort Ltd128 illustrates the difficulties which arose when a 
Scottish judicial factor attempted to challenge a transaction as a gratuitous 
alienation under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, where the recipient was 
domiciled in England. What is significant is that, despite the obvious desire to 
internalise the rules referable to these situations, the result of poor legislative 
drafting was to throw practitioners and academics back onto international private 
law rules, as well as the rules on the interpretation of statutes, in order to try to 
make sense of the provisions. 129 
Common market law on a larger scale 
The twentieth century saw the development of a much larger economic area, 
indeed one initially often referred to as the Common Market, and now more 
properly as the European Union. The effect of European legislation on the 
international private law rules between Scotland and England will be examined in 
a later chapter. 130 However, what is interesting to note in the present context, is 
the EU concern that the lack of harmonisation of contract laws within the Union 
may be hampering trade. 131 It has been argued that such economic reasons are 
being used to justify the introduction of a European contract law. 
132 It is 
submitted that this merely serves to demonstrate, albeit on a larger scale, the 
power of commerce, and the ability of business concerns to displace traditional 
international private law rules within a common market, or trading area. 
Internalising conflicts with administrative rules 
In a number of areas legislation from the Westminster Parliament has served to 
remove the need for traditional international private law rules by the introduction 
of rules for cross-border recognition, enforcement or execution, which are almost 
akin to administrative procedures. 
128 1998 GWD 20-1040 & 29-1504. 
129 See Crawford, "A question of jurisdiction". 
130 See Chap. 6. 
131 J. Smits, The Making of European Private Law: Toward a Ius Commune Europaeum as a 
Mixed Legal System, transl. N. Kornet (Intersentia, 2002), pp2-3; "Discussion Paper on the 
Law of Contract", paper given by H. L. MacQueen at Franco-British Lawyers Society 
Conference, Glasgow, 19 September 2003. 
132 Eighth Wilson Lecture, "Harmonisation of Contract Law in Europe" given by H. M. Watt, 
Edinburgh, 20 November 2003. 
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Administration of the succession 
Unlike continental civilian systems, in which property usually devolves to the heir 
(or similar) himself, both Scots and English law have a neutral figure interposed, 
known in Scotland as the executor. 133 There are, however, subtle differences such 
as the power of personal representatives in England to commence ingathering the 
estate and to carry out certain other functions prior to the granting of probate, in 
cases of testate succession. 134 Nevertheless, legislation has been used to make the 
administration of cross-border estates in the UK very much an administrative 
matter. Thus if the deceased died domiciled in Scotland, the Inventory will show 
estate in Scotland, followed by estate in England and Wales, and Northern 
Ireland, respectively. Estate from outwith the UK is noted after the summary for 
confirmation. The confirmation then granted gives the executor sufficient title to 
the property. There is no need for resealing, 135 nor any need to lead evidence in 
England to prove that the document is a Scottish confirmation. 136 Similar rules 
exist in England to allow English personal representatives to deal with Scottish 
property of the deceased. 137 In contrast, if the deceased was domiciled in a 
Commonwealth country or South Africa at the time of his death, resealing will be 
required before the personal representative may deal with Scottish property of the 
deceased. 138 If the deceased was domiciled in a country which is not a member of 
the Commonwealth or South Africa, then the resealing procedure is not available. 
In these circumstances, the foreign executor must prove his legal entitlement to 
deal with any asset of the deceased in Scotland, and confirmation solely in respect 
of the Scottish asset will have to be obtained. 139 
These rules (which ante-date modern EU-inspired commercially driven 
harmonisation) can be characterised as representing ever-decreasing circles of 
convenience. Within the UK, since there is much cross-border movement and 
cross-border property holding, it is felt that inconvenience should be at a 
133 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p648; P. North & J. J. Fawcett, Cheshire 
and North's Private International Law, 130' edn. (Butterworths, 1999), p975. 
134 J. G. Currie, The Confirmation of Executors in Scotland, 8`h cdn., by E. M. Scobbie (W. 
Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), para 14.25. 
135 Administration of Estates Act 1971, c. 25, sl. 
136 Ibid., s4(1). 
137 Ibid., s3. 
138 Colonial Probates Act 1892 (55 & 56 Viet), c. 6. 
139 Currie, Confirmation, paras 14.12-14.13. 
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minimum: recognition of confirmation-type documentation is automatic and no 
additional paperwork is required. The nature of inheritance tax as a UK-wide 
system no doubt eases this approach. Within the Commonwealth, perhaps as a 
throwback to Empire, or perhaps in recognition of 'ex-pats' dispersed across the 
former Empire, a concession is made in the availability of the resealing 
procedure. Outwith these areas, however, the number of estates with a UK 
dimension is not sufficient, or the clamour is not loud enough, for the 
Westminster Parliament to introduce an easier method of dealing with the estate 
of the deceased. 140 
Recognition and enforcement of judgments 
A somewhat similar pattern can be traced in respect of cross-border recognition 
and enforcement of judgments. Initially in order to enforce a foreign decree in 
personam in Scotland it was necessary to obtain decree conform. 
'41 However, the 
Westminster Parliament passed legislation such as the Crown Debts Act 1801,142 
and the Judgments Extension Acts of 1868 and 1882,143 which made provision for 
the recognition and enforcement of decrees within the various jurisdictions of the 
UK. 144 Such legislation perhaps reflects the sentiments of Lord President Inglis 
that "I can conceive nothing more anomalous or indecent than that any Court in 
Great Britain or Ireland should scrutinise the decrees of another Court of the 
United Kingdom, as if they were those of a foreign country" . 
145 Later a need 
developed for wider recognition provisions, encompassing the countries of the 
Empire: the Administration of Justice Act 1920, Part Il. 146 Eventually a scheme 
was enacted which extended to countries outwith the dominions, in the Foreign 
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.1aß 
140 The UK chose not to ratify Hague Conventions of 1973 and 1989 on succession. Contrast, 
perhaps, the attitude of European legislators: there are currently proposals (known as 
"Brussels IV") for an EU Regulation on succession matters. 
141 Crawford, International Private Law, para 19.10. 
142 1801 (41 Geo III), c. 90. 
143 Judgments Extension Act 1868 (31 & 32 Viet), c. 54; Inferior Courts Judgments Extension Act 
1882 (45 & 46 Viet), c. 31. 
144 This also gave rise to the subsidiary result that, except in special circumstances, the court will 
not require an English party to a court action to sist a mandatory (Lawson's Trs v British Line, i 
Co. (1874) 1R 1065), since a Scottish decree for expenses can be enforced in England. 
ias Wilkie v Cathcart (1870) 9M 168 at 171. 
146 1920 (10 &I1 Geo V), c. 81 (it was open to dominions to transfer to the 1933 Act scheme). 
147 1933 (23 & 24 Geo V), c. 13. 
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These schemes worked by replacing the necessity of obtaining a new decree in 
Scotland, with administrative-type provisions whereby a foreign judgment could 
be registered in Scotland. However, although registration is, in certain 
circumstances, compulsory under the 1933 Act, there remain certain grounds on 
which the registration can be set aside, such as a lack of jurisdiction in the 
original court, fraud or a breach of natural justice. 148 Within Europe the 
harmonisation of rules on jurisdiction in the Brussels Convention, and now 
Council Regulation 44/2001 ("the Brussels I Regulation"), allowed the inclusion 
of rules easing the enforcement of judgments within the states of the European 
Union. Indeed securing the " 'free movement' of judgments" 149 within the (then) 
EEC was the principal aim of the Brussels Convention, in which aim the securing 
of agreement on acceptable grounds of jurisdiction was a pre-requisite and 
concomitant. It is notable that it is the jurisdictional rules which have proved a 
richer source of litigation. There are, however, limited grounds on which 
recognition of a judgment may be denied. '50 
By contrast, over time, the enforcement of judgments awarding sums of money 
within the UK had become more or less automatic. The Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982, which implemented the Brussels Convention, was also used 
as an opportunity to codify and to innovate upon the existing rules for enforcing 
judgments within the UK. The preceding report prepared by the Maxwell 
Committee demonstrated the Committee's concern that enforcement should not be 
easier as between the (then) EEC states, than the jurisdictions of the UK, and 
suggested an "even more 'automatic' " system. '5' For civil judgments falling 
148 Ibid., s4 (or, in cases falling under the Administration of Justice Act 1920, justifying refusal of 
registration). 
149 Jenard Report [1979] OJ C59/1 at 59/7. 
150 These are, in terms of the Brussels I Regulation, Art. 34, failure to serve certain documentation 
in sufficient time to, or in a manner which allows one to, prepare one's defence; 
irreconcilability with certain prior judgments; and public policy (on which see, e. g., 
Krombach v Bomberski [2001] All ER (EC) 584; SA Marie Brizzard et Roger International v 
William Grant & Sons Ltd (No 2) 2002 SLT 1365). The Brussels I Regulation, Art. 35 also 
allows non-recognition if any of the insurance, consumer contracts and exclusive jurisdiction, 
provisions have not been followed, as well as containing a transitional provision. 
ist Report of the Scottish Committee on Jurisdiction and Enforcement (1980) ("The Maxwell 
Report"), para 15.5. It was suggested that "there seems little harm in enforcing the occasional 
judgment founded on exorbitant jurisdiction ... pronounced in another law 
district" of the UK 
(The Maxwell Report, para 15.59), but generally the endorsement of the proposed enforcement 
procedures seems to have been dependent on suitable jurisdiction rules being arrived at: "We 
would not find it tolerable that over the wide range of judgments to which our proposals ... 
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within the ambit of the scheme, there is a straightforward procedure for the cross- 
border enforcement of money judgments. 152 An interested party obtains a 
certificate from the court which pronounced the original judgment, and presents 
this to the appropriate court in the jurisdiction in which the decree is to be 
enforced. As a general rule registration of the judgment by the latter court will 
present little difficulty. The grounds of challenge are very limited, the 
registration only requiring to be set aside if the procedure has not been correctly 
followed, and there being a discretion to do so if res judicata is successfully 
argued. '53 A similar scheme for non-money judgments is put in place by 
Schedule 7 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act. The Maxwell Committee 
pulled back, however, from proposing that English money judgments should be 
enforceable in Scotland without the need for a judicial or administrative 
procedure of any kind, and vice versa. The Committee was concerned about the 
difficulties for sheriff officers in satisfying themselves that a judgment was 
genuine and felt, in any event, that it should continue to be the case that only a 
Scottish court may bestow authority on its officers to enforce decrees within its 
territory. '54 These practical objections are indeed well-founded. However, it is 
submitted that there is a more fundamental difficulty with such a proposal: it 
would represent the first step on a road which leads to assimilation, if not the 
submersion of the Scottish legal system within the English system. 
Family law 
The ease with which decrees of divorce are recognised within Britain nowadays 
belies the troubled history of this subject. From the time of the Reformation it 
was possible in Scotland to obtain a divorce on the grounds of adultery, and 
divorce on the basis of desertion was permitted by legislation of 1573.155 By 
contrast, in England there was no means of divorcing, unless a private Act of 
Parliament was passed, until the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857.156 
relate the Scottish courts would be obliged to give automatic recognition or enforcement of for 
example judgments given in England and Wales on a jurisdiction based solely on the service of 
a writ on a Scotsman momentarily present in England and Wales" (The Maxwell Report, para 
15.5). 
152 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, c. 27, Sch. 6. 
153 Ibid., Sch. 6, para 10. 
154 The Maxwell Report, pars 15.64. 
155 APS, III, 81 (1573). 
156 1857 (20 & 21 Vict), c. 85, ss27 & 31. 
95 
Inevitably, English parties sought to take advantage of the more liberal Scottish 
position. For their part, Scots courts were content to take jurisdiction on the basis 
of residence, 157 and possibly also if the matrimonial offence was committed in 
Scotland. 158 Scots law was applied, even although the marriage had taken place 
in England. '59 However, in Lolley's Case160 an Englishman who had divorced his 
wife in Scotland, and then remarried in England was convicted of bigamy there. 
It was stated that English marriages could not be terminated by divorce, and the 
courts of another country could not purport to do so. It was confirmed in Shaw v 
Gould161 that, unless the parties to the marriage were domiciled in Scotland, a 
Scots divorce would be held by the English courts to be of no effect. 
162 A 
domicile established by forty days residence (which might be sufficient for the 
Scots courts to take jurisdiction) would not suffice to establish a Scottish domicile 
for the purposes of recognition by the English courts. 163 
The situation eased with the wider availability of divorce in English domestic law 
after 1857, and the acceptance in both Scots and English law of the husband's 
domicile as the appropriate ground of jurisdiction. 164 In the 1942 divorce action 
of Sellars v Sellars, 165 Lord President Normand noted that: 
"We are now less embarrassed in cases of this kind than formerly, because the 
oblique motive which sometimes induced a pursuer in an action of divorce to 
157 See, for example, Utterton v Tewsh (1811) Ferg Cons 23. 
158 See J. Hosack, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws of England and Scotland (William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1847), pp283-284. This was eventually rejected in the later case of 
Stavert v Stavert (1882) 9R 519. 
159 There is interesting discussion of the appropriate law to be applied in such cases, and the basis 
for this, in the judgments of Edruonstone v Lockhart; Butler v Forbes; Duntze v Levert (1816) 
19 Fac Coll 139. In Gordon v Pye (1815) Ferg Cons 276 at 361, Lord Meadowbank posed the 
colourful question: "Would a husband in this country be permitted to keep his wife in an iron 
cage, or beat her with rods the thickness of a Judge's finger, because he had married her in 
England, where it is said this may be done? ". 
160 (1812) Russ & Ry 237. 
161 (1868) LR 3 HL 55: this case is discussed in greater detail at pp127-128 below. 
162 See also the English cases of Conway v Beazley (1831) 3 Hagg Ecc Rep 639; Dolphin v 
Roberts (1859) 7 HL Cas 39. 
163 Shaw v Gould (1868) LR 3 HL 55. It was accepted that limping marriages might therefore 
result (ibid., per Lord Cranworth at 72). 
164 Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier [ 1895] AC 517; Crawford, International Private Law, paras 10.03- 
10.05. 
165 1942 SC 206. 
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assert a Scottish domicile in preference to an English domicile has been 
removed, since the statutory amendment of the law has for practical purposes 
brought the law of divorce for desertion in England and in Scotland into close 
agreement". 166 
By the time legislation on the recognition of foreign divorces was contemplated 
later in the twentieth century, the Law Commissions had concluded that easier 
recognition of divorces emanating from politically foreign countries, than of 
British divorces would be "an absurdity". 167 The scheme originally contained in 
the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971,168 and now the 
Family Law Act 1986,169 reflects such thinking. A clear distinction is drawn 
between divorces granted by courts within the British Isles and those outwith 
Britain. There is automatic recognition in Scotland of divorces in the former 
category. 170 The grounds on which recognition of a British divorce may be 
refused are limited: this will be examined in a later chapter in the context of 
public policy. 171 As will later be seen, the advent of the Brussels II Regulation 
has added an extra layer in terms of the recognition of divorce decrees from EU 
members, but does not affect the intra-UK internalising rules laid down in the 
Family Law Act. 172 
The recognition and enforcement of custody decisions within the UK has been 
placed on an almost administrative footing. Again, this was for a long time a 
fraught area of the law, with conflicting conclusions as to the appropriate custody 
arrangements for a child being reached on both sides of the border. 
173 However, 
the Family Law Act 1986, Part I, provided that custody decrees emanating from 
166 Ibid. at 210. 
167 Law Com. No 34/Scot. Law Com. No 16, Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorces and 
Legal Separations (1970), para 1 of Notes to Clause 1 of draft Bill. 
168 1971, c. 53. 
169 1986, c. 55. 
170 Ibid., s44. 
171 See p199 below. 
172 See Chap. 6. 
173 See pp120-121 below. The first battle was on jurisdiction, the historical basis of which was 
different in each of the two legal systems (stress being laid in Scotland on the father's domicile, 
and in England on residence or nationality). It was suggested by one English judge that 
"Neither court is avid of jurisdiction, and neither court will disclaim the jurisdiction with 
which it is entrusted" (Re X's Settlement [1945] 1 Ch 44 per Vaisey J at 47), but it might be 
doubted whether the latter clause of the dictum was more accurate than the first. See also Re P 
(GE) (an infant) [1964] 3 All ER 977 per Lord Denning MR at 980-981. 
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UK courts should be recognised automatically throughout the UK. 
174 
Furthermore, once such a judgment is registered in another part of the UK, it may 
be enforced by that court. 175 This has even allowed an English court to enforce an 
interim order of the Scottish courts, when the action for divorce and custody 
would ultimately be heard in England. 176 The path of the legislative scheme has 
not been quite so smooth in Scotland, as is witnessed by the First Division 
decision of Woodcock v Woodcock. 177 The court in this case effectively found 
that there remained an inherent jurisdiction to refuse to enforce English custody 
orders despite the provisions of the Family Law Act: a conclusion which seems 
to go against the clear terms of the legislation. 178 
In terms of the status of adopted children, an order which has the effect of an 
adoption in England and Wales is placed on a par with a Scottish adoption 
order. 179 Unlike overseas adoption orders, the relevant legislation did not allow 
for an English adoption order to be annulled or made invalid in Scotland . 
180 The 
consequence of all this is that English adoption orders are automatically 
recognised in Scotland. '8' Recent legislation to allow the implementation of a 
new Hague Convention in this area does not change the position as between 
Scotland and England. 182 
Execution of criminal warrants across the border 
A special statutory procedure also exists which allows for the enforcement of 
warrants for apprehension and imprisonment within the UK. Thus a warrant 
issued in England and Wales (or Northern Ireland) can be executed by a Scottish 
police constable, or by a constable from the jurisdiction in which the warrant was 
174 Family Law Act 1986, s25. 
175 Ibid., ss25 & 29. 
176 Re M (Minors) (Custody: Jurisdiction) [1992] 2 FLR 382. 
"' 1990 SLT 848. 
178 See D. J. Edwards, "A domestic muddle: custody orders in the United Kingdom" (1992) 41 
ICLQ 444. 
179 Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, c. 28, s38(1). 
180 Ibid., s47. This may be based on a public policy objection (Ibid., s47(2)(a)). The common law 
rules as to recognition may sometimes still be relevant in respect of adoptions in politically 
foreign countries (Crawford, International Private Law, para 11.15). 
18, See too A. B. Wilkinson & K. McK. Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland, 
2°d edn., by K. McK. Norrie (W. Green, 1999), para 5.40. 
182 Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999, c. 18, in implementation of the 1993 Hague 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption. 
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issued. 183 Similarly, a Scottish warrant may be enforced in England and Wales 
(or Northern Ireland) by a constable from Scotland, or the jurisdiction in which 
the warrant is to be executed. 184 There is no need in either circumstance for 
endorsement of the warrant. There are also provisions allowing for cross-border 
arrests to be made without a warrant, and detailing the powers available to 
constables in such a situation. 185 Proposals to sanction the giving of assistance by 
one police force to another were ultimately abandoned, 186 but it is interesting to 
note that these proposals arose from a report by the Lothian and Borders, 
Dumfries and Galloway, Northumbria and Cumbria police forces. 
'87 
Notwithstanding the international nature of modem crime, there is perhaps still an 
acute awareness of the difficulties when two jurisdictions meet, at the border of 
those jurisdictions. '88 
Recognition of previous convictions 
Traditionally, previous convictions from a foreign country are not put before a 
Scottish criminal court at sentencing, since the behaviour in question may not 
have been such as to secure a conviction in Scotland and, in any event, it could be 
difficult to provide the necessary proof of the conviction. 
189 The current 
'codification' by means of statute of the criminal procedure rules in Scotland does 
not explicitly allow the prosecutor to refer to English convictions, nor does it 
define a previous conviction. However, it is provided that a previous conviction 
can be proved by, inter alia, "extract conviction of any crime committed in any 
part of the United Kingdom". 190 An extract conviction and extract of previous 
conviction are defined so as to encompass a "document lawfully issued from any 
court of justice of the United Kingdom as evidence of a conviction". 
191 This 
apparent ability to refer to English convictions when sentencing in Scotland is 
183 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, c. 33, s136(1), (7). 
184 Ibid., s136(2), (7). 
185 Ibid., ss137,138 & 140. 
186 Ibid., s141 (now repealed). 
187 Annotations by H. H. J. R. May & J. J. McManus to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994. 
188 Indeed it was remarked during the parliamentary debates that "I am bound to say that I am 
surprised that we have got to 1994, after nearly 300 years of union between Scotland and 
England, and have not managed until this Bill to put in place proper arrangements for cross- 
Border policing" (Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, HL Debs, vol 554, col 504). 
189 Crawford, International Private Law, para 20.11. 
190 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, c. 46, s285(1), (6). 
191 Ibid., s307(l). 
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borne out by the Crown Book of Regulations, which confirms that only previous 
convictions arising from Scottish or English and Welsh proceedings should be 
raised by the prosecutor in Scotland. 192 However, these provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in effect only deal with the second of the 
traditional objections to raising foreign previous convictions, that of proof. Thus, 
in practice, it may be that an English previous conviction is of little assistance to a 
sentencing judge in Scotland if the substance of the English offence is unclear. 
Perhaps the most dramatic impact of an English conviction is to be found in the 
case of Herd v HMA. 193 The accused had committed a number of offences of the 
same nature in England and Scotland over a period of time. In 1991, he was duly 
convicted and sentenced by an English court, which imposed a period of six 
months imprisonment. Having been convicted by a court in Scotland in respect of 
the Scottish offences, the Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal reduced the resultant 
sentence of imprisonment to take account of the fact that "if all the offences had 
taken place in England, they would all have been dealt with in 1991". 194 This 
case would seem very much to depend on its own facts. 
Internalising conflicts by judge-made law? 
The examples of the internalising of conflicts discussed thus far have, almost 
without exception, 195 been carried out by the use of legislation. Is it possible for 
the internalisation of conflicts to be brought about through case law? 
There certainly have been some judicial dicta that might be thought to display 
internalising sentiments. As well as the words of Lord President Inglis in Wilkie v 
Cathcart quoted above, 196 there have been more modern examples. In Davenport 
v Corinthian Motor Policies at Lloyds197 the pursuer had earlier raised an action 
for damages, and obtained decree, following a road traffic accident. Having 
192 The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Vol 17, para 794. In the case of 
Mawhinney v HMA 1948 JC 44, previous convictions from England and Ireland were libelled 
as an aggravation of the offence committed. Successful objection was taken to the inclusion of 
the Irish conviction, but none to the reference to the English conviction. 
193 1993 GWD 24-1503. 
194 Ibid. 
195 That exception being the House of Lords decision in Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG 
1990 SLT 891. 
196 See p93 above. 
197 1991 SLT 774. 
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failed to recover the sum from the defender, she sought to take advantage of a 
statutory provision, and raised an action against the defender's insurers. She did 
so in Scotland, where she had successfully raised the first action. The insurers, 
however, were domiciled in England, and therefore entered a plea of no 
jurisdiction. The pursuer failed to convince the sheriff and an Extra Division of 
the Inner House that her claim was one relating to delict in terms of Schedule 4 of 
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. Lord Prosser felt that the general 
spirit of Schedule 1 of the Act had to be adhered to, 
"notwithstanding the fact that the Sched. 4 version is concerned with allocation 
of jurisdiction within the United Kingdom, where it might be easier to regard 
jurisdiction based on domicile as less a matter of principle, and the 'special' 
jurisdictions not as derogations from any such sensible (and perhaps the 
obviously sensible) basis for jurisdiction". 198 
Lord Milligan was even more blunt: 
"I add only a note of regret in that there seems to me much to be said for there 
being jurisdiction to pursue an action such as the present in a court where there 
was jurisdiction in the delictual action, and rather less to be said against this 
being so, at least within the United Kingdom". 199 
Such regrets, however, did not prevent the Division finding against the pursuer. 
Soklia v Secretary of State for the Honte Department200 was an immigration case, 
in which the petitioner brought a petition for judicial review to challenge his 
detention. Although he had no links with Scotland, it appeared that such 
challenges were far more likely to meet with success in the Scottish courts as 
opposed to the English courts. The question of forum non conveniens was 
accordingly under consideration. Lord Prosser opined that: 
198 Ibid. at 780-781. 
199 Ibid. at 782. 
200 1992 SLT 1049. 
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"I am disposed to think that where the alternative jurisdiction is another part of 
the United Kingdom, rather than a wholly foreign country, and at least where 
the ground of jurisdiction is a normal one such as domicile, and not an oddity 
such as arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem, a strong preference might 
201 indeed be given to the forum chosen by the petitioner". 
Ultimately, however, Lord Prosser found that England was the appropriate forum. 
Clements v HMA202 was a criminal appeal against convictions of being concerned 
in the supply of drugs contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971: 
203 a UK statute. 
Whilst the two appellants had been found to be involved in the chain of supply 
which ended in Scotland, neither had actually carried out any of the relevant acts 
in Scotland, indeed the position of the second appellant was that he did not know 
that it was Scotland for which the drugs were bound. It was argued before the 
Court of Criminal Appeal that the trial court had accordingly had no jurisdiction, 
however, the appeal met with no success. For Lord Justice-General Hope it was 
"sufficient to look only to the situation within the United Kingdom and to ask 
why the courts of one part of it should be denied jurisdiction if the activities of 
persons elsewhere in the United Kingdom are seen to have their harmful effects in 
that part". 204 He was attracted to the idea that everyone who had taken part in the 
chain of supply should be prosecuted in the. UK jurisdiction to which the chain 
led. 205 It is submitted that the majority opinion in Clements v HMA constitutes a 
very subtle internalising approach to the difficulties which the case, at first 
glance, presented. Any perceived need for an intention to commit the crime in 
Scotland under the normal jurisdictional rules206 (which would have caused 
particular difficulties in respect of the second appellant) was avoided by the 
characterisation of certain actings within the UK as constituting concern in the 
201 Ibid. at 1054. 
202 1991 JC 62. 
203 1971, c. 38. 
204 Ibid. at 69. 
205 Ibid. at 70. He noted that this would avoid a multiplicity of trials, and differences in 
sentencing, where such groups of offenders were involved. See also per Lord Wylie at 76-77; 
cf Lord Coulsfield at 74; and compare also P. W. Ferguson, "Jurisdiction and criminal law in 
Scotland and England" in R. F. Hunter (ed. ), Justice and Crime (T&T Clark, 1993), p96. 
206 Clements v HMA, supra, per Lord Justice-General Hope at 70-71. 
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supply of drugs to Scotland, irrespective of where those acts took place, and thus 
a crime under the law of Scotland. 
However, it is submitted that Clements v HMA is a rare example of the judicial 
internalisation of conflicts. For the most part, in those few cases where 
internalising sentiments have been voiced, such as Davenport and Sokha, they 
have had no effect on the ultimate judicial decision. The internalising of conflicts 
within the UK is generally carried out by means of legislation, not judicial dicta. 
This is partially because of the lack of any mechanism to give vent to 
internalising impulses in the Scottish courts. 207 It is significant that the backdrop 
to Clements v HMA was a statute with UK-wide application. A comparison can 
be drawn with the constitutionalisation of conflicts, 208 which could be advanced 
judicially since judges can call upon general aims and themes of the constitution 
to give legitimacy to the decision they reach. Furthermore, it has been submitted 
that economic and commercial concerns have been of vital importance in 
prompting the passing of internalising legislation. Arguably such pressure is less 
likely either to be brought to bear on, or to be given effect to, the judiciary in 
Scotland. Perhaps, indeed, a quite opposite concern will constitute a greater 
influence on Scottish judges, and that is the (even subconscious) impulse to 
preserve the separate Scots legal system. 
The effect of devolution on the internalising of conflicts 
The devolution settlement brings opposing forces to work on the concept of 
internalising conflicts. On the one hand, it has been submitted that the impetus 
for the internalising of conflicts has in the past generally come from the 
legislature rather than the judiciary. Devolution involves the fragmentation of 
legislative power, with one of the wielders of legislative power (the Scottish 
Parliament) only having competency within Scotland. 209 On a purely technical 
level this could affect the ability to pass internalising legislation. Furthermore, on 
a broader level, the existence of a Scottish Parliament gives added legitimacy to 
207 The somewhat unusual position of the House of Lords allows for some internalising of 
conflicts in that forum: reference has already been made to Armour v Thyssen 
Edelstahlewerke AG 1990 SLT 891. 
208 See Chap. 3. 
209 Scotland Act 1998, s29. 
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notions of Scotland as a separate, and different, entity. There may, therefore, be 
less acceptance of the view that the UK is a political whole, and that conflicts 
should be avoided by internalisation. It is interesting to note in this connection 
the disquiet in Scotland over the use of the Sewel Convention, the method by 
which the Westminster Parliament passes legislative schemes applying to the UK 
as a whole even although the subject-matter is one which is devolved to the 
Scottish Parliament. 210 In this context, many people have seen use of the Sewel 
Convention to introduce UK-wide schemes as a failure in itself, or certainly as a 
procedure which is being over-used: "the United Kingdom Government should 
not legislate on devolved matters; they are devolved precisely because it is our 
job to legislate on them"; 211 "This is Scotland's Parliament; let Scotland's 
Parliament legislate". 212 In the context of the Civil Partnership Bill 2004, it was 
argued that the Scottish Executive, in supporting a Sewel motion was "ducking 
controversial moral issues ... People 
do not send us here to Edinburgh ... so that 
we can pick and choose what bits of the job we want to do". 213 Such sentiments 
militate against UK-wide schemes, and foster peculiarly Scottish legislative 
solutions. 
However, there are other considerations to be set against the factors outlined 
above. It has been submitted that much of the internalising of conflicts has taken 
place in the area of UK common market law. As was stated earlier, from the 
outset, the White Paper on Devolution made it clear that UK common market law 
would be reserved to the Westminster Parliament, and this intention has been 
carried through into the Scotland Act 1998.214 Thus the UK Parliament retains 
the ability to pass UK-wide legislative schemes, incorporating internalising rules, 
in the subject area which, in the past, it has perhaps been most likely so to do. 
Furthermore, the fact that UK common market law is reserved, in stark contrast to 
the many devolved areas of law, may strengthen the conviction of the UK 
Government that it is appropriate to treat of such commercial law areas on a UK- 
210 See pp147-149 below. 
211 A. Morgan, SPOR, vol 1, no 8, col 361 (9 June 1999). 
212 R. Cunningham, SPOR, vol 10, no 4, col 403 (18 January 2001). 
213 N. Sturgeon, SPOR, vol 2, no 6, col 8950 (3 June 2004). See also M. Fraser, SPOR, vol 2, no 
6, cols 8961-8963 (3 June 2004). 
214 s29 & Sch. 5. 
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wide basis, rather than make separate provision for Scotland. 215 In addition, even 
within the Scottish Parliament, the dominance of Labour in the current ruling 
coalition, coupled with that party holding power in the UK Parliament, might lead 
to some similar legislative objectives. The Mortgage Rights (Scotland) Act 
2001216 is an example of Scottish legislation which brings Scots law closer to 
rules of English commercial law in that area. 217 The existence of administrations 
dominated by the same political party in both the Scottish and Westminster 
Parliaments, together with the existence of the Sewel Convention, may allow a 
pan-UK agenda to be followed on particular policy issues. A Sewel motion was 
successfully carried in the Holyrood Parliament by the Scottish Executive in 
respect of the Civil Partnership Bill 2004.18 In its current form, the Bill provides 
for automatic recognition throughout the UK of dissolutions or annulments of a 
civil partnership219 (or legal separations of its partners) which emanate from a UK 
court, 220 subject to very few exceptions. 22' This can be contrasted with the 
provisions in respect of overseas dissolutions, annulments or legal separations. 
22 
On balance, therefore, the conclusion is that the advent of devolution may do very 
little to staunch the flow of legislative internalisation of conflicts within the UK. 
215 Thus Himsworth questions "whether the ... reservation of certain matters to the 
Westminster 
Parliament will, over time, have the effect of persuading the courts that such reservation 
implies an intended uniformity of provision across the United Kingdom" (Himsworth, 
"Devolution and the mixed legal system of Scotland", 124). 
216 2001, asp 11. Disappointingly, the Act also adopts an English term of art in its short title. 
217 M. Higgins, "2001 -a base (rate) odyssey" 2001 SLT (News) 273. 218 SPOR, vol 2, no 6, cols 8978-8980. 
219 This being defined as a relationship between two persons of the same sex (Civil Partnership 
Bill 2004, cl. 1(1)). 
220 Ibid., cl. 225(2). 
221 These are irreconcilability (ibid., cl. 225(3)), and the lack of an actual civil partnership in the 
view of the law of the court asked to recognise the dissolution, annulment or legal separation 
(ibid., cl. 225(4)). 
222 Ibid., cls. 226-228. Clause 211 allows for special provision to be made for the recognition of 
judgments of courts of member states of the EU. 
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5 APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE 
LAW RULES WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Purpose of chapter 
Having examined the extent to which there is any constitutionalising, or 
internalising, of the conflicts arising as between Scotland and England, the 
present chapter turns to the situations in which traditional international private 
law rules are applied. Lasok and Stone posit that: 
"the political-legal status of a territory, although relevant in certain respects, 
such as state and diplomatic immunity and treaty-making power, is not the sole 
factor determining the need for conflict rules. What matters is the existence of 
an autonomous legal order pertaining to a territory ... as 
in the case of 
Scotland". 1 
However, it is submitted that it is the political-legal status of Scotland (as set out 
in the Acts of Union) which has allowed for the existence of an autonomous legal 
order. 
In this chapter, it will be sought to identify the areas in which rules of jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and on the recognition of judgments, are applied in the Scottish 
courts indiscriminately, i. e., making no differentiation as between England or a 
politically foreign jurisdiction. The reasons for such use of international private 
law rules will be analysed, with one eye always on the desirability, or otherwise, 
of reform. The effect of devolution on Scottish conflict rules, and on the reliance 
upon such rules for resolving intra-UK conflicts, will also be examined. 
D. Lasok & P. A. Stone, Conflict of Laws in the European Community (Professional Books, 
1987), p4. 
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Proof of English law 
The status of English law in Scots courts 
English law, like any foreign law, is a matter of fact, which must be proved in the 
Scottish courts if it is to be relied upon. This flows from the fact that: "the 
judicatories of Scotland and England are as independent of each other, within 
their respective territories, as if they were the judicatories of two foreign states". 
Indeed, it is submitted that the treatment of English law as any other foreign law 
is a cornerstone of the Scottish legal system preserved by the Acts of Union. If 
Scots law is to remain a separate system, it is crucial that English law is seen to be 
different, and thus requiring of explication by English practitioners. It is 
sometimes argued, however, that while this is the general rule, there are certain 
limited exceptions to it. 3 It is submitted that, as will become clear, on closer 
analysis the examples commonly given are not true exceptions to the rule. 
Firstly, English charity law is often said to be within judicial knowledge in 
Scotland. 4 This can be traced back to the English House of Lords decision in 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel, 
s in which the 
meaning of the word 'charitable' in the context of the Income Tax Act 18426 was 
in issue. Lord Herschell recognised that, in a UK statute, it was not acceptable 
simply to apply English law. 7 However, both he and Lord Watson were of the 
view that Scots and English law on this point were very similar. 
8 One could be 
critical of this conclusion, as demonstrating too ready a willingness on the part of 
the House of Lords to find Scots and English law to be the same. The words of 
Lord Macnaghten (who was also of the opinion that Scots and English law in this 
matter were broadly similar) are particularly disturbing: 
2 Orr Ewing &cv Orr Ewing's Trs (1884) 11 R 600 per Lord President Inglis at 629. The same 
position is adopted in England towards Scots law (T. Hodgkinson, Expert Evidence: Law and 
Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), p294, and note, for example, the giving of evidence on the 
content of Scots law in Shaw v Gould (1868) LR 3 HL 55). 
3 I. D. Macphail, Evidence: A Revised Version of a Research Paper on the Law of Evidence in 
Scotland (The Law Society of Scotland, 1987), paras 2.04-2.05; F. Raitt, Evidence, 3rd edn. 
(W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), para 4.08; M. L. Ross with J. Chalmers, Walker and 
Walker: The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 2°d edn. (T&T Clark, 2000), para 16.5.1. 
° Macphail, Evidence, para 2.04; Raitt, Evidence, para 4.08; Ross with Chalmers, Walker and 
Walker, para 16.5.1. 
5 [1891] AC 531. 
6 1842 (5 &6 Viet), c. 35. 
7 [1891] AC 531 at 570-571. 
8 Ibid. at 573 & 563; cf Lord Chancellor Halsbury at 548-550. 
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"A simpler plan is now recommended. Though the words have a definite legal 
meaning in England, you must not, it is now said, look at that meaning unless 
it be in vogue north of the Tweed. You must put out the light you have, unless 
it penetrates directly to the furthest part of the room". 9 
However, the reason for being critical of the judgment is because the case may 
seem to be another historical example of the House of Lords introducing English 
legal concepts into Scots law. 1° These then become a part (however ill-fitting) of 
Scots law. Thus as Lord Normand later recognised: 
"their Lordships ... are technically not 
bound by the decisions of the English 
courts in the matter of charities, and it is not improper for them to discuss or 
criticise English decisions. The Court of Session is not reduced to the role of 
an obsequious follower of decisions either of a Judge of first instance or of the 
Court of Appeal, though it is only good sense to pay special regard and respect 
to the decisions and opinions pronounced by the English Courts on a branch of 
the law built up by English Judges, and familiar to them by long training and 
experience". 11 
It is submitted that Lord Reid correctly states the position in giving judgment in 
the same case: 
"It has commonly been accepted since Pemsel's case that the words charity and 
charitable in income tax legislation must be interpreted according to English 
law, but I do not think that that is a full or accurate statement of the position. 
In my judgment, holding that those words must be interpreted according to 
English law must mean that it is to be held that Parliament enacted that on that 
matter the law of England should also become the law of Scotland, and it must 
follow that Parliament must be held to have placed on the Courts of Scotland 
' Ibid. at 580. Lord Morris concurred with Lord Macnaghten. 
10 See pp61-63 above. 
11 Inland Revenue v Glasgow Police Athletic Association 1953 SC (HL) 13 at 22. 
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the duty of administering what was formerly only the law of England but what 
has been made by Act of Parliament the law of both countries". 12 
The definition of charity for the purposes of the law relating to income tax is now 
set out in the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988,13 a statute which applies 
inter alia to both England and Scotland. Accordingly, the Scottish courts are 
simply being asked to interpret a UK statutory provision, not apply English law. 
In looking to English cases to assist in that interpretation, the courts are sensibly 
drawing guidance from the source of the definition, but that does not mean that 
the English law of charities is being applied, nor that it must fall within judicial 
knowledge. A modem parallel might be the ability of judges to look at human 
rights cases from other jurisdictions to assist in interpreting the European 
Convention on Human Rights, or cases emanating from other EU members in 
interpreting EU legislation. 14 
Similarly, whilst it is often said that the English law of treason is within judicial 
knowledge, 15 it is submitted that this is another example of English concepts 
being imported into Scots law, on this occasion by legislation in the form of the 
Treason Act 1708.16 Accordingly, whatever its initial source, this is now merely a 
part of Scots law. 
Scottish judges are also said to take judicial notice of English substantive and 
procedural criminal law when sitting in Courts Martial appeals. 
'7 However, it is 
submitted that in such appeals judges are simply applying a particular code, which 
applies in what is effectively an internal military situation. In practice this code is 
derived from English law and procedure, but it is perhaps an exaggeration to say 
that English law is within judicial knowledge in this context. 
12 Ibid. at 29. Jackson's Trs v Inland Revenue 1926 SC 579 is an example of an earlier case 
displaying the attitude which Lord Reid here criticised. 
13 1988, c. 1, s506(1). Certain statutes provide that "charitable" is to be construed as it is in the 
income tax legislation: Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39, s189; Local Government (Financial 
Provisions, etc. ) (Scotland) Act 1962, c. 9, s4(10)(a). 
14 Roy v M. R. Pearlman Limited 2000 SLT 727 per Lord Hamilton at 734. 
15 Macphail, Evidence, para S2.04. 
16 1708 (7 Anne), c. 21, s7. 
17 Macphail, Evidence, para 2.05; Raitt, Evidence, para 4.08. 
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The last example commonly offered as an exception to the general rule that 
English law is within judicial knowledge, is English maintenance law in the 
context of certain legislation on maintenance orders. '8 This is moving into the 
territory of international private law. A Scottish court is empowered to take 
notice of the law of another part of the UK when varying the rate of periodical 
payments set down in a judgment from that part which has been registered in 
Scotland. 19 The varied payment may not exceed the maximum in the jurisdiction 
whence the judgment was issued. 2° It is therefore submitted that the provision 
only allows the court to refer to the current maximum rates of payment, and there 
is obiter dicta to this effect in Thompson v Thompson. 
21 The Maintenance Orders 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972 allows the application of the law in force in a 
reciprocating country relating to sufficiency of evidence. 22 However, this clearly 
need not be confined to English law and, in any event, would seem simply to be a 
choice of law provision. 23 Once again, therefore, it is submitted that these are not 
in reality examples of English law being a special case, and thus admitting of 
exceptions to the general rule that foreign law is not within judicial knowledge. 
Introduction of English law into a Scots action 
It is generally accepted that English law, like any foreign law, must be raised by 
one of the parties to the action in the pleadings if it is to be relied upon. If not, it 
seems that the case will proceed on the basis that Scots law applies. 
24 
Furthermore, even if a foreign law is said to apply, in the absence of averments as 
to the content of that law, it would appear that it will be presumed to be the same 
as Scots law. 25 Accordingly, the introduction of English, or any other, law into an 
18 Macphail, Evidence, para 2.05. 
19 Maintenance Orders Act 1950 (14 Geo VI), c. 37, s22. 
20 Ibid. 
21 (1953) 69 Sh Ct Rep 193; in which case evidence was also led from an expert as to the powers 
of the English courts (cf Cowan v Cowan 1952 SLT (Sh Ct) 8). 
22 1972, c. 18, s7(7)(c). 
23 cfKillen v Killen 1981 SLT (Sh Ct) 77. 
24 Pryde v Proctor and Gamble Limited 1971 SLT (Notes) 18; Anton with Beaumont, Private 
International Law, pp411 &775; Macphail, Evidence, para 2.08. 
25 See Rodden v Whatlings Limited 1961 SC 132; Bonnor v Balfour Kilpatrick Ltd 1975 SLT 
(Notes) 3, although compare MacKinnon v Iberia Shipping Co. 1955 SC 20 per Lord Carmont 
at 33 and Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, pp774-775. 
110 
action becomes very much a tactical decision to be taken by the pleaders and their 
clients. 26 
In this, Scots law adopts a similar position to English law, where the introduction 
of foreign law can be described as voluntary. 27 Mandatory introduction of foreign 
law into an action is usually associated with the civilian systems, although in truth 
there is a certain amount of variation between these. 28 Within Canada, however, 
it has been argued that a court is constitutionally obliged to apply the true content 
of the law of a sister province where that would govern the matter. 
29 
It has already been argued that the constitutionalising of conflicts within the UK 
is not desirable, 30 and thus that basis for such a Canadian rule would not 
recommend itself. However, it is submitted that there are other powerful reasons 
why the Scots courts should adopt a mandatory approach to the introduction of 
any foreign law into an action, including English law. Choice of law rules allow 
the application of the rules of a legal system closely connected to the factual 
matters from which the case arises, and this seems desirable. 31 Concern has been 
expressed in France that "French choice-of-law will remain a pure theoretical 
masterpiece, as long as courts are not ready to consider it as an integral part of the 
French law for purposes of application" . 
32 Scottish international private law rules 
are part of Scots law, and it seems inappropriate that they may be ignored on the 
basis of the two presumptions outlined at the beginning of this section. Arguably, 
judges could, and should, raise the question of whether a foreign law applies ex 
proprio motu, since the content of Scots conflict rules is within judicial 
knowledge. Scotland is a mixed legal system, and one which has long been 
26 As Fentiman notes, this may amount to a choice of law in favour of the lex fori (R. Fentiman, 
Foreign Law in English Courts: Pleading, Proof and Choice of Law (Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp19,22,60-61 & 95). 
27 See Fentiman, Foreign Law; S. Geeroms, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative 
and Functional Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
28 Fentiman, Foreign Law, Chap. 9; T. C. Hartley, "Pleading and proof of foreign law: the major 
European systems compared" (1996) 45 ICLQ 271; Georoms, Foreign Law. 
29 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p58; although see Tetley, "On-going saga", 40-41, 
discussing the case of Belliveau v Royal Bank of Canada (2000) 224 NBR (2d) 354. 
30 See Chap. 3. 
31 As Fentiman observes "a case's foreign elements are important because they allow courts to 
arrive at results which reflect a case's true nature" (Fentiman, Foreign Law, p308). 
32 Geeroms, Foreign Law, para 2.57; and see Fentiman: "the obligation to introduce foreign law 
connotes more than a duty to rely upon foreign law. It implies a requirement that a case should 
be fought as a conflicts case" (Fentiman, Foreign Law, p70). 
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receptive to other systems of law. It is not theoretically problematic to place a 
duty upon the judge within an adversarial system, to introduce the question of 
applicability of foreign law, where prima facie indicated by choice of law rules. 
33 
The judge has available as a sanction the power to dismiss cases which ignore a 
conflicts issue. 34 The move towards greater judicial case management in certain 
types of action35 would also lend itself to the exercise of such a judicial duty. 
Methods of proof of English law 
The content of English law, like that of any other foreign law, can be admitted by 
the opposing party, 36 or can be proved by leading an expert witness, 
37 or remitting 
to a foreign lawyer. 38 English statute law cannot simply be interpreted by a Scots 
court as if it were a UK statute. 39 There is legislation allowing a court within the 
Crown's dominions to give its opinion on the application of its law to certain 
facts, 40 and arguably the terms of the statute would not prevent it applying as 
between the jurisdictions of the UK. There is evidence of its use in just such a 
fashion. 1 The usefulness of such a provision should not be overlooked. 
Fentiman has described the Act as requiring "effectively, a mini-trial abroad", 
42 
but it might be questioned whether the expense of carrying out such an exercise in 
England is necessarily much more costly or time-consuming than hearing 
evidence from English experts in the Scottish courts. In certain cases, this may be 
a worthwhile method of proceeding, and is at least an option which should not be 
rejected out of hand. 
33 Fentiman, Foreign Law, pp63 & 267; Georoms, Foreign Law, paras 2.121-2.126. Nor is the 
mandatory introduction of foreign law incompatible with that law being a factual matter which 
requires to be proved (Fentiman, Foreign Law, pp267-268). 
34 See Fentiman, Foreign Law, p68. 
35 For example commercial actions in the Court of Session. 
36 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p776; Crawford, International Private Law, 
para 4.12. 
37 Ross with Chalmers, Walker and Walker, para 16.5.4. See, for example, McKeand v Dorian 
2000 GWD 15-578. 
38 Ross with Chalmers, Walker and Walker, para 16.5.3. 
39 Higgins v Ewing's Trs 1925 SLT 329. 
40 British Law Ascertainment Act 1859 (22 & 23 Viet), c. 63. 
41 Earl of Eglinton v Laib (1867) 15 LT 657 (case to be stated for the opinion of Scots court); 
Duncan v Lawson (1889) 41 ChD 394 (a remit from the Court of Session); a reference to the 
Scottish courts was also suggested as a possible course in Re Stirling [1908] 2 Ch 344. 
42 Fentiman, Foreign Law, p239. 
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Are there grounds for altering the rules on the methods of proving English law in 
Scotland? It has been argued that the content of foreign law is now so easily 
ascertainable that it should be possible in Scots courts for parties to research 
foreign law and place the relevant information before a judge, thus dispensing 
with the need to lead expert evidence. 3 It may be thought that this reasoning is 
particularly valid with respect to English law. Scottish lawyers have often in the 
past had to make reference to English legal writing, 44 and often still rely on 
English cases which are effectively authoritative in Scotland. However, it is 45 
submitted that this would be a path fraught with danger. There would be practical 
difficulties with legal aid rules, 46 and the professional indemnity insurance of 
counsel and agents, although neither of these should be insurmountable. The 
more fundamental objection is that whilst English law might be similar to Scots 
law and accessible to Scots lawyers in some areas, in others it is quite different. 
The potential for misunderstanding a system in which the Scots lawyer has not 
been trained, and consequently misapplying the law, is great. As Dewar Gibb has 
pointed out: 
"Each system has an idiom and the genius of a language. Just as a language is 
best expounded, not by the ignorant foreigner who has never studied it but by a 
person steeped in it for a lifetime, so is it with the law of a country" 
47 
More recently, Lord Reed has perceptively noted that: 
"a legal system is more than an accumulation of solutions to problems: even if 
two legal systems provided identical solutions to all the most common 
43 Macphail, Evidence, para 2.08, commenting on proposals from the Canadian Law Reform 
Commission. 
44 Although over the years there has been a welcome increase in the quantity of legal texts 
dealing specifically with aspects of Scots law: see C. McDiarmid, "Scots law: the turning of 
the tide" 1999 JR 156 at 165-166. 
45 For example, Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893] 1 QB 256; Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145; Associated Picture Houses v Nednesbury Corporation 
[1948] 1 KB 233; and see McDiarmid, "Scots law: the turning of the tide", 161-163. 
46 See, for example, The Scottish Legal Aid Board, The Scottish Legal Aid Handbook, 60, cdn. 
(Scottish Legal Aid Board, 2001), pA: 17, para 1.11.8. 
47 Gibb, Law from over the Border, p2. 
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problems of life, they could nevertheless remain profoundly foreign to each 
other's practitioners". 
48 
A slightly different response has been adopted in England. Generally, foreign law 
is a matter of fact, which requires to be proved. However, if a point of foreign 
law has been the subject of a decision by a higher civil or criminal court, the 
report of that case provides proof of foreign law in subsequent civil cases, unless 
disputed by a party to the action. 49 Macphail has argued that such a provision 
could usefully be introduced into Scots law. 50 However, this is to make the 
(unrealistic) assumption that foreign law is static and unchanging. If a foreign 
law is to be applied, it is desirable that that law, in its current form, is accurately 
applied. 51 Otherwise, the rule becomes an artificial presumption, somewhat 
ridiculously allowing historic rules, which may no longer be the law, to be relied 
upon in the absence of challenge by the opposing party. 
If Scots lawyers are required to prove English law by the leading of evidence, are 
there any grounds for allowing English lawyers to appear in Scots courts in a 
representative capacity to deal with such points? In Hoekstra v HMA52 both 
Dutch and Scots advocates were allowed to appear for the appellants. It is also 
understood that English barristers have attempted to assert rights of audience 
before the Inner House, in an appeal from an Employment Tribunal. It is 
submitted that allowing English counsel to appear in Scots courts would have 
serious, and damaging, consequences. It would be a short step to allowing 
barristers to argue points thought to be common to the whole of the UK. Larger 
corporations, or English-based parties, may simply instruct English counsel, 
thereby putting Scots practices at risk. There is also a risk that points of 
48 Lord Reed, "The constitutionalisation of private law", 69. 
49 Civil Evidence Act 1972, c. 30, s4. This is not possible in Scotland at common law (Kille: v 
Killen 1981 SLT (Sh Ct) 77 at 82). 
so Macphail, Evidence, para 2.07. 
51 Insofar as any application of foreign law can be described as accurate. Fentiman makes the 
point well that "We need not expect the proof of foreign law to produce a correct result, any 
more than the process of adjudication ever does so. But we may insist that the process be 
authentic, capturing the assumptions, reasoning and idiom of the foreign forum" (Fentiman, 
Foreign Law, p20). 
52 (28 January 2000, unreported). 
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difference between the two systems become lost, as the Scots system becomes 
swamped by the personnel of our larger neighbour. 
It is therefore submitted that there is no reason why, in principle, English law 
should be any easier to prove than the laws of a politically foreign jurisdiction. 
The possibility of agreeing, in effect, to proceed upon a version of the law which 
may be out of date (as with the English Civil Evidence Act 1972), seems to 
undermine the goal of reaching a conclusion on the foreign law, such as would 
have been arrived at by a court of that foreign country. Nor, for the reasons 
outlined above, would it be of benefit to allow English lawyers to appear in a 
Scots court and present cases in which a question of English law arises (as 
opposed to the unobjectionable practice of leading such lawyers as expert 
witnesses in the course of a proof). In appropriate cases, however, the procedure 
under the British Law Ascertainment Act 1859 might be worth adopting, and thus 
its potential in intra-UK cases should not be forgotten by practitioners. 
One quirk in the system is, however, provided by the position of the House of 
Lords. The laws of all parts of the UK are deemed to be within their Lordships' 
judicial knowledge. 53 Hence, what has been a matter of fact and proof below, 
may become a matter of law and argument above. Moreover, if evidence of 
English law has been led in the Scottish courts, the House of Lords may rely on 
their own knowledge of English law to find the opinion evidence mistaken. 
54 The 
extent to which the ability of the House of Lords to call upon English and Scottish 
law has resulted in the introduction of English concepts into Scots law has already 
been noted. 55 
The connecting factor in matters of status 
The connecting factor may provide the basis on which a court takes jurisdiction in 
areas such as divorce, or dictate which law is to be applied, for example, to 
questions of capacity to marry. Despite increasing encroachment by the use of 
53 Presumably this would also be the case in the Supreme Court proposed by the current 
government (see pp63-64 above). 
54 Macpherson v Macpherson (1852) 1 Macq. 243 per Lord Chancellor St. Leonards at 248. 
55 See pp61-63 above. 
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concepts such as habitual residence, 56 domicile remains perhaps the most 
important connecting factor in matters of status within both jurisdictions of the 
UK. 57 Traditionally, however, domicile has been seen as a badge of a Common 
Law system, whereas the use of nationality as a connecting factor is more closely 
linked to civil law countries. 58 Why then has the former been favoured in 
Scotland? Why, indeed, is a connecting factor required to link persons to 
Scotland, rather than to the UK? 
The answers to these questions can be traced back to the Acts of Union. As has 
been seen, the system of the Acts was to establish one nation state (Britain), but to 
preserve two legal systems. This constitutional set-up was already in place when 
the use of nationality as a connecting factor gained significant ground. 
59 
Accordingly nationality could not operate as an adequate connecting factor in the 
UK, since this would not indicate which system of private law should govern, for 
example, issues of capacity to marry, or choice of law in succession. Instead a 
connecting factor was required to link persons to a particular legal system within 
Britain, and the concept of domicile could fulfil this role. Thus whilst shorthand 
references are often made to a Scots domicile, it must be remembered that this 
domicile does not connect a person to Scotland per se, but rather to the Scots 
legal system. Even proponents of the use of nationality as a connecting factor, 
such as Mancini, recognised that domicile was more appropriate where a state 
consisted of a number of legal systems. 60 
The nature of domicile in both England and Scotland, with the persistence of the 
domicile of origin, is often said to spring from the position of Britain as the 
headquarters of an Empire, and the consequent desire to preserve ties between the 
56 See, for example, Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, c. 60; the Brussels II Regulation. 
Ordinary residence can also be of relevance. See P. North, Private International Law 
Problems in Compton Law Jurisdictions (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp8-9. 
57 It remains, for example, of significance in questions of choice of law in succession, capacity to 
marry, and status generally. 
58 K. H. Nadelmann, "Mancini's nationality rule and non-unified legal systems: nationality versus 
domicile" in K. H. Nadelmann, Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1972), p49 at 49. 
59 Crawford, International Private Lativ, para 6.28. 
60 Nadelmann, "Mancini's nationality rule and non-unif ied systems", p49. 
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Empire's servants and their homeland. 61 As has already been noted, the British 
Empire was an enterprise in which Scots are now recognised to have played a 
significant part, 62 and thus this rationale is as important for Scotland, as for 
England, in the development of domicile rules. Both before, and after, she gained 
access to a British Empire, Scotland saw periods of mass emigration. 63 Again, 
this may tend to buttress a concept of domicile which retains links with its 
peoples, however far they may have travelled. 64 A contrast can be made with the 
United States, which over the centuries has been a receiver of immigrants, and 
thus logically favours domicile rules which lay emphasis on easy changes of 
domicile. 65 In fact, cases now regarded in England and Scotland as seminal on 
the continuance of the domicile of origin, 66 and the revival of the domicile of 
origin, 67 were actually Scottish cases heard by the House of Lords on appeal. 
It has been suggested in the past that it may be easier for a person to change his 
domicile as between the jurisdictions of the UK, than between Scotland and a 
politically foreign country. Is this so? The connecting factor of nationality is 
"state-centred": 68 nationality is in the gift of a state, and will generally only be 
gained or lost as a result of application by the citizen to the state. Political 
changes to the state may affect a person's nationality, 69 but less commonly his 
domicile. Indeed domicile, by contrast, is "person-centred". 70 It has been well- 
described as a person's "'legal' centre of gravity" 7' Based as it is on a number of 
factors concerning a person's residence, intention and state of mind, it is open to a 
person to change his domicile at his own hand. It is not dependent on acceptance 
by a state. At their most general level, the rules of domicile are designed to 
61 J. G. Collier, Conflict of Laws, 3`d edn. (Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp5l-52; R. H. 
Graveson, "The law of domicile in the twentieth century" in R. H. Graveson, Comparative 
Conflict of Laws (North-Holland, 1977), Vol I, p160 at 160. 
62 See pp76-77 above. 
63 See, for example, Devine, Scotland's Empire, Chaps 1,5 & 6. 
64 C. Robertson, "International succession law: a co-ordinated approach? " (1989) 34 JLSS 377 at 
379. 
63 Ibid.; Collier, Conflict ofLaivs, p51. 
66 Bell v Kennedy (1868) 6M (HL) 69. 
67 Udny v Udny (1869) 7M (HL) 89. 
68 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p 123. 
69 See Re O'Keefe [1940] Ch 124, in which a British national who had a domicile of origin in the 
south of Ireland (and had acquired an Italian domicile of choice) was held to be a national of 
the new Republic of Ireland, on her death. 
70 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p123. 
71 K. McK. Norrie, "Personal law: concept and development" 1983 SLT (News) 53 at 53. 
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identify the legal system, rather than the political state, with which the propositus 
is most closely linked. It is therefore submitted that, in theory, the fact that the 
competing legal systems in a question of domicile are part of one political country 
should make no difference to the application of the rules on domicile. Domicile 
eschews the political influence of the state implicit in a nationality-based 
connecting factor. The factors which are taken into account in determining 
whether a person has altered his domicile are not tied inseparably to notions of 
political state. Whilst it may in the past have been easier to move from Scotland 
to England, than to a country outwith the UK, 72 in principle, this touches only on 
the residence component of domicile, which factually and legally is easily 
changed within one sovereign state. Furthermore, such practical ease of 
movement is not available only within a politically unified nation. The existence 
in the past of a large Empire, together with certain government encouragement of 
migration, allowed inexpensive movement to English-speaking countries, where 
newly-arrived immigrants remained under the protection of the British Crown. In 
modem times, the European Union has introduced measures to allow workers to 
move within Europe, with certain minimum rights guaranteed. In theory then, it 
should be no easier to change domicile as between Scotland and England, than 
Scotland and other countries. 
It is submitted that this is supported by the case law. In the case of Liverpool 
Royal Infirmary v Ranisay73 a Scotsman lived in Liverpool for almost forty years, 
and showed no desire to return to Scotland. However, it was found that his move 
to Liverpool was motivated by a wish to obtain support from his family in 
Liverpool, and that his long residence there was not coupled with the requisite 
intent to effect a change of his Scottish domicile. There is no suggestion in the 
72 See the comments of Sir Jocelyn Simon P in the English case of Henderson v Henderson 
[1967] P 77 at 79-80: "England and Scotland have distinctive legal systems. But the high 
roads between the two countries are not barred by any frontier; there is merely a border to be 
crossed. A common tongue is spoken on either side. Many English people go to work in 
Scotland and even more Scotsmen come to work in England. They settle down in a new home 
near the place where they are working. Intermarriage is frequent. But most people, and not 
least Scotsmen, retain a pride of ancestry and a sentiment of attachment to the land of their 
fathers. It is often difficult to determine whether they have settled in their new place of 
residence with the intention of making it their permanent home; or whether they intend to 
return at some time to live permanently in their country of origin; or whether, thirdly, the 
residence is quite indeterminate in character, no clear intention as to ultimate permanent 
residence being formed". 
73 1930SC(HL)83. 
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judgments of a less stringent test for acquisition of a new domicile within the 
UK. 74 The more recent cross-border case of Reddingtorz v Riach's Executor75 may 
have found there to be a loss of Scottish domicile, but again there is no indication 
that the judge directed himself to a different test because the issue was whether 
the propositus had a Scottish or English domicile. 76 Furthermore, as Lord Sands 
once observed "[r]esidence in England, or other relations with England, will never 
establish a domicile in Scotland". 77 
Some nations which make use of domicile as a connecting factor do appear to 
allow easier alteration of domicile within a country, but this effect has been 
achieved by legislation. In New Zealand there are rules to assign domicile when a 
person arrives in the country with a clear intention to stay in New Zealand, but is 
as yet uncertain as to the part of the country in which he will settle. 78 Such 
legislation, however, only affects new arrivals to the country. Australian 
legislation on this topic is more far-reaching. Anyone who is "domiciled in a 
union, but is not ... domiciled in any particular one of the countries that together 
form the union", will be assigned the domicile of the country "with which he has 
for the time being the closest connection". 79 It might be speculated that this 
legislation makes it easier to assign to an immigrant the domicile of one of the 
Australian states, even if it is not yet clear in which state he will ultimately settle. 
Perhaps the legislation reflects Australia's status, like the United States, as a 
receiver of immigrants. In the past, the Law Commissions have recommended 
legislation on the Australian model, although alert to the very real danger that a 
domicile may be allocated which does not spring from particularly close ties with 
74 See also Sellars v Sellars 1942 SC 206, in which an English domiciliary posted in Scotland 
during the Second World War was unable to establish the acquisition of a Scottish domicile of 
choice. 
75 2002 SLT 537. 
76 It might, however, be thought after comparison of Liverpool Royal Infirmary v Ramsay 1930 
SC (HL) 83; and Reddington v Riach's Executor 2002 SLT 537, that the task of dislodging the 
domicile of origin, whatever it be, has become easier in modem times. 
77 Grant v Grant 1931 SC 238 at 254. 
7$ Law Com. No 168/Scot. Law Com. No 107, Private International Laiv: the Law of Domicile 
(Cm 200) (1987), para 7.6. Note, for historical interest, what was effectively the allocation of 
a domicile within the UK to refugees in the Guardianship (Refugee Children) Act 1944 (7 &8 
Geo VI), c. 8, s2. 
79 Domicile Act 1982, sl1. 
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the jurisdiction in question. 80 Looked at solely in terms of alteration of domicile 
as between the jurisdictions of the UK, it is submitted that there is no good 
theoretical reason for the introduction of such legislation. The concept of 
domicile is sufficiently subtle, and flexible, to deal with movement of persons 
between Scotland and England. 
However, modem times have seen a weakening of the claims of both domicile81 
and nationality82 to be pre-eminent connecting factors within the law of persons. 
There is now a range of connecting factors, mostly variations on residence, for 
example, habitual residence or ordinary residence. Poland once had two different 
connecting factors, one for conflicts with other countries and one for conflicts 
within Poland. 83 Scots law has never embraced such an approach. Whilst it now 
recognises a number of possible connecting factors, the applicability of these is 
determined on a topical, rather than geographical, basis. More recently, however, 
the possibility of different connecting factors being used within the UK, from 
those relevant to foreign states, has arisen. Conventions and legislation from the 
European Union may prescribe a connecting factor between members states, but 
the UK may be free to choose whether to apply the European rules as between its 
constituent parts. This issue will be examined in a later chapter. 
84 
It would also be possible for different connecting factors to be adopted by the 
Scots and English legal systems respectively in a particular area. Were this to 
occur, would it be desirable? It is instructive to look at jurisdiction in custody 
matters prior to the passing of the Family Law Act 1986. Scottish courts would 
assume jurisdiction on the basis of the child's domicile as a matter of status, 
whereas English courts were prepared to take jurisdiction if the child was 
80 Law Com. No 168/Scot. Law Com. No 107, Private International Law: the Law of Domicile 
(Cm 200) (1987), paras 7.8 & 7.4. 
81 See, for example, North & Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law, pp160- 
162; Law Commission/Scottish Law Commission, Custody of Children - Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement within the United Kingdom (Working Paper No 68/Memorandum No 23) (1976), 
paras 3.44-3.52. 
82 Nadelmann, "Mancini's nationality rule and non-unified systems", p81; Th. M. dc Boer & R. 
Kotting, "Private international law" in J. M. J. Chorus et al., Introduction to Dutch Law, 3`d 
revised edn. (Kluwer Law International, 1999), p265 at 276. 
83 Nadelmann, "Mancini's nationality rule and non-unified systems", p74; Lasok & Stone, 
Conflict of Laws in the European Community, pp126-127. 
84 See Chap. 6. 
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resident, or present, in England as a matter of protection. The use of these 
different connecting factors meant that both courts might claim jurisdiction in the 
same case. This occurred in Stuart v Moore, 85 and having both assumed 
jurisdiction, the Court of Session and the English Chancery Court delivered 
opinions, each at variance with the other. In Babington v Babington86 the Court 
of Session considered it had jurisdiction based on the child's domicile, and would 
not decline jurisdiction in favour of an English court which took jurisdiction on 
the ground of the child's presence. The ultimate result was two irreconcilable 
decrees. This is as undesirable within the UK, as it is on a wider stage. 
Interestingly, in modem times a proposed bill on civil partnerships in England and 
Wales required only the residence of one of the parties in the UK for cohabitants 
to be able to register their relationship, and thus obtain particular rights in law. 
87 
A later bill on this subject altered the connecting factor to habitual residence or 
domicile (of one partner), and narrowed the territory indicated by that connecting 
factor to England and Wales. 88 This raised the possibility of a Scottish 
domiciliary, unable by virtue of Scots common law to enter into a marriage with 
someone of the same gender, entering into a statutory civil partnership under such 
an English statute. Would Scots law recognise the relationship? 89 It now seems, 
however, that this matter is to be dealt with by UK wide legislation: another 
potential conflict internalised? 90 
Perhaps the most radical suggestion in the field of connecting factors in questions 
of status is the argument that connecting factors, in the sense of a link to a legal 
system other than the one in which a person is present, should be abolished 
altogether. Raeburn has argued that it should be acknowledged that public policy 
considerations dictate the use of these connecting factors 91 This may well be one 
85 (1860) 22 D 1504; (1861) 23 D 51,446,595,902. 
86 1955 SC 115. 
87 Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill 2001, cl. 1(1). 
88 Civil Partnerships Bill 2002, cl. 2(1)(b). 
89 Examining similar Scandinavian legislation, Norrie reasoned that a registered homosexual 
partnership, entered into by a Scots couple abroad, would not be recognised in Scotland 
(K. McK. Norrie, "Reproductive technology, transsexualism and homosexuality: new problems 
for international private law" (1994) 43 ICLQ 757). 
90 See pp105 above & 150-151 below, and on the internalisation of conflicts generally, Chap. 4. 
91 W. Raeburn, "Dispensing with the personal law" (1963) 12 ICLQ 125. Such considerations 
are certainly apparent in Law Com. No 168/Scot. Law Com. No 107, Private International 
Law: the Law of Domicile (Cm 200) (1987), para 3.6, in the comment that habitual residence 
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aspect of the development and application of connecting factors. Since it will be 
argued in a later chapter that despite the union of Scotland and England in a single 
political framework, reliance on public policy objections within the UK remains 
possible in Scots law, 92 this does not undermine the case for retaining these 
connecting factors within the UK. In any event, it is submitted that the use of 
such connecting factors is still valuable in the quest to identify the most 
appropriate legal system to determine important matters such as status. 
Property law 
Property law has traditionally been seen as an area of the law where the civilian 
influences on Scots law are much in evidence. Reid has opined that: 
"Scots law is a mixed legal system, but it is a mixture in which the ingredients 
are unevenly distributed ... 
Property law is nine parts Roman to one part 
feudal and, except in the related field of the law of trusts, English law has little 
or no place". 93 
In Scots law property rights are generally easily verifiable through public records, 
and matters are usually 'black and white': one either possesses a real right to 
property which can be ascertained, or one does not, and has only a personal right. 
English law, however, contains rather more shades of grey, the influence of the 
separate equity jurisdiction having created a multitude of rights to property which 
are not a matter of public record. 94 Furthermore, the remedy of specific 
implement has always had a significance in Scotland unknown to the law of 
England. 95 
"would cut the links between many temporary expatriates and their homeland, isolating them 
and their dependants from its law and courts despite their remaining closely connected with 
that country. The results would be particularly dramatic where the cultural background of the 
country of habitual residence, as reflected in its law, was very different or even alien to the 
culture of the person's own country". 
92 See Chap. 7. 
93 K. G. C. Reid, "Sharp v Thomson: a civilian perspective" 1995 SLT (News) 75 at 75. Sec too 
Smits, The Making of European Private Law, p112. 
9, See, for example, P. Birks (cd. ), English Private Law, Vol I (Oxford University Press, 2000), 
Chaps 4&5. 
95 D. M. Walker, The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland (W. Green & Son, 1974), pp276-277. 
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For the purposes of international private law, however, both countries adopt the 
classification of property into immoveables and moveables. This terminology is 
quite different from the English domestic categories, and there is not an exact 
correspondence between the two. 96 In the Canadian Common Law context, 
Castel has argued that: 
"to arrive at an internationally accepted basis upon which to solve ... disputes, 
Canadian courts do not use the common law technical distinction between 
realty and personalty. The more natural civil law distinction between 
movables and immovables has been adopted, even in situations involving 
property located in common law jurisdictions". 7 
In Scots law there is a closer similarity between the domestic and the international 
classifications, both in terminology and in content. Whilst it is true that the 
concept of heritage is jettisoned in international matters, the old bond and 
disposition in security seems to be the only case where the categories of heritage 
and immoveable property may not coincide. 98 
There is little differentiation in the generality of conflict rules in Scots property 
law as to whether English law, or some other legal system is involved 
99 It is 
submitted that this can be accounted for by a number of factors. The Acts of 
Union preserved the distinct legal bases of the two systems of property law. 
However, the existence of a British state allowed persons to travel freely between 
the jurisdictions. Together with the shared language, and the increasing ease of 
travel over the years, this made cross-border landholding a real possibility in 
Britain. '00 By contrast, until the passing of the Naturalization Act 1870, it was 
96 For example, a mortgage is personalty, but in a conflicts context immovable (North & Fawcett, 
Cheshire and Norths Private International Law, p925). 
97 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p155. 
98 R. D. Leslie, "Prior rights in succession: the international dimension" 1988 SLT (News) 105 at 
106; Crawford, International Private Law, para 14.02. An English court might, however, 
treat a Scottish heritable security as movable (see Anton with Beaumont, Private International 
Law, p600). 
99 In contrast the position when property law comes into contact with commercial law has been 
noted in Chap. 4 (see pp84-89 above). 
100 For example the propositus in the cross-border domicile dispute of Marchioness of Huntly v 
Gaskell (1905) 8F (HL) 4, held land in Scotland and England. 
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not possible for non-British subjects to own land in Scotland, or England. 
10, Thus 
at a time when conflict of laws principles applicable to property were developing, 
it can be inferred that most such disputes would be within Britain. 102 Since the 
property laws of Scotland and England differed significantly, the rules developed 
in a British cross-border setting could then be applied, without the need for any 
further alteration, to international property disputes. Secondly, property law has 
for many years been characterised in Scotland by a lack of legislative 
intervention. 103 As has been seen in the last chapter, it is usually through statute 
that internalising solutions are introduced. 
Matters of succession 
Substantive succession law is an area which has been approached quite differently 
on either side of the Tweed, thus giving rise to a number of interesting conflict 
questions. 104 
Perhaps the most obvious difference in domestic law between the jurisdictions 
over the years has been the attitude to provision for close family after death. 
Whereas in Scotland, the spouse and children have long had indefeasible rights to 
fixed portions of the deceased's estate, in England a system of complete freedom 
of testation was favoured. English law has gradually moved to a position where 
the courts have a discretion to award certain relatives and others part of the 
deceased's estate. 105 
Potential cross-border conflicts are resolved in Scots law by reliance on common 
law, international private law, rules. If the deceased died domiciled in Scotland, 
101 1870 (33 & 34 Vict), c. 14, s2; see, for example, Leslie v Forbes (1749) Mor 4636. 
102 For example, cross-border property holdings within Britain giving rise to conflict cases in the 
nineteenth century in the Scots courts include Monteith v Monteith's Trs (1882) 9R 982 and 
Carruther's Trs, Allan's Trs (1896) 24 R 238; and in the English courts, Adams v Clutterbuck 
(1883) 10 QBD 403, and Duncan v Lawson (1889) 41 ChD 394. 
103 Although this may be changing; see Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, asp 9; and the 
current proposals for legislation on the law of the tenement. 
104 Discussed below. As to the future, see the discussion of the possibility of EU legislation at 
p158 below. 
ios The first steps were taken with the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 (1 &2 Geo VI), 
c. 45, and the law is now contained in the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) 
Act 1975, c. 63, discussed below at p126. 
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legal rights are exigible from the moveable estate. 106 It has been posited that 
moveable property, situated in Scotland, but owned by an English domiciliary, 
could not be used to satisfy legal rights. 107 Hence domicile, rather than sites, is 
the key. This result seems justifiable: a legal obligation to provide for the 
immediate family after death reflects the morals of a particular society, and it 
would seem right that the deceased should have 'belonged' to that society before 
he is made subject to such an obligation. The Succession (Scotland) Act 1964108 
also established certain prior rights which accrue to a person's spouse on 
intestacy. One of these is the right to a dwellinghouse in which the deceased was 
ordinarily resident, and had a relevant interest. 109 Concerned as this is with 
immoveable property, it is the lex sites which determines the application of prior 
rights: thus a widow or widower has a right to such a house if it is situated in 
Scotland, but not if it is in England. 11° This reflects the continued importance of 
the lex Situs in questions concerning immoveables. However, a further right, to 
furniture and plenishings from a house in which the deceased was ordinarily 
resident, "' raises a nice point. Technically, these are items of moveable property, 
and thus should be available to a spouse in fulfilment of his prior rights if the 
deceased was a Scottish domiciliary at the date of death. ' 12 In practice, however, 
it is very likely that the furniture and plenishings will be those of the 
dwellinghouse referred to above. 113 There would therefore seem to be much to 
recommend the view that the furniture and plenishings should be within a house 
in Scotland for a prior right to them to be exercised. ' 14 The spouse also has a 
right to a cash sum from the estate. This is only applicable in respect of 
106 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p673. 
107 D. R. Macdonald, Succession, 3`d edn. (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), para 14.26. 
108 1964, c. 41. 
109 Ibid., s8(1). 
110 M. C. Meston, The Succession (Scotland) Act 1964,5th edn. (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002), p133; Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, pp674-675. 
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, s8(3), (4). 
112 Scottish Law Commission, Some Miscellaneous Topics in the Law of Succession (Memo No 
71) (1986), para 6.2(b); Meston, The Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, p134; Anton with 
Beaumont, Private International Law, p675. 
113 Although they may not be: the deceased may have had a number of properties, or may have 
been ordinarily resident in a property in which he did not have the requisite interest demanded 
by s8(1). 
114 Macdonald, Succession, para 14.29; Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p675; 
Leslie, "Prior rights in succession", 105 (in which he argues that the deceased must also be 
domiciled in Scotland at death because the furniture and plcnishings are moveable). 
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moveables belonging to the deceased if the deceased was domiciled in Scotland at 
death, and in respect of heritage in Scotland. ' 15 
The statutory discretionary scheme under English domestic law is triggered only 
where the deceased was a domiciliary of England and Wales, 116 but applies in a 
testate or intestate succession. 117 A spouse, 118 or child, 119 or someone who was 
maintained by the deceased, 120 may seek an order, for example, for a payment 
from the estate or a transfer of property. 121 The test is that reasonable financial 
provision has not been made for that person in the succession. 
122 This is 
measured in terms of what is reasonably required for his or her maintenance, 
except in the case of the spouse, where it is determined by a concept of 
reasonableness. 123 There are a number of factors to which the court must have 
regard in considering the making of such an order. 124 
However, in contrast to the position in substantive succession law, Scots and 
English law rely upon the same conflict rules. In both there is an adherence to the 
scission principle, and the same connecting factors are utilised on either side of 
the border with respect to succession to heritage and to moveables. However, the 
difference between the domestic laws is perceived by some to result in, for 
example, unfair windfalls. 125 The Scottish Law Commission has argued that the 
operation of the principle leads to an "anomaly ... between two 
jurisdictions 
115 Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, s9 (Meston, The Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, pp134-135; 
Anton with Beaumont, Private International Lawv, p675). Under s8(1), a cash sum can also be 
claimed, but this is in lieu of the dwellinghouse, and thus entitlement is also determined by the 
lex situs since it is a surrogate for heritage (Meston, The Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, 
p134), although cf Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p675- 
117 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, sl(1). 
ýýý Ibid. 
118 Ibid, sl(1)(a); and also a former spouse who has not remarried (ibid., sl(1)(b)), or someone 
living as a spouse for a particular period of time (ibid., sl(1)(ba) & I(1A)). 
119 Ibid., sl(1)(c); and also somebody who was treated as a child of the family by the deceased 
(ibid., sl(1)(d)). 
120 Ibid., sl(1)(e). 
121 Ibid., ssl(1) & 2(1). 
122 Ibid., sl(1). 
123 Ibid., sl(2). 
124 Ibid., s3. 
'25 In the nineteenth century case of Train v Train's Executrix (1899) 2F 146, the Court of 
Session found the widow of an Irish domiciliary to be entitled to terce out of two bonds over 
Scottish subjects, since the bonds were heritable in Scots law. The bonds were, however, 
classified as movable under the law in Ireland and the widow accordingly took a further share 
of the bonds under that law. The case is criticised in Anton with Beaumont, Private 
International Law, p599. 
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which attempt to achieve much the same result in the case of intestacy but by 
different methods". 126 The extent of the coincidence between the aims of the two 
systems could, however, be doubted. Furthermore, whilst heritage and moveables 
are, generally speaking, no longer separately dealt with domestically following 
the passing of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, it is submitted that this does 
not necessarily rob the principle of an international, or intra-UK, justification. 
The law of the situs does have a colourable claim to regulate succession to 
immoveables in its territory. 
Although properly a question of status, issues of legitimacy and legitimation are 
often intimately linked with questions of succession. 127 This is an area where 
widely differing stances once were taken in Scots and English law. In Scotland, it 
was possible for a child to be legitimate, even if the marriage of the child's parents 
was invalid; separately, there were also rules of law that a child could be 
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its parents. 128 In conflict terms, Scots 
law looked to the domicile of the child's parents at its birth, and the domicile of 
the father at the time of the marriage, respectively. 129 A difficulty arose within 
Britain, because not only did English law (unusually) not countenance either 
legitimacy arising from a putative marriage, or legitimation, 130 but its conflict 
rules were designed to reflect this. Legitimacy was determined solely by the view 
of English law as to the validity of the marriage of the child's parents. This is 
illustrated by the case of Shaw v Gould. 131 Miss Hickson married in England as a 
result of the fraud of her groom, Mr Buxton, who was sentenced to imprisonment 
for his pains. Many years later, Mr Buxton was persuaded to go to Scotland, 
where the marriage between himself and Miss Hickson was dissolved. Miss 
Hickson then became married in Scotland to Mr Shaw. The latter had initially 
intended to become a barrister, but instead called to the Scots Bar, and the couple 
remained in Scotland until their death. After Miss Hickson's (or, in the eyes of 
126 Scottish Law Commission, Some Miscellaneous Topics in the Law of Succession (Memo No 
71) (1986), para 6.3. 
127 J. H. C. Morris, The Conflict of Lativs, 5`h edn., by D. McClean (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p295. 
12$ Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, pp487 & 492. 
129 Ibid., pp487-488 & 492. 
130 North & Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law, pp888-889 & 899; Morris, 
The Conflict of Laws, pp296-297 & 303. 
131 (1868) LR 3 HL 55. 
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Scots law, Mrs Shaw's) death, a question arose in the interpretation of her great- 
uncle's will, as to whether the children of her second 'marriage' were legitimate. 
The House of Lords concluded that the first, English, marriage was not dissolved 
by the Scottish divorce, and thus the children of the second 'marriage' were not 
legitimate. Short shrift was given to the point that even if the Scottish marriage 
had been invalid under Scots law, this would not have rendered the children of the 
union illegitimate in Scotland: 
"if a constructive legitimacy of this kind would, under the circumstances, have 
arisen in Scotland, I cannot think that we could be bound to recognise it so far 
as to qualify the offspring of a void marriage to take under the description of 
'children' in an English will". 132 
The conclusion that the children of a couple validly married under Scots law, who 
lived in Scotland for the rest of their days, should be held illegitimate in England, 
appears unsatisfactory. As the editor of Morris observes, the effect of these cases 
was that "English law has no conflict rule for legitimacy, only a conflict rule for 
the validity of marriage". 133 In another sense too, English law was bereft of a 
conflict rule in such cases insofar as the children of a putative marriage were 
concerned: the concept being unknown to English law, their legitimacy could 
never be recognised there. The advent of the twentieth century signalled that a 
different approach might be taken. In the English case of Re Stirling134 the 
legitimacy of a child would determine his right to succeed to certain Scottish, and 
English, property. The child's mother had married a Scotsman in Canada, but he 
had subsequently divorced her in North Dakota. She accordingly remarried, and 
the child was the product of that second relationship. The English judge 
classified the (incorrect) view of the child's parents that the North Dakota divorce 
was valid, as an error of law. After hearing evidence from Scots lawyers, he 
concluded that an error as to fact was required before the child would be regarded 
as legitimate in Scotland as springing from a putative marriage. Thus the child 
was illegitimate. However, the judge seemed perhaps more prepared to 
132 Ibid. per Lord Chelmsford at 79. 
133 Morris, The Conflict of Lativs, p296. 
134 [1908] 2 Ch 344. 
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countenance the possibility of recognising a child's legitimate status despite the 
lack of a valid marriage. Following the introduction of legislation in 1959, the 
laws of England on legitimacy have changed, and the concept of a putative 
marriage is now recognised. 135 Concerningly, however, the editor of Morris is of 
the view that the current legislative provisions would not alter the result of a 
modem-day Shaw v Gould. 136 Similarly, it was only with the introduction of a 
concept of legitimation into English law, that the strictness of the conflicts rule 
was relaxed. 137 In Scotland, legitimation is now governed by statute: the 
Legitimation (Scotland) Act 1968138 provides for the legitimation of a child by the 
subsequent marriage of its parents, effectively if its father is domiciled in 
Scotland at marriage. In the case of Dunbar of Kilconzie, 139 this was said to 
operate so as to legitimate the son of an English domiciliary (who married the 
child's mother in 1912) as from the date of the Legitimation (Scotland) Act 
coming into force. Whilst this might seem a possible statutory interpretation, 
Anton is surely correct to argue that what was important was the English law of 
the father's domicile at the time of marriage, and the date that the legitimation 
came into effect under that law (1959). 140 An interesting point as to how the 
separate Scottish and English legislation meshes together presented itself in 
Wright's Trs v Callender. 141 Both the Legitimation (Scotland) Act 1968 and the 
English Legitimacy Act 1959 contained provisions to the effect that their terms 
did not affect deeds executed before the passing of the respective statutes. The 
House of Lords was concerned to avoid the result that an English legitimation 
could not affect prior English deeds, but was effective in respect of prior Scottish 
deeds. 142 
"s Legitimacy Act 1959 (7 &8 Eliz II), c. 73, and see now Legitimacy Act 1976, c. 31, although 
the proper effect of the conflicts case of Re BischofJsheini [1948] Ch 79 remains a moot point 
(Morris, The Conflict of Laws, pp299-300; North & Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private 
International Law, pp893-894). 
136 Morris, The Conflict of Laws, p301. 
37 Legitimacy Act 1926 (16 & 17 Geo 5), c. 60. 
138 1968, c. 22. 
139 1986 SLT 463. 
140 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p494. 
141 1993 SLT 556. The case concerned the ability of persons to benefit under the trust disposition 
and settlements of their Scottish great-grandparents. The mother of the great-grandchildren in 
question was domiciled in England. The great-grandchildren had been legitimated per 
subsequens niatrinionium on the coming into force of the English Legitimacy Act 1959. 
142 Wright's Trs v Callender 1993 SLT 556 per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 559-560 (expressing the 
obiter view that "While it is for the law of Scotland to recognise the status of legitimacy 
conferred by the Act on the children of fathers domiciled in England at the time of relevant 
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It can be appreciated that the gulf between Scottish and English domestic law on 
legitimacy and legitimation, quickly raised conflict issues. Anton notes that this 
is the cause for the speed with which the subject of choice of law in legitimation 
came to be studied. 143 However, these issues continue to be dealt with by and 
large, by the application of traditional methodology, rather than through 
internalising legislation. 
One further matter is of interest before leaving matters of succession. It is widely 
the case that the property of a deceased dying without heirs will fall to the state. 
However, whereas in most European countries this is a rule of succession, in both 
Scotland and England it is analysed as a Crown right to unclaimed property. 
144 At 
one stage it was recommended by the Scottish Law Commission that Scots law 
should be changed to bring it into line with the majority of European countries, 
145 
and this seems unobjectionable. Possible cross-border difficulties within the UK 
caused by English law remaining unchanged seemed to have been considered, and 
discounted. 146 However, some years later the Commission recorded that it was 
"persuaded that there is at present no compelling reason to alter the basis on 
which the Crown takes and that it could be awkward to have the Crown taking on 
one footing in Scotland and on another in the rest of the United Kingdom". 
147 
Later in this chapter the potential effect of devolution on such reasoning will be 
examined. 
Delict 
Briggs has mused as to "whether there are, in the conflict of laws in general, but 
in tort in particular, differing degrees of foreignness, which in turn suggest that 
the law should develop choice of law rules which vary according to their 
marriage, it must also be appropriate for that law to recognise that the legitimacy so conferred 
was subject to limitation"); and per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle at 563 (the avoidance of such 
a "bizarre" result strengthening his view on the correct interpretation of the testator's 
intention). See also E. Crawford, "It's a wise testator who knows his own great grandchildren" 
1994 SLT (News) 225. 
143 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p492. 
144 Scottish Law Commission, Some Miscellaneous Topics in the Law of Succession (Memo No 
71) (1986), para 6.12. 
145 Ibid., paras 6.12-6.13. 
146 Ibid., para 6.12. 
147 Scot. Law Com. No 124, Report on Succession (1990), para 10.10. 
130 
context". 148 As has been touched upon earlier, in both Canada and Australia, at 
least for a period of time, it was thought by some to be appropriate to have 
different choice of law rules in tort dependent upon whether the case was 
international or interprovincial/interstate. 149 The extent to which this was said to 
be justified with reference to the constitutional arrangements of those countries, 
and the inapplicability of that reasoning to the situation of the UK, has already 
been discussed above. '50 Another factor mentioned in the case of Tolofson v 
Jensen was the ease with which the laws of the various Canadian provinces could 
be ascertained within Canada, '51 but the position in the UK has been touched on 
above. 152 A further argument put forward in Breavington v Godleinan as 
justification for the differentiation between international and Australian interstate 
conflict cases, was that a person would appreciate that he was moving between 
states which had different systems of law. 153 It is unclear why this justifies a 
different approach from that adopted in international matters, since it is usually 
just as apparent that one is crossing an international boundary, if not more so: 
"whereas it may be plain within Europe that one is in Rome, it may not be so 
obvious in the United States that one is not in Kansas any more". 154 This 
observation applies with equal force to the border between Scotland and England. 
Certainly Scotland has never differentiated between England and other countries 
in the application of choice of law rules in delict. Matters have been dealt with by 
undiscriminating, common law, international private law rules. These rules have, 
for the most part, now been replaced by a statutory lex loci delicti rule, with a 
flexible exception, introduced by the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995.155 The possibility of an exception for delicts and torts 
148 Briggs, The Conflict ofLativs, p178. 
149 Interestingly, it would appear that the vast majority of tort conflicts cases raised in Australia 
are interstate, rather than international (Nygh, "Choice of law in tort in Australia", 60). 
iso See Chap. 3, in particular pp57-70 above. 
ýs' Tolofson vJensen (1994) 120 DLR (4`h) 289 per La Forest J at 312-313. 
152 See pp113-114 above. 
153 Breavington v Godleinan (1988) 169 CLR 41 per Mason CJ at 78. 
154 Briggs, The Conflict of Laws, p177. 
Iss 1995, c. 42; for the potential difficulties in establishing the locus delicti see B. J. Rodger, 
"Ascertaining the statutory lex loci delicti: certain difficulties under the Private International 
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995" (1998) 47 ICLQ 205. There is likely to be EU 
legislation (the proposed "Rome II Regulation") on this subject in the future, on the effect of 
which see Chap. 6. 
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occurring entirely within the UK had been considered. '56 On this approach, the 
law of the part of the UK in which the most significant elements of the wrong 
took place would have been applied. 157 Consequently, there would have been no 
statutory displacement rule within the UK. 158 It seems clear that this did not 
reflect a decision that different rules were appropriate depending on whether the 
case was international or intra-UK. Rather it was driven by the consideration that 
common law rules may in the past have dictated that English law would always 
be applied to torts occurring in England. 159 No authority was cited by the Law 
Commissions for such a rule forming part of Scots law. It is unclear from cases 
such as Convery v Lanarkshire Trannways Co160 and Naftalin v London, Midland 
and Scottish Railway Co161 whether Scots law would apply to delicts within 
Scotland because it was the lex loci delicti, or as a result of the application of the 
double rule. Given the stress placed upon the lex loci delicti rather than the lex 
fori by the Scots courts, and the uncertainty surrounding the ability to rely upon a 
flexible exception in Scots law, 162 this issue has perhaps caused less concern in 
Scotland than in England. In any event, for the reasons stated at the outset of this 
section, a differentiated approach is as undesirable as it was unprincipled, and was 
indeed ultimately rejected. 163 The Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act makes it clear that its provisions apply equally between Scotland 
and England, as between Scotland and foreign countries. 164 The factors listed as 
ones which a court might take into account in considering whether to displace the 
general rule, can be said to relate to the factual aspects of the case. 
165 There is 
accordingly nothing to prevent the displacement provision being utilised as 
156 Law Com. No 193/Scot. Law Com. No 129, Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort 
and Delict (1990), paras 3.14-3.19. 
157 Ibid., cl. 3 of the proposed Bill (pp38-40). 
1S$ Ibid. 
15, Ibid., paras 3.14-3.19; and see Ennstone Building Products Ltd v Stanger Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 
3059 (the cause of action having arisen prior to the passing of the legislation described above), 
in which negligent advice provided by the Scottish office of an English company to the 
English claimant, in respect of stone used in a Scottish building, was held to be an English tort, 
and thus English law applied. 
160 (1905)8F117. 
161 1933 SC 259. 
162 See p133 below. 
163 See the criticisms of the Law Commissions' proposal in P. B. Carter, "Choice of law in tort and 
delict", [1991] 107 LQR 405 at 415-417. 
164 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s9(7). 
165 Ibid., s12(2). 
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between Scotland and England. There is also a public policy exception, '66 
however, the ability of a court to avail itself of such an objection to rules of law 
within the UK will be examined in a later chapter. 167 
The old common law choice of law rule continues to apply in defamation 
actions. 168 In Scots law, this rule operates so as to require that the delict should 
be actionable under both the lex loci delicti and the lex fori. 169 The test under 
English law, whilst similar and driving from the same (English) roots, is not in 
exactly the same terms: the tort has to be actionable by the lcc fori, and not 
justifiable by the lex loci delicti (which was eventually found to mean that the 
alleged tortfeasor must be civilly liable for his acts by the lex loci delicti). 
170 
Latterly, English law had arrived at the position where either the lex foci or the lex 
loci delicti could be displaced in particular circumstances, 171 but there were no 
instances of its use in Scotland before 1996, and to date there is nothing to 
suggest that a Scots court would in future wish to take, or exercise, such a 
discretion. 172 As between the two jurisdictions, this merely represents slight 
differences in the development and interpretation of the double rule, but on the 
main issue under discussion there is no doubt that the same choice of law rule will 
be utilised in Scots law for delictual events with an English, as opposed to a 
foreign, element. The same view will prevail in England. 
The classic exposition of the application of the double rule in Scotland is the 
intra-UK case of M'Elroy v M'Allister, 173 a case to which history has not been 
166 Ibid., s14(3)(a)(i). An exception if the application of the lex loci delicti would result in 
enforcement of penal, revenue, or other public, laws is contained in s14(3)(a)(ii). The 
operation of these concepts within the UK has already been discussed at pp48-51 above. 
167 See Chap. 7. 
161 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s13. 
169 See Naftalin v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co. 1933 SC 259; M'Elroy v M'Allister 
1949 SC 110. 
170 Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1; Chaplin v Boys [1969] 2 All ER 1085; see also Ennstone 
Building Products Ltd v Stanger Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 3059. The case of Machado v Fontes 
[1897] 2 QB 231 was authority in England for a spell, but was disapproved in the Scottish case 
of M'Elroy v M'Allister, supra (see, for example, the comments of Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson 
at 118). 
171 Chaplin v Boys, supra; Red Sea Insurance Co. Ltd v Bouygues SA [ 1994] 3 WLR 926. 
172 B. J. Rodger, "The Halley: holed and now sunk" (1996) 1 SLPQ 397 at 399-400; Crawford, 
International Private Law, paras 13.14-13.16; Anton with Beaumont, Private International 
Law, pp404-405. 
173 1949 SC 110. 
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kind, 174 but which bears further examination. Mr McElroy was employed by a 
firm based in Glasgow. Whilst in one of the firm's lorries, which was being 
driven by the defender (a Glasgow resident), an accident occurred and Mr 
McElroy was killed. The accident happened at Shap, in the north west of 
England, and Mr McElroy and the defender had been heading south at the time. 
The pursuer (Mr McElroy's widow) brought an action in the Court of Session, 
both as his widow, and in her capacity as executrix. It was not at that time 
inevitable that the widow would also be executrix. She sought damages under 
four heads: solatiuni; a sum under the English Fatal Accidents Acts; a sum 
under English law in terms of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1934; 175 and funeral expenses. The pleadings, even to modern eyes used to a 
more relaxed approach, are not admirable. It was said that Scots law applied, or 
that alternatively English law may apply in which case only certain of the claims 
should succeed. There is no appreciation of the application of the double rule. 
However, the double rule was applied both before the Lord Ordinary, and on 
appeal to a bench of seven judges, with the net result that the pursuer received 
only funeral expenses. A bench of seven judges has considerable scope for 
overturning older authorities to achieve a just result. However, it seems that in all 
the circumstances the judges were not convinced that the outcome was unfair. 
'76 
The claim for solatium fell because there was no such award under the lex loci 
delicti. The claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts was time-barred under English 
law, and the judges were particularly critical of the notion that the defender 
should be robbed of this defence simply by the device of the pursuer bringing the 
action in Scotland. '77 The claim as executrix under the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 was valid under English law, but had no 
Scottish equivalent, and so also failed. It should be noted that, certainly in 
modern times, any sums awarded under this Act must be set off against awards in 
174 Collier describes the case as "unfortunate", with a "preposterous result" (Collier, Conflict of 
Laws, pp221 & 223). For the editor of Morris it is an example of how the double rule can 
cause "gross injustice" (Morris, The Conflict of Laws, p361); and see also the oblique, 
unflattering, reference by Lord Wilberforce in a parliamentary debate (Lord Wilberforce, HL 
Debs, vol 559, col 841). 
175 1934 (24 & 25 Geo V), c. 41. 
176 Only Lord Keith maintained a partial dissent. 
177 1949 SC 110 per Lord Russell at 126-127; per Lord President Cooper at 137. 
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terms of the Fatal Accidents Acts. 178 It was clear that Lord President Cooper was 
of the view that the pursuer should properly have raised her case in the English 
courts. 179 Seen in the light of its circumstances the result is perhaps not as 
monstrous as critics have suggested. It may be thought to be unfortunate that the 
pursuer was not allowed to recover either solatium or a sum under the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. However, the latter was payable to 
an executor, and it was simply fortuitous that the pursuer also held that capacity. 
Solatiuni is a uniquely Scottish concept, and it might be questioned whether a 
defender should properly expect, when driving under English highway rules, to 
become liable for such a sum. It has been said that the accident happened "a mere 
40 miles south of the border", 180 and so the application of English law was 
inappropriate. However, the argument for giving a role to the lex loci delicti 
should not recede the closer one is to home. 181 
It is interesting to speculate whether a different result would be achieved under 
the new statutory provisions were an accident with these facts to occur today. It 
is submitted that a radically different conclusion would not be reached. If the 
pursuer was (fortuitously) executrix, she would receive an award under the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. Otherwise she would only receive 
the funeral expenses, were section 11 of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 applied. Would the displacement rule 
contained in section 12 have been applied? The editor of Morris clearly thinks 
this would be appropriate. 182 The English courts have now twice invoked the 
displacement rule in cases where an English passenger has been injured in a car, 
driven by an English driver, in an accident on foreign roads. 183 In a road accident 
in another EU member state, the ability to raise an action other than in the courts 
178 P. Shears & G. Stephenson, James' Introduction to English Law, 13th cdn. (Butterworths, 
1996), pp314-315. 
179 1949 SC 110 per Lord President Cooper at 139 (interestingly he remarks that "Difficulties may 
of course arise in founding jurisdiction against the defender in the foreign forum, but I should 
consider that risk a slight one where the foreign forum is England"). 
180 Morris, The Conflict of Laws, p356. 
181 And indeed in this example the parties were travelling away from Scotland! 
182 Morris, The Conflict of Laws, p356. 
183 Edmunds v Sinunonds [2001] 1 WLR 1003; Hamill v Hamill (24 July 2000, unreported). Sec 
also the remarks in Roerig v Valiant Trawlers Ltd [2002] 1 All ER 961 per Waller LJ at 967- 
968. In Hulse v Chambers [2001] 1 WLR 2386, it was noted that the plaintiff had accepted 
there was no displacement, despite the first two cases referred to, which were said to be 
factually comparable. 
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of the place where that accident occurred, will depend on the domicile of the 
defender. Accordingly the English courts will only have jurisdiction in 'foreign' 
accidents of that kind if the defendant is English domiciled. 184 If foreign law is 
always to be displaced in these circumstances, then this may point to the 
establishment of a homeward trend, whereby English law will usually be applied 
in cases before the English courts, of torts committed abroad. 185 Furthermore, in 
Roerig v Valiant Trawlers Ltd' 86 the (English) lex loci delicti was not displaced in 
a claim by a Dutch woman in respect of her Dutch husband, who was an 
employee of a Dutch company and was injured on an English-registered trawler 
owned by an English company (a subsidiary of a Dutch company) which had set 
sail from a Dutch port to fish. These cases therefore seem somewhat concerning. 
Interestingly, although in M'Elroy v MAllister187 both the deceased and the 
defender were Scottish, as has been seen the court appears to have been of the 
view that England, and not Scotland, was the proper place for the action to have 
been raised. 188 It can be inferred from this that the court in that case would not 
have been minded to invoke any available displacement rule to apply Scots law. 
It is to be hoped that a more thoughtful jurisprudence will characterise the 
Scottish approach to the new statutory rules, in that any tendency in England to 
refer too readily to the forum's law will not be slavishly followed in Scotland. 
The precise amount recovered in damages for delictual actings with an English, or 
a foreign, element, also remains a matter governed by rules of international 
private law. In both intra-UK, and international, situations, Scots law adheres to 
the rule that the availability of heads of damages is a matter for the law which 
184 If the defendant is English resident, but the plaintiff is resident in the country in which the 
accident occurred, it might be thought more likely that the latter will choose to raise the action 
in his home court, and not in England. Such facts arc therefore perhaps unlikely to come 
before the English courts. 
185 See B. J. Rodger, "Developments in international private law in 2000" (2001) 6 SLPQ 293 at 
302. It is reminiscent, perhaps, of the position in the past, where a fictional English locus was 
assigned to torts which had occurred abroad, in order to bestow jurisdiction on an English 
court. Although note that the proposed Rome II Regulation would allow, as an exception to 
the general rule, a delictual obligation to be governed not by the law of the country where the 
damage arises, but by the law of the country in which both the perpetrator of the delict and his 
victim are habitually resident (the Wallis Report, however, suggests this should simply be one 
of a number of factors in deciding whether the general rule would be inappropriate). Both the 
Rome II Regulation and the Wallis Report are discussed in Chap. 6. 
186 [2002] 1 All ER 961. 
187 1949 SC 110. 
188 See also Naftalis v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co. 1933 SC 259. 
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governs liability for the delictual actings, whereas quantification of these heads is 
left to the lex fori. 189 Foreign law may be relevant to quantification in one slightly 
unusual situation. In a claim under the Damages (Scotland) Act 1976, the court 
may take into account that the deceased was under a legal duty to support another 
person. 190 A recent case suggests this is not limited to duties under Scots law. 191 
In contrast, the Australian courts have moved to the position in interstate cases 
where the lex loci delicti now also governs the quantification of damages, 192 
although this approach has not yet been adopted in international cases. 193 The 
appropriateness of a rule obliging damages to be quantified in terms of the lexfori 
is a wide topic of study, the detailed examination of which is outwith the scope of 
this thesis. It can, however, be observed that, at least in intra-UK personal injury 
actions, there would appear to be good reasons for removing the role of the lex 
fori in Scotland in matters of quanttau. Whilst heads of damages may be special 
to a system of law, and thus unusual for the forum, 194 the assessment of many of 
these heads is simply a factual matter. 195 If unfamiliar heads of damages are to be 
enforced, then it would seem both possible and desirable that an approach is taken 
which approximates to that of the system from which they emanate. Even in 
solatiuni-type awards, it might be questioned how far questions of law are really 
involved, as opposed to the derivation of an appropriate figure from a range of 
past awards. It is often argued that losses typically arise in the forum, making the 
law of that court the most appropriate in the exercise of quantification. Of course 
this may not be so, but even in those cases where it is, there seems no reason why 
the location of evidence as to factual matters such as hospital treatment or loss of 
wages particularly requires the quantification thereof by the lac fori. 196 As has 
189 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p405. 
190 1976, c. 13, sl(6). 
19` Shaher v British Aerospace Flying College Ltd, reported in part 2002 SLT 833 , reversed on 
another point in the Inner House. 
92 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36. 
193 Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang [2002] HCA 10. 
194 See, for example, Mitchell v McCulloch 1976 SC 1. 
195 For example, in Scotland, past and future wage loss, or loss of pension rights, are factual 
matters. In the English case of Kornatzki v Oppenheimer [1937] 4 All ER 133, the judge 
concluded that the amount of money to be released was a question of fact, rather than being a 
matter of discretion. 
196 There is, in any event, increasing flexibility in where courts may sit: a New South Wales court 
recently sat in Dublin to take the evidence of an Irishman who was paralysed in a swimming 
accident in Australia ("Australian - legal action heard in Dublin", 
http: //www. rte. ic/news/2002/0902/mulligang. html; "Paralysed swimmer seeks S4.8m", 
http: //www. news. com. au/common/story_page/0,4057,5031 552%5E 1702,00. html). 
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been noted above, the extent to which these arguments might be sufficient in the 
international arena to justify jettisoning the orthodox approach is outwith the 
purview of this thesis. However, it is submitted that they certainly have added 
force in Scottish conflicts cases with an English element. Scottish judges are 
already able to look for guidance to English awards on pain and suffering, and the 
seminal English case of Heil v Ranikin197 has been accepted as a legitimate factor 
for consideration by Scottish judges in domestic damages awards in cases of 
personal injury. 198 The ability to call upon a public policy exception may be 
sufficient to protect the forum from unconscionable quantifications of damages: 
the availability of such an objection within the UK will be examined in a later 
chapter. 199 
Cross-border crime 
In criminal matters, the divide between the Scottish and English legal systems has 
always been distinct. Neither the House of Lords, nor any equivalent, has ever 
had an appellate role in the Scottish criminal justice system. The final court of 
appeal in criminal matters is the High Court of Justiciary sitting in an appellate 
capacity in Edinburgh. 200 English cases do not enjoy the same influence in 
shaping Scots criminal law as they may do in other areas. It is clear that Scots 
law will be applied by the criminal courts in Scotland, and thus both international 
and intra-UK issues resolve purely into questions of jurisdiction. 
201 
American courts over the centuries have tried cases dealing quite literally with 
shootings202 (and'missesi203) over the state line. Such dramatic case law may not 
exist in Scotland, but its courts have been called upon to adjudicate issues of 
cross-border criminal liability within the UK. The rules which have been applied 
197 [2000] 2 WLR 1173. 
198 Duthie v Macfish Ltd 2001 SLT 833; Wallace v Paterson 2002 SLT 563. 
199 See Chap. 7. 
200 Although appeals on devolution issues in criminal cases may now be taken to the JCPC (see 
p63 above). 
201 Various matters akin to recognition issues can arise: these have been discussed in Chap. 4. 
202 State v Hall 114 NC 909,19 SE 602 (1894). 
203 Simpson v State 92 Ga. 41,17 SE 984 (1893). 
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are for the most part derived from common law, and subject to no differentiation 
dependent upon whether the crime has an English, or other foreign, element. 04 
In HMA v Bradbury205 the accused posted in England a letter, requesting goods 
from Scotland, for which he had never intended to pay. Lord Neaves took the 
view that since "[t]he deceptive instrument used, after being set in motion, 
exploded, and took effect ini206 Scotland, the Scottish courts had jurisdiction. It 
was of no moment whether or not the actings complained of were a crime in 
England. 207 It was also said that the Scots court would have been clothed with 
jurisdiction had a Scotsman attempted to perpetrate such a fraud in England. 
208 
Similar facts gave rise to the case of HMA v Allan. 209 Once again the Scots court 
was content to take jurisdiction, but indicated that the English courts could 
equally have heard the case210 The reverse situation occurred in the more recent 
case of Laird and Goddard v HMA. 211 Here a plan was conceived in Scotland, 
and carried out by actions in Scotland and England, to defraud an English 
company. The Scottish courts were found to have jurisdiction, apparently on the 
basis that the genesis of the plan was in Scotland, which also hosted some of the 
machinations necessary to action it. HMA v Bradbury touches on the issue of 
whether actings require to be criminal in England before a cross-border crime is 
prosecuted in Scotland. 212 This problem is rendered particularly acute by the 
power of the High Court in Scotland to declare certain acts to be criminal, even 
although there may have been no prior prosecutions. It is uncertain whether this 
power has survived the introduction of Convention rights into the UK 
jurisdictions. 213 
204 For the position with respect to statutory crimes sec Clements v HMA 1991 JC 62, discussed at 
pp102-103 above. 
205 (1872) 2 Couper 311. 
206 Ibid. at 319. 
207 Ibid. per Lord Neaves at 320; cf the position in the delict of defamation (Evans & Sons v Stein 
& Co. (1904) 7F 65). 
208 HMA v Bradbury (1872) 2 Couper 311 per Lord Neaves at 320. 
209 (1873) 2 Couper 402. 
210 Ibid. per Lord Ardmillan at 407; per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncrciff at 408. 
211 1984 SCCR 469. 
212 See above. 
213 See, for example, C. H. W. Gane et al., A Casebook on Scottish Criminal Law, 3"d edn. (W. 
Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), p8. 
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These are thorny issues. To solve them, commentators have attempted to classify 
crimes into conduct crimes, and result crimes, and thus determine what actings in 
each type of crime should clothe a court with jurisdiction. 214 However, in such 
debates it is unimportant whether the countries involved are Scotland and 
England, or Scotland and another foreign country. The policy reasons for and 
against the prosecution of persons from another jurisdiction215 are not special to 
the intra-UK situation. Similarly in England, it would seem that cross-border 
crimes within the UK are treated no differently from those involving a foreign 
country. 216 
Any legislative provisions in this area have largely been designed to bestow 
jurisdiction in respect of acts committed outwith the UK, and are of no 
application as between Scotland and England. 217 Section 11(4) of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, is remarkable for its rarity: it allows a person in 
possession of property stolen in another part of the UK, or in receipt in Scotland 
of such property, to be indicted as if the property had been stolen in Scotland218 
One remaining issue in the criminal law field is the effect of a previous trial in 
England. Again it seems immaterial to the question of whether the accused has 
tholed his assize whether that trial has been held in England or elsewhere. It is 
stated bluntly in Renton & Brown that "[t]he assize need not be tholed in 
Scotland", 219 for this doctrine to apply. In Hilson v Easson220 it was indicated that 
214 Ferguson, "Jurisdiction and criminal law"; G. H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, 3"' 
edn., edited by M. G. A. Christie (W. Green, 2000), Vol 1, paras 3.42-3.47. 
215 See, for example, G. Williams, "Venue and the ambit of criminal law" [1965] 81 LQR 276 & 
395. 
216 Rv Robert Millar Ltd [1970] 2 QB 54. This case involved the prosecution of a Scottish 
company in respect of the condition of one of its motor vehicles, which was said to have 
contributed to an accident in England. 
217 For example, Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, c. 39, sl6B; Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, ssl l(1) &I IA. 
218 Interestingly, a number of US states have similar provisions (W. R. LaFavc and A. W. Scott, 
Handbook on Criminal Law (West Publishing Co., 1972), pp119-120). Another such unusual 
provision is to be found in the Computer Misuse Act 1990, where certain actings need not have 
taken place in Scotland for a conviction to be secured (1990, c. 18, ss4 & 5). 
219 R. W. Renton & H. H. Brown, Criminal Procedure according to the Law of Scotland, 6th edn. 
(updated looseleaf edition), (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), para 9-09. 
220 (1914) 7 Adam 390. In the course of being tried for an offence in England, the accused 
admitted his guilt of a separate offence for which a warrant had been issued in Scotland. It 
appeared that the English judge had taken this into account when sentencing. The Scottish 
court witheringly dismissed the notion that the accused had tholed his assize, but allowed that 
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an actual trial must have taken place, which was not so in that case. There is also 
a later, obiter remark by Lord Justice-Clerk Hope that if someone has been "tried 
for theft in England, we would not try him again here". 221 Even if the authority 
for the proposition is somewhat sparse, it does seem unlikely that the Scottish 
authorities would wish to re-try someone who has already been tried in England. 
However, whilst the authorities may relate to an intra-UK situation, the pragmatic 
and intuitively just reasons for such an approach apply with equal force to trials 
held in foreign countries. 
A similarity between Scottish and English international private law rules? 
It has been argued that, in the areas discussed in this chapter, a constitutionalising 
or internalising solution has been eschewed, and instead Scots law has used the 
same international private law tools in cases with an English element, as it would 
in truly international cases. Specifically, most of the examples, it will have been 
noted, are of the use of choice of law rules. But, it may be objected, is not Scots 
international private law merely a mirror of English conflict of laws rules? Such 
a viewpoint does no justice to the Scottish international private law rules which, it 
is submitted, have no less a claim to being separate and special to their legal 
system than other areas of Scots law. 
At the outset, it must be recalled that "the trans-border nature of the subject- 
matter and of underlying policy considerations has given rise to significant 
similarities in some areas" 222 of international private law. Across the legal 
systems of the world, therefore, there are many points of coincidence in their 
conflicts rules. 223 This will account for some of the similarities between conflict 
rules in Scotland and England, and indeed other countries. Anton argues that not 
only did Scotland and England learn much from the international private law texts 
in the circumstances the English sentence could be relevant in sentencing in respect of the 
Scottish offence. 
221 Macgregor and Inglis (1846) Ark 49 at 60. And see also Clements v HMA 1991 JC 62 per 
Lord Justice General Hope at 71. 
222 P. B. Carter, General Editor's Preface in Fletcher, Luolvency in Private International Law; sec 
also Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p2. 
223 For example, there has been widespread reliance on the brocard locus regit actuni (see Collins, 
Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laivs, para 32-173). 
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of mainland Europe, but that it was via Scotland that such material reached 
English lawyers. 224 
Moreover, it is not correct to suggest that Scots international private law 
resembles its English equivalent in every particular. They differed, for example, 
in their basic approaches to jurisdiction. In English law the ability to effect 
service was paramount in bestowing jurisdiction on the court, and mere presence 
could suffice. This was not a route favoured by Scots law, the exorbitant 
jurisdictions of the latter tending perhaps to be grounded by the presence of 
property in Scotland. 225 Indeed, when the Brussels Convention required to be 
implemented by the UK, since "Scots law was already much closer to the civil 
law tradition which so influences the 1968 Convention, the provisions of Title II 
... could be taken as the basis for a re-writing of the rules of 
jurisdiction in civil 
cases for Scotland". 226 By contrast, there is no English equivalent in the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of the Scottish Schedule 8 on internal jurisdiction. 
In the field of domicile, Lord President Clyde was unimpressed by the argument 
that there could be a place in the law of Scotland for the concept of Anglo-Indian 
domicile: 
"it is clear that it was evolved and developed entirely in the Courts of England. 
In those same courts, since 1863, no one has had a good word to say for it ... I 
cannot see any reason why, in deciding it in Scotland, we should deliberately 
darken our minds by regarding as authoritative to-day an interpretation by the 
Courts of England of the judgment in Bruces v Bruce, which is now recognised 
to be a legal anomaly in the law of England ... ". 
227 
224 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, pp8-9. The development of a body of 
conflict rules in England is normally traced to the eighteenth century, and the editors of Dicey 
and Morris argue that it "came into prominence ... mainly because of conflicts 
between the 
laws of England and Scotland" (Collins, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Latins, para 1- 
014). 
225 See Crawford, International Private Law, para 18.04. 
226 Annotations by R. C. A. White & H. Currie to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, 
p27-5; and see also the comments of the Lord Chancellor, HL Debs, vol 425, col 1130. 
227 Grant v Grant 1931 SC 238 at 249-250. 
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Turning to family law, in all the circumstances, a Scottish court might be unlikely 
to apply the rule laid down in the English case of Sottomayor v De Barros (No. 
2), 228 which is that a lack of capacity to marry by the law of the domicile of a 
party to a marriage, which does not pertain under English law, will be ignored in 
the event of marriage to an English domiciliary. 229 Furthermore, a Scots court 
will only find a person guilty of bigamy if he has attempted to re-marry in 
Scotland, 230 whereas in England such an attempt by a British citizen will be a 
crime under English law, no matter where it is celebrated. 231 Also, as has been 
seen in this chapter, Scottish choice of law rules differed from those originally 
applied in England in matters of legitimacy and legitimation. 32 
In succession law, there is evidence of a slightly different approach on either side 
of the Tweed to the construction of wills. Thus under Scots law, the law of the 
testator's domicile will be used to determine, for example, who is an 'heir' of the 
testator. 233 But if there is reference in the will to the 'heir' of some other person, it 
is the law of the latter person's domicile which is relevant. 234 Furthermore, the lex 
situs is likely to have a role if heritage is being bequeathed. 235 By contrast, in 
England, the identity of 'heirs' and such like is generally a matter for the testator's 
domicile, unless some contrary intention of the testator can be proved. 236 The lex 
situs is not routinely applied even if immovable property is involved. 
237 
Specifically, the 'heir' of a named person in the will (other than the testator) is still 
decided by the laws of the testator's domicile: much to the chagrin of the editors 
of Dicey and Morris, who favour the position of Scots law. 238 
228 (1879) 5 PD 94. 
229 Crawford, International Private Law, para 9.18, cf Anton with Beaumont, Private 
International Law, p432. Clive takes the view that the rule can "hardly be regarded as firmly 
entrenched" (E. M. Clive, The Law of Husband and {Vife in Scotland, 4`h cdn. (W. Green, 
1997), para 09.061). 
230 Crawford, International Private Law, para 9.09. 
231 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Viet), c. 100, s57; Collins, Dicey and Morris 
on the Conflict ofLaws, para 17-186. 
232 See pp127-130 above. 
233 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, pp692-693; Crawford, International 
Private Law, para 17.30. 
234 Mitchell's Tr v Rule (1908) 16 SLT 189; and Smiths Trs v Macpherson 1926 SC 983, arc the 
authorities for this proposition: both are intra-UK cross-border cases. 
235 Murray v Earl of Rothes (1836) 14 S 1049; Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, 
p694; Crawford, International Private Law, para 17.30. 
236 Collins, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict ofLaws, paras 27R-054 to 27-055 & 27-061. 
237 Ibid., paras 27-063 to 27-064; Collier, Conflict of Laws, p273. 238 Collins, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, para 27-061. 
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As was discussed above, there has also been a slight difference of approach in the 
conflict rules in delict. 239 The common law double rule has not been interpreted 
in the same way in Scotland and England. The likelihood that Scottish courts will 
not avail themselves of any flexible exception in the context of the double rule, 
has also been noted. 
Of course, just as there are such differences, there are also similarities between 
Scots and English international private law rules. As a small jurisdiction, it is 
always natural that Scotland will not accumulate the same breadth of authority, 
and so will have sometimes to look elsewhere for guidance in deciding a novel 
point of law. For much of the period when the subject was developing into the 
framework we recognise today, Scotland and England have been united into a 
British state, 240 and thus English authorities may have been thought to spring from 
sufficiently similar circumstances to provide such guidance. However, in the 
field of international private law, the cross-border influences did not all flow in 
the one direction. As has already been hinted at, many key conflicts cases, 
regarded as so on both sides of the border, arose in Scots courts. 241 Furthermore, 
whilst initially there was "reluctance to equate English law with Scots law", 
242 the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens was finally accepted by the English courts, and 
is now defended there with the zeal of the converted! 243 It also has to be 
remembered that: "Borrowing ... does not by any means ensure similarity. 
A cat 
cannot sing just because it has swallowed a canary". 244 
239 See p133 above. 
240 See Chap. 2. For Lord Reed, "Scots private law became heavily influenced by English law, 
after 1707, through the process of integration of the United Kingdom" (Lord Reed, "The 
constitutionalisation of private law", 70). 
241 See p117 above; and see Lashley v Hog (1804) 4 Paton 581; Mackinnon's Trs v Lord 
Advocate 1920 SC (HL) 171; Administrator ofAustrian Property v Von Lorang 1927 SC (HL) 
80. 
242 North & Fawcett, Cheshire and North's Private International Law, p335. Sec also the 
comments of Lord Diplock that "[i]t would not be consonant with the traditional way in which 
judicial precedent has played its part in the development of the common law of England, to 
attempt to incorporate holus-bolus from some other system of law, even so close as that of 
Scotland, doctrines or legal concepts that have hitherto been unrecognised in English common 
law" (MacShannon vRoclavare Glass [1978] AC 795 at 811). 
243 See, for example, Airbus Industries GIE v Patel and Others [1998] 2 All ER 257 per Lord 
Goff at 271; I. Karsten, "Brussels II - an English perspective" [1998] IFL 75 at 76. 244 Weir, "Divergent legal systems in a single member state", 574. 
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International private law in the lawyers' paradise 
The veteran critic of devolution, Tam Dalyell said that his "fear is that the 
interaction between Holyrood and Westminster will be a lawyers' paradise". 245 
This is not the place to rehearse the political arguments for, and against, 
devolution. However, what is important in the context of this thesis is the effect 
of the new constitutional settlement on the Scottish rules of international private 
law. 
It is submitted that the making of international private law rules is within the 
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, and the remit of the Scottish 
Executive. This seems to have been the view of the Scottish Office prior to the 
transfer of powers. 246 Despite the 'international' tag, conflict rules are not, of 
course, "part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland", 247 nor are 
they a reserved matter, 248 so the Scottish Parliament can legislate in this field. 
This is reinforced by the explicit inclusion of international private law in the 
definition of Scots private law laid down by the Scotland Act. 49 As a 
consequence, international private law also falls within the powers of the Scottish 
Executive. 250 The potential therefore exists for Scottish legislative change in this 
area. 251 Holyrood has been able to devote much greater time to Scottish affairs 
than Westminster had in the past, allowing reforms to be implemented more 
speedily. 252 There is therefore the possibility that Scots conflict rules could 
diverge further from their English counterparts. 
At a more basic level, the advent of a legislative body elected by Scots also raises 
the prospect of a growing gulf between Scots and English private law, thus 
245 Mr. T. Dalyell, HC Debs, vol 307, col 96. 
246 J. L. Jamieson, "Devolution and the Scottish Law Officers" 1999 SLT (News) 117 at 118, 
referring both to private international law, and separately the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments. 
247 Scotland Act 1998, s29(2)(a). 
248 Although the conflicts aspect of a reserved matter, such as intellectual property, will be 
reserved. 
249 Scotland Act 1998, s126(4)(a). 
250 Ibid., s54. 
251 Indeed, the Scottish Executive may not act in contravention of EU legislation, which is 
increasingly important in international private law (ibid., s57(2)). 
252 For example, see annotations by A. Brown to Criminal Procedure (Amendment) (Scotland) 
Act 2002, asp 4, p4-1; annotations by M. Radford to Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) 
Act 2002, asp 6, p6-1; and see Himsworth, "Devolution and the mixed legal system of 
Scotland", 125; Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, pp347-348. 
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creating more regular conflicts for international private law rules to police. The 
voting system adopted lends itself to coalition government, 253 and this indeed has 
been the result of the first two Scottish parliamentary elections. Furthermore, in 
modern British political history the party with the majority of Scots votes has not 
always been the governing party at Westminster. 254 It is therefore likely that there 
will at times be differences in the political make-up of the executives in 
Edinburgh and London, each with their own legislative agenda. Another product 
of the method of electing the Scottish Parliament has been the greater 
involvement of smaller parties and independents. Scottish MPs at Westminster 
are drawn from the Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Scottish 
National, parties: currently the Scottish Parliament includes representation from 
these parties, but also the Scottish Green Party, the Scottish Socialist Party, the 
Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party, and the Save Stobhill Hospital Party, as well 
as a number of independents. This broader spectrum of opinion has the potential 
to change the tone of the Parliament's legislative output. 255 
Thus far, the Scottish Parliament has been responsible for measures which deviate 
from the political programme for England and Wales pursued at Westminster. 
For example, certain forms of animal hunting have been banned in Scotland; 
256 
measures have been passed to control further the physical chastisement of 
children; 257 'up-front' university tuition fees are not payable by Scottish students; 
and the legislative framework has been constructed to allow free personal care for 
the elderly. 258 Freedom of information provisions relating to Scotland are thought 
to be more wide-ranging than the Westminster equivalent. 259 Accordingly 
concerns over different approaches being taken on either side of the border, for 
253 A. Myles, "The new electoral system" in Hassan (ed. ), A Guide to the Scottish Parliament, p89 
at 91. 
254 B. Taylor, Scotland's Parliament: Triumph and Disaster (Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 
p298; R. McLean, "A brief history of Scottish home rule" in Hassan (cd. ), A Guide to the 
Scottish Parliament, p21 at 27. 
255 A good example of the power of a small party to exert influence on the introduction of 
legislation is the input of the Scottish Socialist Party to the Abolition of Poindings and Warrant 
Sales Act 2001, asp 1 (see annotations by S. Styles on Abolition of Poindings and Warrant 
Sales Act 2001). 
256 Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002. 
257 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, asp 7. 
zsa Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act 2002, asp 5. 
259 See annotations by R. McInnes to the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, asp 13, 
p13-4. 
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example, with respect to the nature of the Crown's right as ultimus haeres, may be 
less valid in the post-devolution UK. Arguably the statutes thus far produced by 
the Scottish Parliament may also reflect the importance of principles in Scots 
law. 260 In the past, Acts of the Westminster Parliament might often commence 
with a definition, before setting out a number of technical legal consequences, or 
possible judicial remedies. 261 In any event, Scots law might simply be amended 
by the inclusion of some additional provisions in a statute on a topic, or by 
collecting a number of legislative reforms into a miscellaneous statute. 262 By 
contrast, a number of the Acts of the Scottish Parliament begin by setting out 
broad principles. 263 Perhaps rather than approaching a subject from the 
perspective of the court remedies available, there may in future be a greater 
concentration on the actual content of the rights bestowed. 
However, another matter which must be taken into account when attempting to 
predict how far Scots private law may differ from that of England as a result of 
devolution, is the Sewel Convention. 264 It is generally accepted that the effect of 
constitutional doctrine is that the UK Parliament retains the power to legislate for 
Scotland in devolved matters. Despite some disquiet, 265 this was explicitly stated 
in the Scotland Act. 266 Reassurance was given that Westminster would not, in 
fact, so legislate without gaining the consent of the Scottish Parliament, and the 
procedure of obtaining this agreement has come to be known as a Sewel 
motion. 267 The impression given by Donald Dewar both prior to, and after, his 
260 Cf Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, pp347-348. On the importance of principles 
in Scots law see N. R. Whitty, "From rules to discretion: changes in the fabric of Scots private 
law" (2003) 7 EdinLR 281; and note too Smits, The Alaking of European Private Law, p87. 
261 See, for example, Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 (11 & 12 Gco V), c. 58; Companies 
Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1985, c. 9; Sale of Goods Act 1979; 
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, c. 35; Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985, c. 37. See too as to the level of detail, E. Clive, "Law-making in Scotland: from APS to 
ASP" (1999) 3 EdinLR 131 at 144-145. 
262 McDiarmid, "Scots law: the turning of the tide", 159-160; sec also Mr J. Wallace, HC Debs, 
vo1241, col 379. 
263 For example, see: Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, asp 4; Standards in Scotland's 
Schools etc. Act 2000, asp 6; National Parks (Scotland) Act 2000, asp 10; Mental Health 
(Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, asp 13. 
264 Although Munro has questioned whether it is properly a convention at this stage (J. Munro, 
"Thoughts on the'Sewel Convention"' 2003 SLT (News) 194). 
265 See Ashton & Finch, Constitutional Law in Scotland, para 8.04. 
266 Scotland Act 1998, s28(7). 
267 It initially seemed that this would also entail opposition to a Private Member's Bill purporting 
to legislate for Scotland on a devolved matter, but this does not seem always to have been done 
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election as First Minister, was that these motions would be rare, 268 but this has not 
really been the case. 269 This has caused concern, and certainly a number of 
constitutional law issues are raised. Does the system allow for adequate scrutiny 
of Westminster measures applying to Scotland? 270 Does it needlessly complicate 
the legal system? 271 Does it allow circumvention of the courts' control on 
Scottish legislation which breaches the European Convention on Human 
Rights? 272 Centrally, does it affect the power of the Scottish Parliament to 
legislate on an area in the future? 273 For many there is a worry that it gives away 
the opportunities presented by devolution for Scottish solutions to perceived 
problems. 274 What is important in the context of the present analysis is the 
reasons for the greater than expected use of the Sewel Convention. One motive is 
the concern that a fragmented UK response will generate loopholes. 275 As 
Burrows has noted, the Scottish Executive have prayed in aid the value of 
uniformity, without explaining precisely what that value may be in the areas 
concerned 276 Others have pointed to "a higher-than-predicted quest for 
uniformity of provision, whether because of high electoral expectation of similar 
rules, the need for regulatory equivalence, or because of the similarity of political 
commitment of governments in Edinburgh and London". 277 However, as 
Himsworth has noted "when so-called anomalies are highlighted, they are often 
merely consequences of there being different legal systems"278 In debating a 
Sewel motion on the Civil Partnership Bill 2004, it was said that UK legislation 
(N. Burrows, "This is Scotland's Parliament: let Scotland's Parliament legislate" 2002 JR 213 
at 233-234). 
268 Ibid., 216 & 218-219. 
269 Ibid., 229 & 234; Taylor, Scotland's Parliament, p143; and see Himsworth & O'Neill, 
Scotland's Constitution, p197. 
270 Burrows, "This is Scotland's Parliament", 218 & 231-232; Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's 
Constitution, p199. 
271 Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, p199. 
272 L. Fabiani, SPOR, vol 2, no 6, cols 8955-8956 (3 June 2004). The concern here must be that 
whilst an Act of the Scottish Parliament incompatible with Convention rights could be struck 
down by the Scottish courts, if the matter is legislated on for Scotland by the Westminster 
Parliament, the only remedy is a declaration of incompatibility. 
273 Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, pp196-197; Munro, "Thoughts" 195-196; 
Burrows, "This is Scotland's Parliament", 235-236; Devolution Guidance Note 13, Handling 
of Parliamentary Business in the House of Lords, para 2.2. 
274 See p104 above. 
275 See Burrows, "This is Scotland's Parliament" 224 & 226. 
276 Ibid., 225 
277 Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's Constitution, p198; and see also Burrows, "This is 
Scotland's Parliament", 235. 
278 C. M. G. Himsworth & C. R. Munro, Devolution and the Scotland Bill (W. Green, 1998), p30. 
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was appropriate because the issue touched upon devolved and reserved matters, 
and that separate Scottish legislation "would not be in the best interests of 
consistency or clarity, and ... could lead to problematic cross-border issues". 
279 
Whatever the potential criticisms or advantages, it seems that for the foreseeable 
future these attitudes dictating the use of the Sewel Convention might diminish 
the extent to which Scots law follows a radically different path. 280 
However, the difference wreaked by the passage of time in politics is 
legendary. 281 As has been argued above, it is quite possible that in the future a 
political party, or parties, may be in power in Holyrood, but not Westminster. 
Possible battlegrounds in these circumstances have already been identified by 
commentators, for example Westminster's control over the size of the block grant 
which forms the majority of the public funding open to the Scottish Parliament to 
allocate, 282 and the lack of decisive Scottish input into EU negotiations. 283 
Strained relations, together with ideological differences, could see further 
divergence between Scots and English law, resulting in an increased need to rely 
upon conflict rules within the UK. 
Another factor which may be of some significance for Scots international private 
law is how far a stronger Scottish identity in terms of matters of status emerges: 
whether as a cause or an effect of devolution. For Taylor: 
279 H. Henry, SPOR, vol 2, no 6, col 8946 (3 June 2004). 
280 The extent to which most delegated legislation pertinent to Scotland may be made by the UK 
government rather than the Scottish Executive has also been the subject of investigation (C. T. 
Reid, "Who makes Scotland's law? Delegated legislation under the devolution arrangements" 
(2002) 6 EdinLR 380). 
281 It was Harold Wilson who first remarked that "A week is a long time in politics". 282 Ashton & Finch, Constitutional Law in Scotland, para 8.25; Himsworth & O'Neill, Scotland's 
Constitution, pp394-398; C. Mair & B. McCloud, "Financial arrangements" in Hassan (cd. ), . el Guide to the Scottish Parliament, p73 at 78-80; Taylor, Scotland's Parliament, Chap. 13. 
283 Ashton & Finch, Constitutional Law in Scotland, para 8.45; N. Burrows, "Relations with the 
European Union" in Hassan (ed. ), A Guide to the Scottish Parliament, p125 at 130; T. StJ. N. 
Bates, "Devolution, the European Union and the Scotland Bill" 1998 Scotland Forum (Issue 2) 
4 at 4; Taylor, Scotland's Parliament, Chap. 14. 
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"The history of devolution is that of a people who increasingly believed they 
had a particular national identity and wanted that identity expressed in political 
form. It is a history of political response, not political initiative". 284 
The Scotland Act does not supply a statutory definition of a Scot. However, it is 
necessary to define a Scottish taxpayer. This is, broadly, someone who is resident 
in the UK for income tax purposes, but has his closest connection with Scotland 
in that tax year. 285 The latter concept is linked to the place of principal home and 
the days of residence in Scotland. 286 The adoption of a different approach to the 
funding of university education has also seen the need to devise a definition of a 
Scottish student. It seems that this has been done by using the terminology of 
domicile, but providing specific rules to allow domicile to be determined by a 
simple rule in each case: the student must be UK resident in terms of the funding 
rules, and ordinarily resident in Scotland at the beginning of the university 
course. 287 Therefore as well as the continued role for the common law concept of 
domicile in determining status for the purposes of, for example, succession or 
marriage, there may well be an increasing number of special statutory Scottish 
domiciles, such as those described above. 
It is still too early accurately to assess or predict the full impact which all of the 
factors discussed in this section have had, and will have, on Scots international 
private law rules. Legislation on cross-border adoption has been left to 
Westminster by use of the Sewel motion procedure. 288 There are also conflict 
measures in the Civil Partnership Bill 2004, which would apply to the whole of 
284 Taylor, Scotland's Parliament, pp 116-117; and see also Nairn, After Britain, pp217-220 & 
303-305. 
285 Scotland Act 1998, s75(1). The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 utiliscs the 
concept of habitual residence (ibid., Sch-3, para 1; but as we shall sec this is derived from a 
Hague Convention: see p151 below). However, the court will also have jurisdiction over a 
British citizen with a closer connection to Scotland than another UK jurisdiction (ibid., Sch. 3, 
para 1(2)). 
286 Scotland Act 1998, s75(2), (3). 
287 See University of Strathclyde Student Finance Office, Guidance for U. K. & E. U. 
Undergraduate Students: Session 2000/2001 and Beyond (2000). Liability to the Graduate 
Endowment is, however, determined by, inter alia, ordinary residence in Scotland (The 
Graduate Endowment (Scotland) Regulations 2001, SSI 2001/280). 
288 Sewel motion passed in respect of Adoption and Children Bill (SPOR, vol 11, no 11, cols 
1181-1232 (4 April 2001)). 
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the UK by virtue of reliance on the Sewel Convention. 289 However, the Scottish 
Parliament has ventured into the international private law field. The first point 
which should be made is that there appears to have been a change of terminology. 
Statutes passed by the UK Parliament tended to refer to a 'part of the United 
Kingdom'. 290 However, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, and the 
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, which are a product of 
the Scottish Parliament, make reference to a "country other than Scotlandi291 or a 
"territory other than Scotland". 292 The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act is of 
particular significance. Reform of this general area in Scotland had been 
considered by the Scottish Law Commission, and pressed for by a variety of 
bodies concerned in that field, but the UK Parliament was unable to find space for 
any such measures in its legislative programme. 293 Accordingly, very quickly 
after its establishment, the Scottish Parliament passed the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000. Schedule 3 of the Act deals with jurisdiction, applicable law 
and also recognition and enforcement. Whilst the court may find a law other than 
Scots law applicable, mandatory rules having effect in Scotland cannot be 
evaded. 294 The coming into force of the relevant Hague Convention was, 
however, awaited, before the Schedule would take effect. 295 Excitingly, in 2003, 
for the first time, Scotland alone ratified the Hague Convention on the 
International Protection of Adults. 296 Once the Convention is triggered by the 
requisite further ratifications, Scotland will participate in this international 
scheme, even although the Hague Convention rules may not yet apply in the other 
jurisdictions of the UK. This seemingly bold and independent approach to 
289 The recognition provisions of the Bill have been discussed above at p105. The Bill will also 
prevent the treatment as a civil partnership of an overseas relationship entered into by a 
Scottish domiciliary under a certain age, or who is incapable of understanding the nature of the 
relationship, or which is within certain degrees of relationship (Civil Partnership Bill 2004, 
cl. 209(3), (4)). Jurisdiction with respect to dissolution and annulment of a civil partnership is 
treated in clauses 217 and 211. It is explicitly said that sisting provisions similar to those 
contained in the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, c. 45, Sch. 3, applicable to 
divorce, separation or nullity of marriage, maybe made (Civil Partnership Bill 2004, cl. 218). 
290 For example, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982; Child Abduction and Custody Act 
1985; Family Law Act 1986; Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, c. 36. 
291 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, Sch. 3, para 3(2). 
292 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, s290(5)(a). 
293 A. D. Ward, Adult Incapacity (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), paras 3-4 to 3-6. 
294 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, Sch. 3, para 5. 
295 Ward, Adult Incapacity, para 3-20. 
296 "Scotland makes history at the Hague", Scottish Executive News Release (SEJD349/2003), 4 
November 2003, which also noted that Canada has adopted a similar course in allowing a 
Convention to be ratified in respect of one of its provinces. 
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conflict law-making may, however, still be tempered by consideration of the 
situation within the UK as a whole: Schedule 3 also provides that secondary 
legislation can be introduced allowing for the recognition and enforcement of 
orders from other parts of the UK, and these must not be any stricter than that 
applied with regard to orders from other signatories of the Hague Convention. 297 
The availability of more parliamentary time for Scottish matters in the new 
Scottish Parliament could also speed up the process of the transformation of 
conflicts of law into a largely statutory subject. 298 But it cannot be said that the 
Scottish Parliament has thus far rushed to legislate extensively on international 
private law. Secondary legislation such as The European Communities 
(Matrimonial Jurisdiction and Judgments) (Scotland) Regulations 2001299 was 
necessitated by the Brussels II Regulation, which was an EU development, and as 
has been seen, the conflicts provisions of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) 
Act are tied in to a Hague Convention 300 Clearly it would be foolish not to bear 
in mind the intra-UK aspect when considering future legislation on international 
private law. As has been seen, differing jurisdictional rules in Scotland and 
England have in the past led to unhappy results. However, it has also been argued 
in this chapter that certain reforms of conflict rules may be desirable. It is 
submitted that if the case for such reforms is proven, the Scottish Parliament 
should act, and not be inhibited by a lack of UK-wide consensus. 
"a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the speed of 
service"? 3o1 
Thus did Lord Denning famously describe England in the context of choice of 
forum. Even within the UK market there are variations, both in the goods 
available, and in the speed of proceedings. Indeed, it has been submitted that 
following devolution, differences between the two jurisdictions might further 
297 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, Sch. 3, para 10. 
298 See E. B. Crawford, "What happened to Indyka? A survey of developments in international 
private law 1958-1990" in A. J. Gamble (ed. ), Obligations in Context: Essays in Honour of 
Professor D. M. Walker (W. Green, 1990), p151 at 153. 
299 SSI 2001/36. 
300 Although it must be remembered that there is no obligation to ratify Hague Conventions, in 
contrast to EU measures. 
301 The Atlantic Star [1973] 1 QB 364 per Lord Denning MR at 382. 
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increase. The subject of forum shopping within the UK therefore demands 
scrutiny. 
The availability of remedies plays a large part in the preference of one possible 
forum to another, and this is no less a factor in cases as between Scotland and 
England. At a time when divorce in England was, practically, not possible, the 
nineteenth century writer Caroline Norton explored whether she might be able to 
obtain a divorce of her husband in Scotland: 
"I tried the Edinburgh lawyers. I inquired if they could not prove my marriage 
a Scotch one, all Mr Norton's property being in Scotland, his father a Scotch 
Baron of Exchequer, and his mother of a Scotch family, - but without 
success". 
302 
Some of the cross-border cases of this period illustrate concern being evinced that 
English couples were resorting to Scotland to avoid the effect of English domestic 
law. In Morcomb v Macclelland303 it was said by the Commissary Court that "the 
courts of one country ought not to be converted into engines, for either eluding 
the laws of another, or determining matters foreign to that territory" . 
304 Despite 
this, as has been seen, some ostensibly English couples did manage to obtain 
3os decrees of divorce in Scotland. 
We have seen that a suspicion was entertained by the Court of Session that Mrs 
McElroy may have been attempting to evade the effects of a claim under English 
law being time-barred. 306 A more modern, yet very clear, example of forum 
shopping is provided by Sokha v Secretary of State for the Honte Departm e»t. 307 
This case was remarkable for its lack of any real link to Scotland, and seemed 
only to have been raised to take advantage of the Scots courts' greater readiness to 
grant a particular remedy. In James Miller and Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street 
302 Norton, "A Letter to the Queen", p49. 
303 (1801) Ferg Cons 264. 
304 Ibid. at 264; and see Hosack, A Treatise on the Conflict ofLaws, pp271-272 & 284. 305 See p96 above. 
306 M'Elroy vM'Allister 1949 SC 110 (see pp134-135 above). 
307 1992 SLT 1049 (see pp101-102 above). 
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Estates (Manchester) Ltd, 308 an action was raised in England in which it was 
argued that an arbitration between the parties had been governed by English law, 
and thus a case might be stated to an English court. However, the court noted that 
in the arbitration "Scottish procedure was followed throughout without objection 
until the application was made for a case to be stated. Then for the first time, 
when it was realised that this procedure was not available in Scotland, was any 
attempt made to depart from what had previously been agreed". 309 The arbitration 
was accordingly found by the court to be governed by Scots law and the attempt 
to utilise an English remedy unavailable in Scotland was rebuffed. Differences in 
the rules on financial provision on divorce also act as an encouragement to careful 
forum selection within the UK. 310 Another powerful motivation is money: in a 
variety of ways. Firstly, there is a perception, probably not ill-founded, that 
higher sums of damages are awarded in England than Scotland, particularly in 
defamation actions. 311 This monetary advantage seems to have been the main 
reason for Scottish workmen bringing an action in England for injuries sustained 
in Scotland in MacShannon v Rockware Glass. 312 And how else to explain Foxen 
v Scotsman Publications Ltd313 and Cumming v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday 
Mail Ltd? 314 Both were defamation cases against Scottish newspapers. In the 
first the plaintiff was a Scottish domiciliary, and only ten per cent of the 
newspaper's circulation was in England. The plaintiff in the second was a 
Scottish student, and only about 7.5 per cent of the newspaper's weekly 
circulation of 850,000 was through distribution in England. This factor was quite 
explicitly discussed in Lennon v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd. 315 
The latter's circulation in England was 22,069, but in Scotland more than twenty- 
fold that figure. The defendant argued that: 
308 [1970] 1 All ER 796. 
309 Ibid. per Lord Hodson at 802. 
310 Both in Scotland and England the lexfori will be applied in divorce cases before their courts 
(on the effect of such rules on forum shopping see A. S. Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in 
Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2003), para 2.38), and for the differing 
cross-border approaches to financial provision on divorce see Editorial (2001) 50 SLFB 1; D. 
Hodson, "Brussels III; financial provision - the next generation" [2002] Fam. Law 30. 311 The quantification of damages currently being a matter for the lex fori under both Scots and 
English law. 
312 [1978] AC 795. 
31 1994 TLR 84 
314 1995 TLR 333. 
315 [2004] EWHC 359 (QB). 
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"it is a well-known fact that awards for damages in defamation are higher in 
England than Scotland ... He submits that the English courts must thus 
be 
vigilant to ensure that they are not used as a vehicle to circumvent what 
claimants perceive to be the less 'remunerative' attitude to damages under Scots 
law. Any other approach ... would result in the English courts 
having a 
jurisdictional trump-card with respect to any defamatory Scottish publication 
involving a comparatively small cross-border publication". 316 
Another way in which money impacts upon a pursuer's choice of forum is in 
terms of the cost of litigation. There seems to be a popular feeling that legal 
action in Scotland may be comparatively cheaper and quicker than in England. 
This appears to have been demonstrably the case in the distant past, as between 
Scottish divorces and English judicial separations. 317 In more modem times it was 
thought that this factor might cause one of the more notorious libel battles to be 
fought in Scottish courts. 318 
If both the Scots and English courts have jurisdiction in a matter, the success or 
failure of attempts to choose the Scots forum depends upon the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens: a concept that, as we have seen, was eventually also adopted in 
England. Scottish courts do not seem to have applied the doctrine any differently 
whether the alternative forum was England or a foreign country. 319 In both cases, 
for example, the basing of jurisdiction on the arrestment of property ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem makes it more likely that a plea of forwn non 
conveniens will succeed. In Williamson v North-Eastern Railway Co320 a widow 
attempted to sue an English company for the death of her husband (which had 
occurred in England) by founding jurisdiction on the arrestment of property in 
Scotland. It was recognised that the widow could not bring an action in England, 
316 Ibid. para 22. 
317 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the cost of divorcing in Scotland was on average 
between £15 to £30, but an undefended judicial separation in England might cost from £120 to 
£140, and a divorce by private Act of Parliament around £700 (Leneman, Alienated Afections, 
p15). 
318 W. Tinning, "Legal views differ on Hamilton suing in Scotland", The Herald, 17 November 
1997; K. Symon, "Hamilton to sue Fayed in Scotland", The Sunday Times, 16 November 
1997. 
319 See, for example, Robinson v Robinson's Trs 1930 SC (HL) 20. 
320 (1884) 11 R596. 
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yet nevertheless the defenders' plea of forum non conveniens was upheld. 32' 
Anton believes that the ability to cite witnesses outwith Scotland, but within the 
UK, may account for the decision in Munro & Co v Anglo-American Nitrogen 
Co, 322 but this is not said explicitly in the report . 
323 
The effect of EU Conventions and legislation on the existence of the plea of 
forum non corveniens will be discussed in another chapter. 324 For the present it is 
recorded that it will be this author's submission that neither the Brussels I 
Regulation, nor the Brussels II Regulation prevent reliance upon the doctrine 
within the UK. 325 It is submitted that in these areas, as well as in others, the 
doctrine continues to provide a useful protection. It seems inappropriate that a 
case which is most closely connected with one forum should be allowed to 
proceed in another. This is particularly so if this favours the more affluent 
pursuer able to manipulate the system in search of monetary gain. Such concerns 
have no less force within the UK. 326 Giving evidence to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Brussels II Regulation, Clive argued that: 
"Assuming that the grounds of jurisdiction are reasonable, and that all the 
countries involved will conduct the proceedings in a way which is in 
accordance with accepted principles of natural justice, a simple rule for the 
resolution of such conflicts is arguably better than a complicated set of rules. 
A mandatory system is arguably better than a discretionary system, which 
327 leaves open the possibility of two sets of proceedings continuing". 
321 A decision applauded by Bell (Bell, Forum Shopping, para 2.12). 
322 1917 1 SLT 24. This was an action by a Scots firm against an English company for breach of 
contract, in which the latter appeared to base their (unsuccessful) plea of fori m non conveniens 
on the presence of witnesses in England. 
323 See the first edition of Anton with Beaumont: A. E. Anton, Private International Law: A 
Treatise frone the Standpoint of Scots Law, 1" edn. (W. Green & Son, 1967), p152. 
324 See Chap. 6. 
325 In the latter case, insofar as this is not prevented by the sisting provisions of the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, Sch. 3. On the potential availability of a plea of forum non 
conveniens in a divorce action see P. R. Beaumont, "Conflicts of jurisdiction in divorce cases: 
forum non conveniens" (1987) 361CLQ 116. 
326 Indeed, may have more force in a country with no political borders between its jurisdictions, 
which all have a common language. 
327 E. M. Clive, Memorandum contained in Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities, Brussels II: the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters (HL Paper 19, Session 1997-98), p3. 
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That possibility is indeed undesirable, and is prevented by the operation of a 
system of lis alibi pendens. But with that certainty comes inflexibility. The 
grounds upon which Scottish and English courts can both legitimately have 
jurisdiction are still such that the prize in the race to litigate may be the selection 
of a forum which seems inappropriate, in all the circumstances of the case, to the 
impartial observer. It is submitted that the key to the benefits of a doctrine of 
forumn non conveniens is that a choice between a number of forums is not resolved 
simply by rewarding the party who is fastest to act, but by dint of a more 
sophisticated mechanism, rooted in the concept of justice between the parties, 328 
and operated by an independent judicial body in the form of the court . 
329 As Bell 
observes, the idea of a natural forum gives: 
"a neutral and objective solution to clashes between parties relating to the 
venue for the resolution of a transnational dispute - something of a tie breaker 
in cases of contested jurisdiction and at the same time a corrective to the 
phenomenon of forum shopping". 330 
The preservation of the fortan non conveniens doctrine within the UK is to be 
commended as it allows the courts to continue to fulfil such a valuable role. 
328 See Bell, Forum Shopping, paras 3.87-3.88. 
329 The cynic may argue that a court seised, before which any arguments of forum non convenieus 
may be heard, cannot be totally impartial, as it already has an interest in the case. However, 
cases such as Williamson v North-Eastern Railway Co. (1884) 11 R 596; and Sokha v 
Secretary of State for the Honte Department 1992 SLT 1049, are testament to the ability of 
Scots courts to decline jurisdiction where they conclude that England is the proper forum. 330 Bell, Forum Shopping, para 3.89. 
157 
6 THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION 
LEGISLATION ON INTRA-UK CONFLICT 
RULES 
One of the most significant events for the UK in the development of modem 
international private law has been our entry into the (then) European Economic 
Community (now the EU) signalled by the European Communities Act 1972. 
Over the years the range of areas in which EU action is deemed necessary to 
support the Internal Market (and since the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 and the 
Tampere Conclusions of 1999, to create an area of freedom, security and justice) 
between member states has increased. The stated aim is greater convergence in 
civil law. As recently as 1989, a writer on succession matters in the international 
arena commented that this area of law "falls squarely within the zone of matters 
that are outwith the scope of the EEC Treaty, therefore international action in this 
field has to be taken in alternative fora". 1 Now Brussels IV, an EU Regulation on 
succession, is in contemplation. 2 Another important shift in EU involvement in 
conflicts law has been the move from the use of Conventions, which the UK 
would implement with domestic legislation, 3 to the use of Regulations, 4 which are 
directly enforceable in all member states, and which have been described as "the 
most invasive legal instrument that European law has at its disposal". 5 Briggs has 
described the process as "the concreting over of the common law conflict of 
laws". 6 But how does this endless construction work affect the regulation of 
international private law matters within the UK? And do Scotland and England 
share the same planning objections? 
I Robertson, "International succession law", 377. 
2 C. M. V. Clarkson, "Brussels III - matrimonial property European style" [2002] Fain Law 683 at 
683; Hodson, "Brussels IIP", 30. 
Such as the Brussels Convention, implemented by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982; and the Rome Convention, implemented by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
° For example the Brussels I Regulation, and the Brussels II Regulation. There is also a 
proposal to convert the Rome Convention into a Regulation. 
5 K. Boele-Woelki & R. H. van Ooik, "The communitarization of private international law" 
(2002) 4 YPIL I at 28. Contrast the shortcomings of Directives (L. Niglia, "The Non- 
Europeanisation of private law" (2001) 4 ERPL 575). 
6 Briggs, The Conflict of Latins, p. v. 
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Choice of law in contract: the Rome Convention 
Article 19(2) of the Rome Convention7 presented the UK with a clear choice, 
providing as it does that "[a] State within which different territorial units have 
their own rules of law in respect of contractual obligations shall not be bound to 
apply this Convention to conflicts solely between the laws of such units". This 
brought forth an equally clear response in the UK implementing legislation. 
Section 2(3) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 provides that the Rome 
Convention provisions also apply to conflicts between the jurisdictions of the UK. 
Whilst the Bill was being debated, the then Lord Advocate stated that this was the 
government's intention, but did not explain the thinking behind the move. $ 
Anton, who assisted in negotiating the Convention, 9 suggests that to do otherwise 
would have led to difficulties for lawyers. 10 Similarly the editors of Cheshire and 
North ascribe the decision to "the obvious inconvenience"" of different rules 
dependent on whether the conflict arose within the UK, or in respect of a foreign 
country. Interestingly, however, arguments were made during parliamentary 
debates for the Convention not to apply with respect to foreign countries who 
were not contracting states, and it was not posited that this course would cause 
great difficulties. 12 The UK also decided to disapply certain Articles of the 
Convention. 13 This would seem to suggest that the view was taken that the UK 
was, in the main, satisfied with the Convention rules, and thus content for them to 
apply within the UK, as well as with respect to foreign countries. Indeed, whilst 
it would be inaccurate to describe, and dangerous to regard, the Convention as a 
codification of the well-developed English choice of law rules in this area, there 
are undoubted similarities between the two. 
7 More properly, the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations. $ Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, HL Debs, vol 513, col 1258. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p314. 
11 North & Fawcett, Cheshire & North's Private International Law, p545- 
12 See HL Debs, vol 513, cols 1269-1270 & vol 515, cols 1474-1482. In the event, the Rome 
Convention does have universal application, and thus must be applied in the courts of all 
contracting states to qualifying disputes, even if the contending laws are not those of 
contracting states. 
13 Namely Arts 7(1) & 10(1)(e). It is questionable whether the UK will be allowed to disapply 
these provisions if the Convention is converted into a Regulation (sec p160 below) (E. B. 
Crawford & J. M. Carruthers, "Conflict of laws update" 2003 SLT (News) 137 at 140). 
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The Scots and English courts have not, however, necessarily adopted the same 
approach as each other to the interpretation of the Rome Convention. In 
Caledonia Subsea Ltd v Micoperi Srl, 14 the Inner House appeared to place much 
emphasis on Article 4(2) of the Convention, the law thus indicated only being 
displaced if "the outcome of the comparative exercise referred to in para 5 ... 
demonstrates a clear preponderance of factors in favour of another country". 15 
This accorded with the Dutch approach to interpretation of the Article. '6 
Accordingly, Scots law having been identified by Article 4(2), this was not to be 
disregarded in a contract with the defenders (an Italian company subcontracted to 
an Egyptian company), for work in Egypt. This does not coincide with the views 
of the editors of Dicey and Morris, 17 nor with certain English decisions which 
suggested that Article 4(2) was easily to be displaced by the law suggested by 
Article 4(5). 18 Whilst this latter approach may have been modified in Definitely 
Maybe (Touring) Ltd v Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH, 19 it arguably 
still does not coincide with the Scottish view. Crawford and Carruthers sense a 
difference in interpretation within the UK. 20 
When the Rome Convention was drafted, a mechanism was also put into place 
whereby differences in interpretation could be lessened by means of references to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ)21 This Brussels Protocol never entered into 
force, but the same effect would be achieved if the current proposal to convert the 
Rome Convention into an EU Regulation were to succeed. 22 ECJ jurisdiction 
over contractual disputes involving the law of a politically foreign country 23 
caused concern at the time of the preparation of the Rome Convention. 24 What 
was much less clear was whether the ECJ could accept a reference from a UK 
14 2002 SLT 1022. 
's Ibid. per Lord President Cullen at 1029. 
16 Ibid. per Lord Cameron of Lochbroom at 1031; per Lord Marnoch at 1032. 17 Ibid. per Lord President Cullen at 1029. 
I$ Credit Lyonnais v New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep I per Hobhousc LJ at 
5. 
19 [2001] 4 All ER 283; followed in Ennstone Building Products Ltd v Stanger Ltd [2002] 1 
WLR 3059. 
20 Crawford & Carruthers, "Conflict of laws update" (2003), 138-139. 
21 The first Protocol on the interpretation of the Rome Convention by the European Court ("the 
Brussels Protocol"), contained in Schedule 3 of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
22 See Crawford & Carruthers, "Conflict of laws update" (2003), 137. 
23 Because of the universal application of the Convention (see note 12 above). 24 Tizzano Report [1990] OJ C219/1, para 23. 
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court in an intra-UK contractual conflicts case, had the Brussels Protocol been in 
effect. The terms of Article 19(2), and the Brussels Protocol itself, together with 
s2(3) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, do nothing to suggest that this 
would not be possible. The editors of Dicey and Morris felt it likely that such a 
reference could be made, and that the ECJ would accept jurisdiction. 25 However, 
whilst the case of Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Glasgow City Council26 clarified the 
ECJ's lack of jurisdiction over national legislation simply modelled upon 
European rules, it is not entirely clear whether the reference of internal matters 
directly to European legislation founds ECJ jurisdiction. 7 The binding nature of 
any ECJ judgment arising from such a reference was identified as being of 
importance. 28 Plender is of the view that the reliance on the Rome Convention 
itself for cross-border conflicts within the UK, together with the lack of any 
direction to treat ECJ cases differently in international or intra-UK cases, is 
currently sufficient for the ECJ to take jurisdiction in the latter type of case. 29 He 
admits, however, that this is "still an open question". 30 
Thus, in terms of the choice of law rules applying to contracts, the UK response to 
the Rome Convention was to adopt, almost in their entirety, the Convention rules 
in the areas which it governed. In particular, the common law rules were not 
retained for choice of law issues in cross-border contracts within the UK, 
although as has been noted, there were similarities between the English Common 
Law (to which Scots conflict law owed a debt), and the Convention, rules. There 
may presently, however, be some difference in approach in Scotland and England 
to the implementation of the Rome Convention rules. 
25 Collins, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, para 32-029. 26 [1996] QB 57; the case concerned the interpretation of the 'Modified Convention' in the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch. 4. 
27 This practice was, interestingly, described as a renvoi (Kleimvort Benson Ltd v Glasgow City 
Council [1996] QB 57 per Advocate General at 70). The Advocate General was most hostile 
to the ECJ issuing rulings in such renvoi situations (ibid. at 73-80), but unfortunately the 
Court's own judgment is less clear. 
28 Ibid., 82-83. 
29 R. Plender & M. Wilderspin, The European Contracts Convention: The Rollie Convention on 
the Choice of Law for Contracts, 2°d cdn. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), paras 2-28 to 2-32. 30 Ibid., para 2-32. 
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Choice of law in non-contractual obligations: Rome II 
The proposed Regulation on non-contractual obligations31 (commonly referred to 
as "the Rome II Regulation") would govern choice of law in delict, and 
obligations characterised as unjust enrichment and agency without authority. As 
with the Rome Convention discussed above, 32 the Rome II Regulation would 
apply not just in situations where the choice of law is between the laws of 
member states, but also where the law of a non-EU country is involved. 33 
However, again as with the Rome Convention, member states comprising more 
than one legal system are explicitly allowed a choice as to whether to apply the 
Rome II Regulation in conflicts between the laws of those legal systems 34 
To choose to apply the Rome II Regulation within the UK would require 
amendment of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995. The Rome II Regulation lays great stress on the law of the country in 
which the delictual loss is sustained, 35 and also contains special rules for 
particular delicts. 36 The latter includes defamation, which currently remains 
subject to the common law double rule in Scotland. 37 In the field of unjust 
enrichment, the Rome II Regulation would replace the existing common law 
rules, such as they are. The final response to the Rome II Regulation with respect 
to intra-UK application will presumably be taken at Westminster level, with input 
from the Scottish Parliament: 38 what will the final decision be? The outcome in 
general, and in detail, is far from clear. The Rome II proposal made insufficient 
31 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations, COM (2003) 427 final; 2003/0168 (COD). 
32 Rome Convention, Art. 2. 
33 Rome II Regulation, Art. 2. 
34 Ibid., Art. 21(2); indeed Scotland is specifically mentioned in the accompanying discussion of 
Art. 21 (Rome II Proposal, p28). 
35 Rome II Regulation, Art. 3(1). This general rule can be displaced in favour of the law of the 
country where both parties are habitually resident (ibid., Art. 3(2)), or the law of a country 
more closely connected with the delict (ibid., Art. 3(3)). 
36 For example, in matters of product liability or unfair competition. For a detailed discussion of 
the Rome II Regulation, see J. M. Carruthers & E. B. Crawford, "Conflict of laws update" 2004 
SLT (News) 19; A. Dickinson, "Cross-border torts in EC courts -a response to the proposed 
'Rome II' Regulation" [2002] EBLR 369. 
37 See p133 above. 
38 Report of the House of Lords European Union Committee, The Rome II Regulation (HL Paper 
66, Session 2003-2004), para 87. However, the Scottish Executive Justice Department seemed 
to suggest in the context of the Brussels I Regulation that amendment to Schedule 4 would be 
dealt with by Westminster, and to Schedule 8 by Holyrood (Civil Justice and International 
Division of the Scottish Executive Justice Department, "New rules on civil jurisdiction" 2002 
SLT (News) 39 at 41). 
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progress in the EU parliamentary session now ended, and in the new session will 
be subject to the co-decision procedure. Moreover, the EU parliamentary 
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market has produced a draft Report 
on the Rome II Regulation39 which suggests significant amendments to the 
proposal. In particular, it suggests a rule for all delictual and unjust enrichment 
matters, but with room for flexibility to take account of various factors, and of the 
special features of particular types of delict. There were many within the UK who 
questioned whether the Rome II Regulation (in its original proposed form) was 
necessary, or indeed legitimately a subject of EU legislation. 40 It is submitted, 
however, that it would be naive to assume that the Commission can ultimately be 
dissuaded from its intention to see this project through: even if changes are made 
to the detail, a Rome II Regulation will come to pass. There are some who take 
the view that if a Rome II Regulation does come into force, it would be easier to 
apply the Regulation rules in intra-UK cases as in all other cases. 41 Furthermore, 
as Carruthers and Crawford observe: 
"Since it was a conscious decision that the 1995 Act should contain no special 
intra-UK rules, it would be ironic if the UK now should choose to disapply 
Rome II within its multi-legal system territory" 42 
Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement: the Brussels Convention and the 
Brussels I Regulation 
In contrast to the reaction to the proposed Rome II Regulation, a modified 
acceptance is apparent in the UK response to the European rules on jurisdiction, 
recognition and enforcement in civil and commercial matters. Like the Rome 
39 Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market (Rapportcur: Diana Wallis), Draft Report 
(Revised Version) on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council regulation on the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligations ("Rome II') (5 April 2004), ("The Wallis 
Report"). 
ao Report of the House of Lords European Union Committee, The Rome II Regulation, paras 48- 
79; "Consultation on a preliminary draft proposal for a Council Regulation on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations: response of the Government of the United 
Kingdom", http: //europa. eu. int/comm/justice_home/unit/civil/consultation/contributions/ 
govem_uk_en. pdf, para 2; Dickinson, "Cross-border torts", 371-372; Carruthers & Crawford, 
"Conflict of laws update" (2004), 24. The amendments suggested in the Wallis Report might 
make the Rome II Regulation slightly more palatable to the critics. at Report of the House of Lords European Union Committee, The Rome 11 Regulation, para 89. 42 Carruthers & Crawford, "Conflict of laws update" (2004), 23. 
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Convention, the original Brussels Convention43 applied between contracting 
states, although there was no equivalent to the Rome Convention provision which 
sharply points up the choice of applying, or not applying, the Convention within a 
member state. 
Jurisdiction 
With respect to jurisdiction, the UK adopted a tiered approach. The Brussels 
Convention applied to allocate jurisdiction in disputes involving Scotland (or 
England) and another contracting state. 44 A modified version of the jurisdiction 
rules applied in intra-UK cross-border cases. 45 As has been noted, because of the 
similarity of the Convention approach to existing Scots rules, it was also possible 
to include within the implementing legislation rules for jurisdiction in Scottish 
domestic cases. 46 Some of the differences between the Schedule 4 scheme and 
the Brussels Convention itself were necessitated by the structure of the UK. 
Thus, certain of the Convention rules favoured central offices, which in the UK 
may often be in London. Applied within the UK, these rules might have resulted 
in the English courts being allocated jurisdiction in circumstances where Scotland 
might be a more appropriate forum. Article 16(4) of the Convention, for 
example, was not adopted in Schedule 4, as otherwise no patent cases could have 
been brought in Scotland. 47 However, other omissions from Schedule 4 merely 
signal UK displeasure with the Convention rule in question, such as the 
provisions on insurance contracts. 48 Furthermore, certain bases of jurisdiction 
absent from the Brussels Convention were not banished from the intra-UK 
arena. 49 In the case of the majority of the Schedule 4 rules, which do coincide 
with the Convention provisions, it was intended that Convention cases would 
5° provide guidance. As has been seen, there was some consideration in 
43 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 44 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch. 1. 
as Ibid., s16, Sch. 4; and see P. R. Beaumont, Anton & Beaumont's Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland, 
2°d edn. (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), paras 9.01-9.04. 
46 See p142 above. 
47 The Maxwell Report, para 13.124; annotations by R. C. A. White & H. Currie to the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, p27-22. 
a$ See the Maxwell Report, para 13.78. 
49 For example, the situs of moveables in actions relating to moveable property, or the situs of 
immoveables in actions relating to a security over the property. 50 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, s16(3). 
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Davenport v Corinthian Motor Policies at Lloyds51 of the possibility of a different 
course being taken in jurisdiction disputes within the UK, but the judges 
ultimately felt constrained to interpret Schedule 4 as they would the Convention 
itself. 52 There is no evidence that provisions appearing in both the Convention 
and Schedule 4 have been interpreted differently by the Scots courts. 53 
Although the Brussels I Regulation replaces the Brussels Convention, 54 it does 
not itself alter the arrangements for the allocation of jurisdiction within the UK. 
The Brussels I Regulation innovates upon the Brussels Convention to some 
degree, although the basic framework is unchanged 55 The Schedule 4 scheme 
already provided for the taking of jurisdiction in terms of Article 5(3) when a 
wrong was merely threatened, but the Schedule has been amended to take account 
of the altered rules on consumer contracts, contracts of lease and employment 
contracts in the Brussels I Regulation. 56 The greater clarity of Article 5(1) of the 
57 Brussels I Regulation has not, however, been carried over to Schedule 4. Nor 
was the opportunity taken to remove any of the remaining differences between the 
rules allocating jurisdiction amongst the various parts of the UK, and the rules 
which apply when the court of another member state is involved. 
A further such difference is the availability of the plea of forum non conveniens 
within the UK. This was initially the subject of some confusion. It was clear that 
as between Scottish courts and courts in another contracting state, there was no 
51 1991 SLT 774. 
52 See pp100-101 above. 
53 Beaumont, Civil Jurisdiction, para 9.06 and see, for example, the intra-UK cases of Montagu 
Evans v Young 2000 SLT 1083; Universal Steels Limited v Skanska Construction UK Limited 
(31 October 2003, unreported), OH. In the intra-UK cross-border case of Lie Administration 
and Management v The Scottish Ministers 2004 SLT 2, the Court's power to make an order 
was reliant upon the proceedings being in respect of a matter which was within the scope of, 
previously the Brussels Convention, and now the Brussels I Regulation. This was determined 
by reference to ECJ case law. 
54 Although the Brussels Convention continues to apply in respect of Denmark. 55 There is greater specification in Art. 5(1) to assist in determining the place of performance of 
the obligation in question; Art. 5(3) has been expanded to include actual as well as threatened 
wrongs; contracts of employment are separately dealt with; and there arc also changes in the 
rules applying to certain contracts of lease, and to consumer contracts. 56 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001, SI 2001/3929. 
57 Although it seems this may be reconsidered by the government in future (Civil Justice and 
International Division of the Scottish Executive Justice Department, "New rules on civil 
jurisdiction", 41). 
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place for the doctrine. 58 However, it was expressly provided in the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 that the forum non conveniens doctrine was 
preserved where this was not inconsistent with the Brussels Convention. 59 Nor 
did Schedule 4 contain the lis alibi pendens rule adopted in the Convention. The 
stated intention of the government of the day, in drawing up the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982, was that fortan non conveniens should remain available 
within the UK. 60 This result seemed to have been successfully achieved by the 
legislation, and this was the view taken by legal commentators. 61 Matters were 
somewhat derailed by the English judgment of Foxen v Scotsman Publications 
Ltd and Another, 62 in which it was held that the use of fortan non conveniens in an 
intra-UK jurisdiction dispute "was inconsistent with at least the spirit and 
probably the letter of the Convention". 63 Somewhat unusually, the opportunity to 
correct this unfortunate authority fell to the same judge in the following year. 
Cumming v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd and Others 64 accordingly 
confirmed that fortan non conveniens was in fact available within the UK, the 
judge observing ruefully that were the case to be appealed: 
"Whatever the Court of Appeal decided, his Lordship would be held wrong. 
6s However, he had the consolation that he would also be held right". 
It is submitted that the advent of the Brussels I Regulation has had no impact 
upon the availability of the plea of fonini non conveniens within the UK: 
Schedule 4 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, rather than the 
Regulation, continues to govern intra-UK jurisdictional matters, and s49 has not 
58 Brussels Convention, Art. 21. 
59 Ibid., s49. It was held in an English decision that forum non conveniens could operate if a non- 
contracting state was the other possible forum (Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd (No 2) [1991] 4 
All ER 334; although see now Lubbe v Cape plc [2000] 4 All ER 268 per Lord Bingham at 
282). 
60 Lord Chancellor, HL Debs, vol 425, col 1132. 
61 L. Collins & B. Davenport, "Forum conveniens within the United Kingdom" (1994) 110 LQR 
325; A. Reed & T. P. Kennedy, "Forzun non conveniens and the Brussels Convention" [1995] 
NLJ 1697; G. Amodeo, "Conflicts of jurisdiction within the UK" (1995) 40 JLSS 321. 62 1994 TLR 84. 
63 Ibid. at 85. 
64 1995 TLR 333. 
65 Ibid. at 333. 
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been repealed. 66 This was also the conclusion reached by the English court in the 
case of Lennon v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail Ltd. 67 
Recognition and enforcement 
The UK government, however, chose not to mirror the Brussels Convention rules 
in the field of intra-UK recognition and enforcement of judgments. Instead, much 
more far-reaching recognition and enforcement provisions were enacted in the 
form of Schedules 6 and 7 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. As 
an example of internalising rules, these have already been discussed in a previous 
chapter. 68 
Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in family law matters: Brussels II 
and Brussels II bis 
It is submitted that it is not unfair to say that the Brussels II Regulation provides 
an example of a somewhat muddled response in intra-UK matters to EU 
international private law legislation. As between member states, the Brussels II 
Regulation regulates jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments, in matters of divorce, legal separation and annulment. 69 There are 
also provisions on related parental responsibility matters. But what is the impact 
on cross-border jurisdictional disputes, or recognition, within the UK? 
Jurisdiction 
The trouble begins with the text of the Brussels II Regulation itself. Article 2, 
which sets down the general jurisdiction rules, must be read in accordance with 
Article 41, which is directed at member states with more than one legal system. 
Article 41 confirms that in this case, habitual residence in a member state should 
be read as habitual residence in a territorial unit with its own legal system. 70 
References to domicile or nationality in a member state, are references to the 
66 Although it is unfortunate that it has not been amended to reflect the coming into force of the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
67 [2004] EWHC 359 (QB) per Tugendhat J. at paras 4-16. 68 See pp94-95 above. 
69 The Scottish actions of declarator of marriage, and declarator of freedom and putting to silence 
thus fall outwith the scope of the Brussels II Regulation. 
70 Brussels II Regulation, Art. 41(a). 
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territorial unit identified by the member state's law. 71 This may adequately reflect 
a federal approach, but is ill-fitted to the UK situation. There is no UK law to 
assign a Scottish or English domicile to a person. There is no explicit statement 
in the Brussels II Regulation (unlike the Rome Convention) that the Regulation is 
not intended to apply within member states. However, Article 7 provides that a 
person habitually resident within a member state, or a domiciliary of a territory of 
the UK, can only be proceeded against in other member states in terms of Articles 
2 to 6 of the Brussels II Regulation. It is therefore submitted that whilst the 
Brussels II Regulation allocates jurisdiction as between the courts of Scotland and 
another member state, it does not do so as between Scotland and England. 72 
However, another layer of confusion is occasioned by the domestic legislation. 
As a consequence of the devolved arrangements, the necessary amendments to 
existing legislation in the UK were made by secondary legislation passed by the 
Scottish Parliament with respect to Scots law, 73 and the Westminster Parliament 
in respect of English law. 74 In terms of the Scottish legislation, a Scottish court 
will have jurisdiction if it has jurisdiction under the Brussels II Regulation or if, in 
the case of excluded actions (in general terms), either of the parties is a Scots 
domiciliary. 75 It has been argued above that a Scots court would not have 
jurisdiction under the Regulation in an intra-UK dispute. But are such actions 
then excluded actions? 76 The definition of this term is two-pronged. Firstly, no 
court of a contracting state must have jurisdiction under the Brussels II 
Regulation, 77 and it has been argued that this condition is satisfied in intra-UK 
cases. Secondly, the defender must not be an Irish domiciliary, 78 or a national of 
" Ibid., Art. 41(b). 
72 See Clive, "Memorandum", p4; insofar as Briggs suggest otherwise, it is respectfully 
submitted that he is wrong (Briggs, The Conflict of Lawvs, pp232-233). 73 The European Communities (Matrimonial Jurisdiction and Judgments) (Scotland) Regulations 
2001, SSI 2001/36. 
74 The European Communities (Matrimonial Jurisdiction and Judgments) Regulations 2001, SI 
2001/310. 
75 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s7(2A), (3A). The latter sub-section also 
contains provisions for founding jurisdiction in excluded actions of declarator of nullity of 
marriage if one of the spouses has died. 
76 McEleavy has identified this as a key issue (P. McEleavy, "Matrimonial jurisdiction and 
judgments - the new law" (2001) 50 SFLB 3 at 3). 77 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s12(5)(d). 
78 Ibid., s12(5)(d)(ii). 
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any other member state (excluding the UK and Ireland). 79 It would seem then that 
the defender could be a Scots or English domiciliary. Accordingly, matters of 
divorce, legal separation and annulment arising within the UK where parties are 
domiciled in Scotland or England will fall into the category of excluded actions. 
Jurisdiction is allocated in such cases on the basis of one of the parties' domicile, 
rather than through application of the Brussels II Regulation rules. 
This conclusion might be thought to be confirmed by the fact that Article 11 of 
the Brussels II Regulation (the lis alibi pendens rule) cannot, in its terms, apply as 
between parts of a member state, together with the fact that the sisting provisions 
of Schedule 3 of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 remain in 
place. 80 It is submitted, however, that it is regrettable that the legislation was not 
recast to make it clear, firstly, that Scotland and England were presented with a 
choice as to whether the Brussels II Regulation jurisdictional rules should apply 
within the UK, and secondly, that the decision taken was that they should not. 
This may be partly caused by the legislative method chosen by the EU. Since 
Conventions required statutory implementation in the UK, legislation would be 
needed to introduce the Convention, and such a statute could also contain intra- 
UK rules. 81 However, since Regulations are directly effective, the only legislative 
action necessary by the Westminster or Holyrood Parliaments is the making of 
consequential repeals or amendments. The European Communities (Matrimonial 
Jurisdiction and Judgments) (Scotland) Regulations 2001 are an example of this - 
and also an example of the muddle which can thereby ensue. 
Recognition and enforcement 
Once again, it is not explicitly said that the Brussels II Regulation provisions on 
recognition and enforcement do not apply automatically as between Scotland and 
England. Fortunately the relevant Articles of the Regulations are more clearly 
79 Ibid., s12(5)(d)(i). 
80 These provide that, in certain circumstances, a consistorial action in Scotland must be sisted in 
favour of proceedings continuing elsewhere in the UK, and also allow the Scots court 
otherwise a discretion to list consistorial actions (Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
1973, Sch. 3). Furthermore, the English legislation (as amended) can also be read so as to 
conclude that the jurisdiction provisions of the Brussels II Regulation do not apply within the 
UK (ibid., s5(2), (3)). 
$1 For example, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 and the Contracts (Applicable 
Law) Act 1990. 
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framed. A judgment is defined as one emanating from a court of a member 
state. 82 Such judgments must be recognised in another member state. 83 Similarly, 
judgments concerning parental responsibility which are governed by the Brussels 
II Regulation are to be enforced in other member states. 84 It is provided, 
however, that to be enforced in the UK, such judgments have to be registered in 
the appropriate part, for example, in Scotland. 85 Furthermore, no amendment has 
been made to the provisions of the Family Law Act 1986 which deal with the 
recognition in Scotland of divorces, legal separations and annulments granted in 
the British Islands. 86 In contrast those relating to the recognition of overseas 
divorces, legal separations and annulments have been amended to take account of 
the Brussels II Regulation. 87 In its essentials, the intra-UK scheme for 
recognition and enforcement of custody orders is also unaltered. It is therefore 
submitted that whilst the recognition and enforcement in Scotland of judgments 
from other member states is governed by the Brussels II Regulation, the 
(internalising) rules on recognition and enforcement within the UK are 
unaffected. This also reinforces the similar conclusion reached with respect to the 
jurisdiction provisions of the Brussels II Regulation. 
Brussels II is dead ... long live Brussels II bis 
The Brussels II Regulation is not to be much longer with us. Council Regulation 
2201/2003 has already been adopted, and will apply from 1 March 2005, on 
which date the Brussels II Regulation will be repealed. 88 Often referred to as 
"Brussels II bis" during the relevant negotiations, this new Regulation brings 
together the rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement contained within 
the Brussels II Regulation, and also new rules on jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement relating to independent parental responsibility proceedings, and child 
abduction. 
82 Brussels II Regulation, Art. 13. 
83 Ibid., Art. 14 (subject to the exceptions in Art. 15). 
84 Ibid., Art. 21(1). 
85 Ibid., Art. 21(2). 
86 Family Law Act 1986, ss44,51 & 52. 
87 Ibid., s45. 
88 Council Regulation 2201/2003, Arts. 72 & 71. 
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Insofar as relevant, the Brussels II bis Regulation provisions with respect to the 
allocation of jurisdiction in divorce, legal separation and annulment echo those of 
the Brussels II Regulation. 89 Thus by dint of the same reasoning as set out above, 
it is submitted that the Brussels II bis Regulation does not govern jurisdictional 
disputes in these matters within the UK. Jurisdiction to make orders in respect of 
parental responsibility falls to the courts of the member state in which the child is 
habitually resident. 90 The effect of Article 66 is that habitual residence should be 
read as being habitual residence in a territorial unit of a member state which has 
its own legal system. In itself, this does not make for clarity. However, Article 
8(1) is subject to Articles 9 and 10, which deal with continued jurisdiction of the 
courts of the child's habitual residence, and jurisdiction in child abduction, and 
these provisions seem designed to apply as between member states. Article 11 on 
the return of abducted children is also only of application between member states. 
Therefore, in all the circumstances, it is submitted that the Brussels II bis 
Regulation provisions on jurisdiction in parental responsibility proceedings are 
not intended automatically to apply to cross-border matters within a member 
state. 91 The substance of the recognition and enforcement provisions of the 
Brussels II bis Regulation are the same as those in the Brussels II Regulation, 92 
and again, in terms of the argument made out above, it is thought that these rules 
are of no application within the UK. 
With respect to divorce and related matters, presumably the Scottish Executive 
will again opt to retain the previous Scottish rules (as seems to have been the 
response to the Brussels II Regulation) rather than replicate the Brussels II bis 
Regulation rules, with respect to the allocation of jurisdiction between Scotland 
and England, and the recognition of English judgments. It is suspected by this 
writer that the current rules in relation to intra-UK custody cases might also 
survive. In truth, since both these and the Brussels II bis Regulation link 
jurisdiction primarily to habitual residence, and allow for recognition and 
enforcement with relative ease, it may not be of great consequence. However, 
89 Ibid., Arts 3,6 & 66. 
90 Ibid., Art. 8. 
91 Which may also be the conclusion of Jamieson (G. Jamieson, "The new law on parental 
responsibility" 2004 SLT (News) 51 at 53). 
92 Council Regulation 2201/2003, Arts 21 (subject to Arts 22 & 23), 28; and see Jamieson, "The 
new law on parental responsibility", 53. 
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some further amendment to the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 
and to the Family Law Act 1986 will, in any event, be required in order that the 
Acts refer to the Brussels II bis Regulation once that Regulation becomes 
applicable. The opportunity should be taken to ensure that the legislation 
explicitly deals with the grounds on which Scots courts may take jurisdiction in 
intra-UK divorces, legal separations and annulments. It is unsatisfactory that such 
important questions should be a matter of inference. 
Insolvency 
A previous attempt to introduce a Bankruptcy Convention by the (then) EC 
having failed, an EU Regulation on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in 
insolvency proceedings is now in force and applicable. 93 Article 3 of this 
Regulation allocates jurisdiction to open proceedings to the courts of a member 
state in whose territory the debtor has his "centre ... of main 
interests". The law 
of that member state will be the applicable law. 94 Provision is also made for 
secondary insolvency proceedings to be opened in another member state, 95 and 
for the law of that country to apply to those proceedings. 96 In these 
circumstances, it is submitted that the Insolvency Regulation does not itself 
allocate jurisdiction as between the Scottish and English courts. This had also 
been the view of the Scottish Law Commission when discussing a draft of the 
Bankruptcy Convention. 97 Provision is only made for judgments to be recognised 
in another nzenther state, 98 and for liquidators to exercise powers in another 
member state. 99 Once again, the existing intra-UK rules are not displaced by 
virtue of the Insolvency Regulation. 
It is interesting that the Insolvency Regulation contains no rule applicable to 
member states which consist of a number of legal systems. Accordingly, it 
93 Council Regulation 1346/2000 
94 Ibid., Art. 4. 
95 Ibid., Art. 27. 
96 Ibid., Art. 28. 
97 Scot. Law Com. No 68, Report on Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and 
Liquidation (1982), para 6.13; see also Collins (gen. ed. ), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of 
Laws: Third Cumulative Supplement to the thirteenth edition (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), para 
31R-058. 
98 Council Regulation 1346/2000, Art. 16. 
99 Ibid., Art. 18. 
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appears merely to allocate jurisdiction to courts in the UK, leaving it to UK 
legislation to specify whether, for example, the Scottish or English courts have 
jurisdiction. This may, however, reflect the high degree of harmonisation and 
internalisation in insolvency legislation within the UK. 1°° It is therefore 
unsurprising that there has been little inclination to unpick intra-UK insolvency 
legislation in response to the Insolvency Regulation. The Scottish Law 
Commission was certainly not keen that the jurisdiction rules of the draft 
Bankruptcy Convention be applied within Scotland, 101 although it is not explained 
why, and so it is unclear what the Commission's view on application within the 
UK may have been. As has been seen, automatic enforcement of insolvency 
orders is already provided as between Scotland and England, 102 so in that 
particular regard the Insolvency Regulation offers little that is new. 
A reluctant partner: the effect of European developments on intra-UK 
international private law 
As has been seen, Conventions and legislation at European level may not directly 
require that international private law rules as between Scotland and England be 
altered. However, as can be appreciated from the above discussion, they do have 
an indirect effect on intra-UK rules. On some occasions the government has also 
chosen to adopt the new European rules for conflicts arising within the UK, and 
on other occasions, a modified version of the European rules has been introduced, 
whilst sometimes the existing Scots and English law has simply been retained. 
It might have been thought that a likely result of increased EU involvement in 
international private law, would have been a corresponding increase in legislation 
dealing with the intra-UK aspects of the topics tackled by the EU. For example, 
the Maxwell Committee argued that it should not be the case that enforcement 
between the (then) EEC countries after the advent of the Brussels Convention 
100 See Chap. 4. Although lurking beneath this is a difference in the traditional common law 
approach, with Scots courts adhering to a theory of unity of bankruptcy, and English law 
preferring separate bankruptcies in different jurisdictions (Crawford, International Private 
Law, paras 16.01-16.02). 
101 Scot. Law Com. No 68, Report on Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and 
Liquidation (1982), para 6.13. 
102 See pp8l-82 above; and see D. McKenzie, "The EC Convention on Insolvency Proceedings" 
(1996) 4 ERPL 181 at 190-191. 
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should be much easier than within the UK. 103 It may well be illogical if measures 
in place between Scotland and England were less comprehensive than those in 
force between the UK and other EU member states. However, taken to extremes, 
such arguments are less convincing. An assumption is made that the EU is a 
political grouping, and since the UK is a much closer political unit, rules within 
the UK must be more prescriptive, more automatic in effect, than those between 
EU member states. Political considerations are, therefore, uppermost. It is 
submitted that this would be the wrong perspective to adopt when considering an 
intra-UK response to European developments. Scotland and England have 
different legal systems, which do not spring from the same source. In some 
respects, Scotland and England may be no closer in their legal approach than 
Scotland and France (or other continental civil law systems). 
Interestingly, however, the approach to intra-UK rules in the areas of international 
private law which have been the subject of EU attention is perhaps largely 
characterised by reluctance. A good example of what is meant by this is provided 
by the response to the Brussels Convention. The UK was unenthusiastic about 
certain aspects of the Convention, for example, the rules on insurance. 104 Having 
decided to participate in the Convention, the UK was obliged to implement its 
provisions for allocating jurisdiction between the UK and other contracting states, 
and recognising judgments emanating from the latter. However, lacking such a 
compulsitor at the intra-UK level, the rules on insurance were not introduced. 
The danger, of course, is that "it seems wrong in principle, and confusing to 
practitioners, to maintain in being two separate and slightly different sets of rules 
of jurisdiction". 105 The Brussels II Regulation was not universally welcomed by 
commentators in Britain, '06 and it has been argued that its terms have not replaced 
the existing rules applying as between Scotland and England. The Report 
prepared by the appropriate House of Lords Select Committee shows a marked 
103 The Maxwell Report, para 15.4. 
104 See p164 above. 
105 The Maxwell Report, para 2.16. 
106 For example, see Karsten, "Brussels II"; N. Mostyn, "Brussels II Regulation: impact on forum 
disputes in relation to the main suit and ancillary relief proceedings" [2000] IFL 162. The 
English President's International Committee and Solicitor's Family Law Association opposed 
the application of certain Brussels II rules to non-member states, insofar as the then draft 
Convention allowed (Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, Brussels II, pp22-23). 
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reluctance to be regulated by the Rome II Regulation, and doubts as to the 
wisdom of the UK's participation in the discussions thus far. 107 The impact this 
will ultimately have upon the choice of law rules applying as between Scotland 
and England in the field of non-contractual obligations remains to be seen. 108 
But how far is this reluctance equally characteristic of the persons who operate 
within the Scottish and English legal systems? The political commentator, 
Taylor, has noted that: 
"Perhaps the most persistent contemporary myth is that Scotland is 
intrinsically pro-European while England is anti, that Scotland adores the 
European Union while England abhors it. Again, myth does not mean 
straightforward falsehood. This collective self-image has something of a basis 
in fact. Opinion polls have occasionally suggested, for example, that Scotland 
might be more amenable to the single European currency. In Scotland, you 
will encounter less strident anti-European sentiments than might be overt in the 
south-east of England" " 
109 
In addition, Scotland is a mixed legal system. A major difficulty in the project to 
harmonise the substantive private laws of Europe, is the perceived gulf between 
the civil and Common Law systems. "° This may also cause problems in attempts 
to harmonise conflict rules, which is the aim of the various EU Conventions and 
Regulations discussed above. Mixed legal systems, such as the Scots one, can do 
much to illustrate how this gap can be bridged, incorporating as they do, elements 
of civilian and Common Law thinking. "' By the same token, it might therefore 
107 Report of the House of Lords European Union Committee, The Route 11 Regulation; sec also 
"Response of the Government of the United Kingdom", and compare the European 
Commission's "Follow-up of the consultation on a preliminary draft proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations ("Rome II")", 
http: //europa. cu. int/comm/justice_home/unit/civil/consultation/contributions en. htm. 108 This is not to suggest that our fellow Europeans are always uncritical of EU legislation: see, 
for example, the view of a Swedish professor on the Brussels II Regulation - M. Jänterä- Jareborg, "A European family law for cross-border situations - some reflections concerning the Brussels II Regulation and its planned amendments" (2002) 4 YPIL 67. 109 Taylor, Scotland's Parliament, p267. 
110 Smits, The Making of European Private Law, p73. 'll Ibid.; MacQueen, "Discussion Paper"; cf Lord Reed, "The constitutionalisation of private law" 69. However, it has also been argued that the differences between Scots and English law 
show that harmonisation is not required in a common market (Weir, "Divergent legal systems 
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be thought that the Scottish legal system would be less resistant to European 
harmonisation than the English Common Law system. 112 
Certainly we have seen that Scots law was sufficiently compatible with the 
principles of the Brussels Convention to allow Scotland to adopt both intra-UK, 
and domestic, jurisdiction rules which were a variation on those applicable 
between the contracting states. 113 England was not in a position to take this path. 
In preparing a response to EU research on a possible 'Brussels III' Regulation on 
matrimonial property, it proved necessary to draft different Scottish and English 
reports, since the current domestic rules were too diverse. 114 In discussing 
Brussels III, an English lawyer, David Hodson, attempted to identify some of the 
differing civilian and English law principles of financial matters in marriage and 
on divorce. ' 15 Interestingly, Scots law had much in common with the civilian 
rules highlighted by him. Furthermore, one of the concerns held by English 
lawyers about the Brussels II Regulation was that the lis alibi pendens principle 
was incompatible with new rules to slow the divorce process, and allow time for 
reconsideration and reconciliation. 116 In giving oral evidence on behalf of the 
Scottish Courts Administration, Peter Beaton stressed that: 
"one has to be careful in discussing the United Kingdom position in this regard 
because the position in England and Wales is rather different with the arrival 
of the new law in relation to divorce whilst the Scottish position remains as it 
was. I accept fully the point and I think there is a serious difficulty in 
philosophy and approach particularly when we come to discuss lis penrdens. I 
think the negotiating position we adopt collectively does not depend on a unity 
of approach within the legal systems in the United Kingdom. I think we live 
in a single member state"): business can be carried on successfully in a small geographical 
unit against a background of differing private laws, and perhaps similar, but unharmonised, 
private international laws. 
112 In terms of their conflict rules, there are similarities between Scots and English law, but see the 
discussion of this at pp141-144 above. 
13 See p142 above. 
114 Clarkson, "Brussels IIP", 684. Although this is not to underplay the differences between Scots 
law and those systems which favour community of property. 115 Hodson, "Brussels IIP. 
116 Karsten, "Brussels II", 76; Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, Brussels II. 
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within that and the position in Scotland is perhaps not so acute but our position 
is that we find the present arrangement satisfactory". "7 
The relatively small number of published comments by Scottish practitioners and 
academics on the Brussels II Regulation does not lend itself to a scientific 
analysis. However, Clive was generally positive about the draft Convention, 118 
whilst Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (in providing written evidence to the appropriate 
House of Lords committee) simply raised two specific points regarding the 
parental responsibility provisions. 119 Beaumont, however, was less convinced of 
the necessity of the draft Convention. 120 McEleavy accepted that there could be 
advantages to EU action in the family law field, although he had certain criticisms 
of how the agenda was pursued. 121 Two practitioners called above all for 
uniformity, and this appears to have been of greater concern to them than any 
objections to the rules set out in the Regulation. 122 
One of the main grounds of opposition to the Rome Convention arose from a 
specifically English concern. In the House of Lords debates on the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Bill, Lord Wilberforce raised concerns about the effect on the 
English Commercial Court, and the London Court of International Arbitration. 
He considered that "[I]t is not an exaggeration to say that the United Kingdom is, 
I believe, the international centre for commercial dispute". 123 Although the 
reference is to the United Kingdom, it should more properly be to England, as it 
was English institutions, applying English law, which were thought to be under 
threat. Indeed it is perhaps one facet of the attitude described by Geeroms in the 
context of the role of foreign law in English courts: 
117 Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Brussels 11, 
p46. 
118 See generally Clive, "Memorandum". 
119 Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Brussels 11, 
p73. 
120 Ibid., pp54ff. 
121 P. McEleavy, "The Brussels II Regulation: how the European Community has moved into 
family law" (2002) 51 ICLQ 883. 
122 S. Barker & S. Smith, "A response to Brussels II -a view from Scotland" [2002] IFL 44; and 
see also the observation of Crawford and Carruthers on Rome II noted at p163 above. 123 HL Debs, vol 515, col 1476; and see also Lord Goff of Chievely, HL Debs, vol 515, col 1482. 
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"English courts have also refused to take judicial notice of foreign law because 
they believed that English common law and its institutions were superior to 
other legal systems ... Today, English commercial courts still apply English 
law to international commercial disputes, in the belief that it is the better 
law". 124 
This does not reflect Scottish thinking, nor is Edinburgh seen as an international 
commercial dispute resolution centre, in the way that has been claimed for 
London by those operating within the English legal system there. 
Of course there are also areas where English and Scots lawyers might be thought 
to present a united front with respect to EU measures. Article 10(l)(e) of the 
Rome Convention which provides for the applicable law to govern nullity of 
contract, was not implemented by the UK, since English and Scots law did not 
approach this as a contractual matter. 125 Forum non conveniens, so staunchly 
defended by English commentators in the face of the EU preference for lis alibi 
pendens, was of course initially a Scottish concept, and has been applauded in this 
thesis. 126 Scotland and England (and also Ireland) remain loyal to notions of 
domicile, and thus are favoured with special provision in the Brussels II 
Regulation. 127 Carruthers and Crawford's suspicion of the inclusion of a 
Community public policy exception in the proposed Rome II Regulation is in line 
with English commentators and the examining House of Lords committee. 128 
It is submitted, however, that the English and Scottish responses to harmonisation 
of international private law rules by the EU probably do not coincide completely, 
but rather fall on different parts of a spectrum. For one, as a mixed legal system, 
open in the past to influences from the continent, Scots law does not necessarily 
share certain of the fundamental objections held by English Common Lawyers. 
However, negotiations with other member states of the EU remains firmly a 
124 Geeroms, Foreign Law, para 3.25; see also Smits, The Making of European Private Law, p94. 125 Annotations by C. G. J. Morse to the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, p36-33; and sec 
Baring Brothers & Co. Ltd v Cunninghante District Council 1996 GWD 25-1405. 
126 See pp155-157 above; although see Clive, "Memorandum", p3 127 Brussels II Regulation, Arts 2(1) & 7; although see Clive, "Memorandum", p2. 128 House of Lords European Union Committee, "The Rome II Regulation", paras 163-168; see 
also Carruthers & Crawford, "Conflict of laws update" (2004), 23. 
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matter for Westminster. Whilst the Scottish Executive may be involved, there is 
no way for it to put forward a view in opposition to the final UK negotiating 
position. 129 Accordingly, for as long as there is reluctance by English lawyers to 
participate fully in EU legislative action, there are likely to be situations where 
EU Regulations are applied only insofar as is strictly required, and thus not in an 
intra-UK situation. 130 In this way, by accident rather than by design, different 
conflict rules may be applied between Scotland and England, from those applied 
in true international cases (at least as far as fellow member states of the EU are 
concerned). 131 This is not to suggest that there might not be instances where a 
different, intra-UK, approach could be justified. The merits of the use of the 
forum non convcniens doctrine within the UK have already been discussed, 
' 32 as 
well as certain modifications necessary to allow the intra-UK application of the 
scheme of the Brussels Convention. 133 Equally, there are areas where uniformity 
of Scots conflict rules (irrespective of whether England, or an EU member state, 
is involved) may commend itself. However, at present the approach of the UK to 
European initiatives arguably may be driven by a reluctance to engage fully with 
the EU project, 134 rather than by principled consideration of any specialities of the 
intra-UK situation. This would, it is submitted, be most unfortunate. 
Europeaulsation: the beginning of the end for the conflict of laws? 
EU harmonisation of conflict rules continues to ripple outwards from commercial 
matters directly connected with a European internal market, to those issues which 
seem more indirectly linked, such as family law. Fawcett has referred to the 
"Europeanization" of international private law, 135 and there has been recent 
t'9 See p149 above. tý0 It may, however, be open to the Scottish Parliament unilaterally to adopt laws modelled on 
EU 
legislation in respect of conflicts with England (on the powers of the Scottish Parliament, see 
131 
p145 above). 
And sometimes other states too, for example, under the Rome Convention, and the proposed 
Rome II Regulation (see note 12 and p162 above). t3= Sec pp155-157 above. t'3 Sec p164 above. " This may be influenced by reluctance on a political level regarding the EU. This thesis 
is not 
the place for a detailed discussion of the strength of 'Euroscepticism' in the UK, although 
Taylor in the quote reproduced at p175 above touches on the extent to which such feelings 
may not be uniform within the UK. Different attitudes to EU policies may cause tension in the 
relationship between Westminster and Holyrood in future (see p149 above). 133 J. Fawcett, "Cross-fertilization in private international law" (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems 
303 at 303-304; and sec Boclc-Woelki & van Ooik, "The communitarization of private 
international law". 
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discussion of what is perceived to be the Europeanisation of family law. 
136 
Ilarnmonisation of conflict rules has been argued to be the first step towards 
substantive harmonisation in Europe: 137 certainly it is plausible that the former 
could provide the bridge to acceptance of proposals for a European private law. 
Such proposals find expression, for example, in working groups attempting to 
harmonise specific areas of law, as well as academic discussion of a corpus of 
European private law. 138 There is debate about how far this is driven by 
economic, or political, objectives. 139 
Accordingly, some commentators argue that international private law will 
disappear. 140 Thus it has been said that "private international law is destined to 
fade into legal history, as uniform substantive law progressively rules the 
world". 141 Full-scale harmonisation of private law within Europe would certainly 
remove the need for conflict rules as between Scotland and England, since their 
respective private law systems would no longer differ. However, talk of the 
death 
of international private law in general is overly dramatic. Europeanisation 
is 
geographically limited. No matter whether all European private laws are 
eventually harmonised, there will still be the need for rules to allocate jurisdiction 
when a non-EU member state could potentially hear the case, to decide whether 
the law of such a state should properly govern the dispute if litigated 
in Scotland, 
and to determine when judgments emanating from such states should 
be 
recognised and enforced within the EU. 142 This is not unimportant. Into this 
category of non-EU member states fall former colonies such as Australia, 
Canada, 
and New Zealand, with which the UK still has congress; developing markets 
such as China; and of course the United States, a major commercial power, and a 
136 C. McGlynn, "The Europcanisation of family law" (2001) 13 CFLQ 35; H. Stalford 
& E. 
Donnelly, "Brussels It revisited - an overview of proposed amendments" 
[2002] Fam Law 904; 
and sec McElcavy, "The Brussels 11 Regulation". 137 McGlynn, "The Europcanisation of family law", 38-41. 138 Sec MacQuccn, "Discussion Paper"; Smits, The Making of European Private Law. ý" Watt, "I larmonisation of Contract Law in Europe"; McGlynn, "The Europeanisation of 
family 
law"; house of Lords European Union Committee, "The Rome 11 Regulation", paras 
57-59 & 
66-72. 
140 Sec McGlynn, "The Europeanisation of family law", 40-41. 14, T. dc Bocr quoted ibid., 41. 14' Fcntiman, Foreign Law, p25. Although see the discussion on the EU's ability to sign up to, 
for 
example, Hague Conventions, and whether its member states remain able to do so (Boele- 
\Voclki & van Ooik, "The communitarization of private international law", 12 & 18-24; and 
sec McElcavy, "The Brussels 11 Regulation", 906-907). 
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country which has for many years held a (perhaps unhealthy) attraction for forum 
shoppers. 143 The possibility of achieving worldwide harmonisation seems too 
large and ambitious a project to constitute an inevitability. As Crawford notes: 
"Upon harmonisation of domestic laws, and/or of conflict rules, the conflict 
lawyer will disappear, his task complete - but we think the day is far distant, 
and the conflict lawyer himself will be needed to bring it forth". 144 
143 "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States"; Smith Kline cf: French Laboratories Ltd v Bloch [1983] 2 All ER 72 per Lord Denning MR at 74. 144 Crawford, "What happened to Indyka? ", 176. 
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7 PUBLIC POLICY IN INTRA-UK 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 
Public policy is a nebulous, multi-faceted, concept which has a particularly 
important role in the conflict of laws, though the point is always made that our 
policy sensibilities should be less open to being shocked in a conflict context, by 
virtue of the nature of that context. It is necessary, in examining the Scottish 
international private law rules which apply in intra-UK conflicts, to identify what 
role public policy may play in this setting. How far can there be said to be a 
Scottish public policy which could be relied upon to exclude recognition of an 
English judgment or rule of law? Further, has the position been changed by 
Scotland's devolved status within the UK? 
It is necessary to try to identify as exactly as possible what is meant by public 
policy. It is submitted that there are three, intertwined, levels of meaning, which 
can be described by the terms: underlying public policy; internal public policy; 
and external public policy. 
Underlying public policy 
Katzenbach perceptively notes that "[o]ne premise of contemporary positivism ... 
is that all law rests, in the final analysis, upon public policy - upon 'considerations 
of what is expedient for the community concerned' ". 1 This encapsulates what is 
meant by the term underlying public policy. It is those values, morals and 
perceived self-interest which inform the legislation passed by the lawmaking 
bodies elected by the citizens of the country, and the decisions reached by its 
judges. 2 Law is not a construct imposed upon society, but a set of rules created 
N. deB. Katzenbach, "Conflicts on an unruly horse: reciprocal claims and tolerances in 
interstate and international law" (1956) 65 Yale LI 1087 at 1091; see also R. Leslie, "The 
relevance of public policy in legal issues involving other countries and their laws" 1995 JR 477 
at 481-484; P. B. Carter, "The role of public policy in English private international law" (1993) 
42ICLQ 1 at 1. 
See Shears & Stephenson, James' Introduction to English Law, p235: "In one sense, all the 
principles of common law and of equity which have been evolved through the centuries are 
rules of public policy, for they have been created by the judges in the light of what they deem 
to be the public good". 
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by the people living and functioning within it. Every statute in force reflects 
(some more obviously than others) policies of the society. 3 These policies are as 
varied as society itself, ranging in topic from the manner in which the estate of the 
deceased should be divided, or the ability to break the marriage bond, to the legal 
enforceability of contracts, or allowing businesses to limit their liability by 
trading through a company structure. 
Internal public policy 
The phrase internal, 4 or domestic, 5 public policy is used to signify a more specific 
legal concept, which operates only in the domestic sphere. It is a common law 
doctrine which can be used by a court to alter the normal legal consequences of a 
given set of facts. Through the use of this tool, for example, certain contracts can 
be robbed of their usual legal effects on the ground that the contract contravenes 
domestic public policy. Although this internal public policy is often contrasted 
with the doctrine of public policy which is operative in conflict cases, this 
misleadingly suggests that the former is a clear cut set of rules. In fact, internal 
public policy is a loose concept, and its boundaries are not easy to identify, except 
that they are often said to be wider than those within which external public policy 
operates. 
Bell states that: 
"The private interests and stipulations of individuals must yield, and their 
natural rights and powers suffer restraint, wherever they are inconsistent with 
the public interest". 6 
What constitutes the public interest, however, is rarely enunciated, ' and can only 
be divined by enumerating the commonly accepted instances of the application of 
For an interesting discussion of how Lord Mackay of Clashfcrn was influenced by his 
Christian principles in reforming English family law, sec: Lord Mackay of Clashfcrn, "Family 
law reform: a personal view" in P. Beaumont & K. Wothcrspoon (cds), Christian Perspectives 
on Law and Relation ism (Paternoster Press, 2000), p237. 
4 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p66. 
S Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 479. 
6 Bell, Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, 7th edn., (cd. ) J. M'Larcn, (Buttcrworths, 1990 
reprint of original 1870 edition) (i, 320). 
7 Indeed most writers concentrate only on the role of public policy in contract. 
183 
internal public policy. The most widely documented role for internal public 
policy is in the field of contract law. It is clear that certain contracts, otherwise 
legally unimpeachable, will not be enforced in Scots law since their purpose, or 
terms, whether in whole or in part, are regarded as being contrary to public policy. 
In broad terms, such contracts appear to be those which involve corruption within 
the legal system (including compromising the neutrality of the professional 
adviser), or of government officers; smuggling; contracts which in some way 
frustrate or undermine government foreign policy; contracts which limit freedom; 
and contracts which involve the commission of a crime or delict. 8 Traditionally it 
has been argued that the courts' unwillingness to adjudicate in gambling contracts 
was not in itself a tenet of public policy, but was because such agreements were 
"unworthy to occupy judicial time". 9 It is submitted that this is a distinction 
without a difference. The approach of Scots law to gambling contracts is 
eloquent of a moral view on such agreements. But it is a viewpoint which is 
perhaps changing, as the courts become drawn into such matters. In Ferguson 1, 
Littlewoods Pools Ltd, 1° the pursuers had given an entry in a football pools 
competition to an agent. Had the football pools coupons been duly submitted by 
the agent, the pursuers would have won around £2.3 million, but (disastrously) 
they were not. The Lord Ordinary dismissed the action brought by the pursuers 
against the football pools company for the prize money, as he felt bound by 
authority to find that the transaction was a sponsio ludicra, and thus not 
enforceable in the courts. The pursuers had argued that the nature of gambling, 
and the interest involved in enforcing gambling agreements, had altered over the 
years, but the Lord Ordinary felt that a change in policy could only be made by 
statute, or by the decision of a higher court. " In the later case of Robertson v 
Anderson, 12 however, the Inner House held that an agreement to share bingo 
8 L. J. Dunlop et al. (eds), Gloag and Henderson: the Law of Scotland, 11`x' cdn. (W. 
Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), para 11.12; E. A. Marshall, General Principles of Scots Lau', 
7th edn. (W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), para 9-58; T. B. Smith, A Short Commentary on 
the Law of Scotland (W. Green & Son, 1962), p798. 9 Dunlop, Gloag and Henderson, para 11.15; and see Smith, Short Conunentaq, p799. Such 
contracts are sponsiones ladicrae. 
10 1997 SLT 309. 
II Ibid. per Lord Coulsfield at 312. 
12 2003 SLT 235. 
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winnings of £108,000 was "related to gaming, but ... not in itself a gaming 
contract". 13 However, the Court also stated that: 
"We were not addressed on the question whether changes in the commercial 
and public significance of betting and lotteries, and in their acceptability, had 
any implications for the development of this common law doctrine. Nor were 
we addressed on the question whether a doctrine under which the court 
declines to entertain an action for the enforcement of contractual rights and 
obligations is compatible with Convention rights, in particular the right of 
access to a court guaranteed by art 6(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In view of the conclusion which we have reached on the applicability 
of the doctrine to the circumstances of the present case it is unnecessary for us 
to consider these questions exproprio motu. 14 
Blom notes that in Canada: 
"Over the last few decades, Canadian domestic law has moved from a criminal 
prohibition against all gambling to a prohibition that applies only if the 
gambling is not sanctioned by the federal or provincial government, with such 
sanction being granted to a wide variety of activities across the country, as 
long as they contribute to the public coffers. Whatever unease the courts might 
have felt earlier about enforcing foreign gambling debts has now evaporated in 
the face of the widespread acceptance in Canada of officially approved 
gambling". 15 
This may reflect the direction being taken in Scots law in a domestic context. 
Over recent years the restrictions on bookmakers have eased, with longer opening 
hours and no requirement for filled-in frontages. The state has also allowed the 
introduction and promotion of a nationwide lottery. In this context it is more 
difficult for the courts to express (implicit) disapproval of such pursuits. Perhaps 
in future the internal public policy based rule against the courts' adjudication in 
13 Ibid. per Lord Reed (delivering the opinion of the Court) at 242. 14 Ibid. per Lord Reed (delivering the opinion of the Court) at 241. 15 Blom, "Public policy", 391. 
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gambling agreements will disappear altogether: the dicta reproduced above might 
suggest that the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
Scotland might allow the final coup de grace thereby to be administered to the 
rule. 
Outwith contract law the overt application of public policy is more difficult to 
identify. It has been said to be a matter of public policy that the court should not 
be denied a locus to intervene in the workings of private bodies exercising a 
function akin to a tribunal, to ensure that the rules of natural justice are 
respected. 16 It would seem also that public policy objections will prevent the 
carrying out of contracts either to prevent someone from marrying, or arranging a 
marriage for payment, or which are "to the prejudice of sexual morality". '7 In 
matters of succession, no effect will be given to a provision in a will which is 
illegal or impossible, or which attempts to prevent someone from marrying. '8 
Public policy can also act so as to strike down testamentary provisions for 
"excessive self-glorification by the testator without any benefit resulting to 
anyone", 19 and this is most famously discussed in cases such as various attempted 
schemes of Mr McCaig and his sister. 20 These public policy restrictions are 
largely replicated in the field of trusts. Trust purposes must not contravene the 
law, morality or public policy. 21 It can also be argued that the rule that a killer 
cannot benefit from his victim's will is grounded in public policy. 2 
Can any general principles be drawn from these examples? One major strand 
seems to be that a person should not gain from criminal acts or wrongdoing. As 
well as signalling moral disapprobation, this has the practical result of removing 
an incentive to commit crime. Another aim of domestic public policy is the 
16 St. Johnstone Football Club Limited v Scottish Football Association Limited 1965 SLT 171 
per Lord Kilbrandon at 175. 
17 Smith, Short Commentary, p798; and see ibid., pp798-799. 18 Ibid., pp421 & 798-799. 
19 Macdonald, Succession, para 9.51; see MacKintosh's Judicial Factor v Lord Advocate 1935 
SC 406. 
20 McCaig v University of Glasgow 1907 SC 231 (testator desiring the erection of towers topped 
by statues of himself and his family); McCaig's Trs v Kirk-Session of United Free Church of Lismore 1915 SC 426 (testator wishing erection of statues of family within McCaig's Folly in 
Oban). 
21 Smith, Short Commentary, p562. 
22 Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 479-480; Macdonald, Succession, paras 2.02 & 2.05. 
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protection of impartiality, whether of judges or of public officials who take 
decisions affecting the community. A further principle appears to be the 
protection of liberty, whether that be a freedom to trade, or to marry whom you 
choose. Scots are often said to have a Calvinist character, and perhaps a dislike of 
waste, and lingering disapproval of certain sexual pursuits, and of gambling, may 
be ascribed to this. It has, however, been argued that "the potential reach of 
public policy has diminished with time as moral imperatives that were taken for 
granted in many societies have lost their force". 23 This observation is no less 
pertinent to Scotland. 
External public policy 
Definition 
External public policy24 describes the public policy considerations which are 
called upon in international private law cases. Whereas in the context of 
underlying public policy, moral values are used in the creation of law (which 
necessarily may include the prohibition of certain behaviour), external public 
policy is primarily a tool of exclusion. It can be used so as not to apply a foreign 
law which has been selected by the Scots choice of law rules, or to refuse 
recognition and deny enforcement to a judgment from outwith Scotland25 In the 
former case, the consequence is normally the application of the le. Y for"i 26 In the 
English case of Royal Boskalis NV v Mountain, 27 the defendants sought to rely 
upon French public policy, but did not plead the content of this. Accordingly 
French and English public policy were presumed to coincide. 28 Since by its very 
nature public policy is special to a country, this approach seems intuitively wrong. 
The rule that the a foreign law should be presumed to be the same as the lex foci 
in the absence of proof as to its content has already been criticised, 29 and it is 
submitted that the case of Royal Boskalis NV v Mountain provides an illustration 
of the shortcomings of such a rule. 
23 Blom, "Public policy", 391. 
24 The phrase is used by both Castel and Leslie (Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p66; 
Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 477). 
25 See Carter, "Public policy", 1-2; Blom, "Public policy", 374-375. 26 Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 479; Blom, "Public policy", 375-376. 27 [1997] 2 All ER 929. 
28 Ibid. per Stuart-Smith LJ at 943; per Phillips LJ at 976-977. 29 See pp110-112 above. 
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However, public policy is something of a master of disguises. Thus, on one view, 
the application of Scots law as the lex fori to all divorces before the Scottish 
courts is done as a matter of public policy in a most sensitive area. Public 30 
policy of the forum may also require the imposition of certain of its own rules (so- 
called mandatory rules), even if another law otherwise governs the matter. 31 For 
example, English v Donnelly & Arnor32 concerned a contract which contained a 
choice of law clause in favour of English law. The Court of Session held that 
section 2 of the Hire Purchase and Small Debt (Scotland) Act 193233 was 
nevertheless mandatory, and applied despite the agreement of the parties. 34 
External public policy may be relied upon at common law by the court, or such an 
exception may be expressly provided for in a conflict statute: of late, this seems 
to be universal practice (specifically to mention that which we presume already 
exists). 35 It is commonly said that external public policy has a more limited scope 
than internal public policy. 36 This must indeed be so. Simply because a matter 
may be unacceptable to the forum in a domestic context does not automatically 
mean that it will also be contrary to external public policy in a conflicts case. 7 
However, the impression given by such statements is that the content of external 
public policy is completely coincident with certain rules of internal public policy. 
In effect, it is suggested that a number of matters contravene internal public 
policy, but that in the interests of comity and tolerance of others, only some of 
these can also be relied upon to refuse to recognise laws, or judgments, of foreign 
countries. On this model, the content of internal, and external, public policy 
respectively could be represented as follows: 
30 See Carter, "Public policy", 3. 
31 See Blom, "Public policy", 379-382. 
32 1958 SC 494. 
33 1932 (22 & 23 Geo V), c. 38. 
34 See also Fawcett, "Evasion of law and mandatory rules", 57. 
35 For example, Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s14(3)(a)(i); 
Family Law Act 1986, s51(3)(c). 
36 For example, Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 481. Sec also Anton with Beaumont, 
Private International Law, p102. 
37 P. B. Carter, "Rejection of foreign law: some private international law inhibitions" in R. 
Fentiman (ed. ), Conflict of Laws (Dartmouth, 1996), p243 at 254. 
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Figure 7.1 
internal public policy 
external public 
policy 
It will be argued that this is not in fact an accurate representation of the 
relationship between internal and external public policy rules. This is important 
because the actual links between underlying, internal, and external, public policy 
are significant in ascertaining how far we can properly speak of a Scots doctrine 
of public policy in conflicts cases which could also operate on an intra-UK basis, 
as well as the likely long-term effect of devolution in this matter. It is to the 
former subject we now turn. It is helpful to analyse the situation in the context of 
Scotland prior to the passing of the Scotland Act 1998. The impact of devolution 
will then be examined in a later section of the chapter. 
Similarities and differences between Scots and English rules of underlying public 
op licy 
Prior to the Union of the Crowns, there can be no doubt that the role of underlying 
public policy in shaping the law was in the context of a Scottish nation which was 
independent both politically and legally. It might be questioned how far that 
policy was unequally influenced by various sectors of the population, or the 
extent to which rules of law were borrowed and assimilated from other legal 
systems. However, the measures that were passed, and the law which was 
developed, was in response to the perceived needs of the Scottish nation. 
The regnal union brought a slight change, in that those reigning, or ruling over, 
Scotland, also controlled England. As has been seen, at certain times there was at 
least a stated desire for the two countries to be united 38 The underlying public 
38 See pp22-31 above. 
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policy might thus be altered, and one would expect that legislation passed in this 
period, and also in the time of the Cromwellian occupation, might reflect that. 
A crucial development, however, is the passing of the Acts of Union. The 
preservation of the Scottish legal system by the Acts of Union meant that Scots 
law, as it had been shaped until that point, survived. Also Scottish judges, who 
would be guided by Scottish underlying public policy concerns, retained a large 
measure of control over the development of the law. Accordingly, there are many 
principles and rules of Scots law which can be said to spring from underlying 
public policy concerns special to Scotland. Into this category might fall the rules 
designed to prevent a testator from willing all his property away from his family; 
the principle that those granting a security over moveable property must give over 
possession of that property; or the importance of specific implement as a remedy. 
By contrast, concerns of underlying public policy in England have given rise in 
that legal system to a necessity for consideration in contracts; 39 the laying of 
great stress on the freedom of parties to contract or to test; 40 and the existence of 
a period for objections to be made to a divorce before it becomes final. `ý1 
An equally important effect of the Acts of Union was the uniting of the two 
Parliaments, since legislation then emanated from a UK, rather than a Scottish, 
Parliament. Thus the underlying public policy was British. Even when 
Westminster legislation relates only to Scotland, it will generally have to be 
promoted by, or have the support of, one of the parties at Westminster which 
considers itself to be a British political party. 42 There is also nothing to prevent 
MPs representing English constituencies voting on Scottish measures. It would 
therefore be artificial to attempt to exclude 'Scottish' legislation passed at 
Westminster from the British underlying public policy concerns. The House of 
39 By contrast, lack of consideration will not prevent a foreign contract being enforced (Re 
Bonacina; Le Brasseur v Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch 394). Indeed one of the arguments put 
forward by parties in that case was that a Scottish contract with no consideration could be 
enforced in England (ibid., at 396). Also, where England was the lex loci contractus the 
Scottish courts have respected the consequences of an absence of consideration (Williamson v 
Taylor (1845) 8D 156). 
40 See C. H. Sherrin et al., Williams on Wills, 8th edn. (Butterworths, 2002), pars 34.12. 
41 Thus explaining the existence of decree nisi and decree absolute (Shears & Stephenson, James' 
Introduction to English law, p442). 
42 For example, the Labour Party, the Conservative Party or the Liberal Democrats. 
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Lords is also likely to be influenced by a British underlying public policy given 
43 its personnel and approach. 
Similarity between Scots and English rules of internal public policy 
As with Scotland, most of the discussion on internal public policy in English law 
concerns its application in the law of contract. An examination of the standard 
works on English law suggests that the grounds on which contracts will be struck 
down as a contravention of public policy are largely the same as those in 
Scotland. 44 Indeed, certain of the authorities relied upon by Scottish textbook 
writers in delimiting internal public policy are English. In England it is clear that 
a legal contract which is to be carried out in an illegal way would fall foul of 
internal public policy. 5 Whilst this was not explicit in Scotland, it was hard to 
see that a Scottish court would be any more likely to countenance such a contract, 
and indeed English authority seems to have influenced the recent decision in 
Dowling & Rutter v Abacus Frozen Foods Ltd. 46 The major difference between 
the two systems in their use of internal public policy in contract law, is that in 
England public policy has a role to play in determining what is valid 
consideration. The latter does not form part of Scots law at all. Outwith contract 
law, English law will not allow certain trust purposes, 47 or certain conditions 
attached to bequests in wills, 48 which are considered to be contrary to public 
policy. The prevention of a person benefiting from the will of someone lie has 
unlawfully killed is clearly ascribed in English law to public policy 49 
The relevance of all this for Scots external public policy is twofold. Firstly, since 
it would seem that there may be little difference between the internal public 
policy rules of Scotland and England, it may be questioned how far there can be 
any difference in the scope of their external public policy. This is particularly so 
43 See pp6l-63 above. 
44 G. H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, 10th edn. (Sweet & Mawell, 1999), pp392-415; P. S. 
Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 5th edn. (Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp341-345; J. C. Smith, The Law of Contract, 3'd edn. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), ppG7,70 & 
242-243. 
45 Smith, The Law of Contract, p243. 
46 2002 SLT 491. 
47 J. Mowbray et al., Lewin on Trusts, 17th edn. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), paras 5-02 to 5-17. 48 Sherrin, Williams on Wills, para 34.12. 
49 Ibid., para 9.13. 
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if the relationship of external to internal public policy is . that portrayed in the 
diagrammatic model (Figure 7.1) above. 50 This leads on to the second point, 
which is that if external public policy is merely a more limited refinement of 
internal public policy, and the rules of the latter are very similar on both sides of 
the border, then there should be very little room left for the intra-UK application 
of external public policy objections in conflict cases. 
The foreign interests of the UK 
One specific area of external public policy which is often differentiated from the 
generality of the doctrine, is "where the enforcement of the transaction in question 
would prejudice the interests of the United Kingdom or its good relations with 
foreign powers". 51 Carter characterises this as the courts wishing "to protect the 
public or national interest or image of the United Kingdom". 52 This is 
inextricably linked to the foreign policy pursued by the UK, and thereby infused 
with British concerns. 
External public policy objections at common law in an intra-UK situation 
Academic definitions of external public policy tend to fall into two quite distinct 
groups. On the one hand, Anton states that the "Scottish courts will not give 
effect to foreign law when to do so would be contrary to the fundamental policies 
of Scots law". 53 Similarly the editors of Dicey & Morris define such objections as 
striking at that which "would be inconsistent with the fundamental public policy 
of English law". 54 On the other hand, some writers adopt a slightly different 
approach. Thus Leslie states that external public policy acts so as to exclude that 
which "would be so unjust, immoral or, in some other way, contrary to the basic 
values or interests of the state or the community as to be unacceptable". 55 Akin to 
this is the belief that external public policy is the correct tool if a foreign law or 
decree "is regarded as repugnant to fundamental English concepts of morality, 
50 See p189 above. 
sl Crawford, International Private Law, para 3.17; see also Carter, "Public Policy", 4-5; C. M. V. 
Clarkson & J. Hill, Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws, 2°d edn. (Butterworths, 2002), p562. 52 Carter, "Rejection of foreign law", p256. 53 Anton with Beaumont, Private International Law, p101. 54 Collins, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, para 5R-001; see too Briggs, The Conflict 
of Laws, p44. 
55 Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 477. 
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decency, human liberty or justice". 56 The first of these two approaches links 
external public policy firmly to a legal system, whether that be Scots law or 
English law. However, the second appears to concentrate on the moral values of 
a community, indeed a country. For Scotland, which has its own legal system but 
is not a politically independent country, the distinction is crucial. Are the values 
inherent in the very principles of Scots law protected by the concept of external 
public policy, or only generic British values such as justice or decency? 57 If the 
latter, there could then be no room for public policy objections in an intra-UK 
case. 
In the early Scots case of Edwards v Prescot58 the pursuer, an Englishwoman, was 
attempting to enforce a decree (which had been passed reliant on an English strict 
liability statute). The defender, who was also an Englishwoman, had fled from 
that jurisdiction to Scotland. The pursuer argued that the union of the countries 
meant that enforcement of decrees from the courts of each country should be 
automatic. 59 One of the defender's counter-arguments was that the English law in 
question was penal and "contrary to the constitution of the law of Scotland", 60 
although this was disputed by the pursuer. Unfortunately the view of the court on 
this point is somewhat unclear: it found that the decree should be enforced 
"unless something competent in law or equity be objected against it". 61 
More guidance is provided by later cases. Connal & Co v Loder & Others 62 
concerned a bankruptcy with cross-border aspects. It was said that property had 
been transferred under English law by the simple expedient of delivering 
warrants, rather than the actual items. Lord Justice-Clerk Patton, however, was of 
the opinion that: 
56 Clarkson & Hill, Jaffey, p559; see also Carter, "Rejection of foreign law", 255. 
57 Leslie poses the question of whether public policy is Scottish or British, but does not record 
what he believes the answer to this question to be (Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 
485). 
58 (1720) Mor 4535. 
39 Ibid., at 4538. 
60 Ibid., at 4540. 
61 Ibid., at 4542. 
62 (1868) 6M 1095. 
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"Now, that is repugnant to the principle of our law, and it is quite obvious that 
it could not exist with our law, ... because it would then be no longer true that 
tradition was necessary; it would no longer be true that intimation was 
necessary, and therefore our law could not subsist. The adoption of the foreign 
law in that matter would be in direct antagonism to our own, and everybody 
knows that the fundamental principle upon which we introduce foreign law as 
law affecting the rights of contracts or otherwise, is only to the effect of 
introducing such law when it is not in direct contradiction to the principles 
upon which our law is governed, and according to which the rights of the 
subjects in this country must be determined". 63 
The case of Hanilyn & Co v Talisker Distillery64 arose out of a contract between a 
Scottish and an English company, which included a clause referring disputes on 
the contract to 'arbitration by two members of the London Corn Exchange, or 
their umpire'. An attempt was made by the Scottish firm to raise an action in 
Scotland. The First Division held that the law of the contract was Scots law, and 
thus the clause referring disputes to arbitration was void since the arbiters were 
not named . 
65 On appeal to the House of Lords it was held that the proper law of 
the arbitration clause was English law (by which the clause was unimpeachable). 
In the words of Lord Chancellor Herschell: 
"But then it is said that the Scotch court is asked to enforce a law which is 
against the public policy of the law of Scotland, and that although the parties 
may have so contracted, the Courts in Scotland cannot be bound to enforce a 
contract which is against the policy of their law. I should be prepared to admit 
that an agreement which was opposed to a fundamental principle of the law of 
Scotland founded on considerations of public policy could not be relied upon 
and insisted upon in the Courts of Scotland; and if, according to the law of 
Scotland, the Courts never allowed their jurisdiction to try the merits of a case 
to be interfered with by an arbitration clause, there would be considerable 
force in the contention which was urged by the respondents. But that is not the 
63 Ibid. at 1110. 64 (1894)21R(HL)21. 
65 Although this rule of Scots law was altered by the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 1894 (57 & 58 
Vict), c. 13, sl: another example of an internalised conflict? 
194 
case ... I have been unable to understand upon what fundamental principle of 
public policy the rule can be said to rest that where an arbitrator is not named 
an agreement between the parties to refer a matter to arbitration ought not to be 
enforced". 66 
In the twentieth century, we have seen that floating charges were judicially 
described as being "utterly repugnant to the principles of Scots law", 67 and that 
certain dicta in cases involving Romalpa clauses suggested that a Scottish court 
would find such a clause (even if enforceable in terms of the law selected by 
Scots choice of law rules) contrary to public policy. 68 
This is a difficult area, and it has therefore been thought worthwhile to reproduce 
some of the relevant judicial dicta at length. The cases indicate that it is possible 
in Scots law to object to the application of rules of English law on the basis of 
public policy. The basis of that objection is that recognition of the rule would 
offend against the principles and policy of Scots law. It is submitted therefore 
that Blom is correct to identify an important manifestation of public policy as 
relying on: 
"the fundamental values that underlie the domestic system of private law. 
According to this aspect of public policy; foreign laws and claims that are 
wholly out of keeping with those values must be rejected so as to protect the 
integrity of the system". 69 
The cases discussed above may seem to relate to quite technical rules of law, but 
these rules were inspired at one time in history by underlying public policy 
concerns. The values beneath Scots law which are protected by the concept of 
external public policy range from such seemingly technical rules to those which 
owe more to the morals of the day, or to notions of natural justice. Whilst an 
66 Hainlyn & Co. v Talisker Distillery (1894) 21 R (HL) 21, at 23-24; see also per Lord Watson 
at 27: "There may be stipulations which, though not tainted with immorality, are yet in such 
direct conflict with deeply-rooted and important considerations of local policy, that her Courts 
would be justified in declining to recognise them". 
67 Carse v Coppenn 1951 SC 233 per Lord President Cooper at 239. 68 See pp86-88 above. 
69 glom, "Public policy", 385. 
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abhorrence of sibling marriage, or a sense of justice and fairness may be shared 
by Scots and English alike, it is submitted that this does not mean that these ideals 
are a matter of British, rather than Scottish, public policy. Such similarities of 
approach on both sides of the border may, however, explain why it is unlikely that 
public policy objections in Scotland to English law will be on the grounds of a 
contravention of moral standards or basic conceptions of justice: it is only to be 
expected that it is at the other end of the public policy spectrum that the doctrine 
will tend to come into play as between Scotland and England. In the Canadian 
context, Blom rightly recognised that external public policy is multi-faceted, and 
that the protection of morality is only one aspect of this. Accordingly there are 
areas where "even sister states in a federation may conceivably have legitimate 
differences" 
'70 and thus the ability of a court to avail 
itself of a public policy 
objection remains necessary in interprovincial cases. It is submitted that this 
same reasoning holds in the UK. It is therefore both possible, and desirable, for a 
Scots court to be able to refuse to apply English law, or recognise an English 
judgment, on the grounds that it would contravene public policy. By this is meant 
that the rule or judgment in question is contrary to certain essential principles 
which inform the Scottish legal system. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the correct analysis of the relationship between 
the three different levels of public policy identified at the outset is as follows. 
Underlying public policy contributes to the statutes which are passed by the law- 
making body (in this case the old Parliament of Scotland, followed by the new 
British Parliament), the tenets set down by institutional writers, and the 
development of both by judges. Certain public policy considerations are so strong 
that they also override the normal legal consequences of actings in domestic law, 
for example, to prevent persons profiting from a crime, or to protect morals. This 
is the application of internal public policy. We recognise that in applying foreign 
law, or recognising foreign judgments, we cannot baulk at rules simply because 
they are different from our own. However, certain of the moral objections which 
drive the concept of internal public policy are so deeply held, that we would also 
70 Ibid., 398. 
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refuse to recognise a foreign law on that basis. 71 In addition to this,. there are 
certain foreign rules or judgments which we consider would be so destructive of 
the fabric of our law (and the underlying public policy reasons for those legal 
rules) that we will refuse recognition to them. 2 Together, this constitutes the 
doctrine of external public policy. We are as careful not to overuse the second 
kind of external public policy objection, as we are not to impose our moral beliefs 
inappropriately when utilising the first kind of external public policy exception. 
Thus in Hanilyn & Co v Talisker Distillery, 73 as we have seen, a clause valid 
under English law referring disputes to unnamed arbitrators was not void as a 
contravention of public policy since arbitration was possible in Scotland. 
However, if references to arbitration had been impossible in Scotland, then the 
contractual clause could legitimately have been struck down on this ground. It is 
therefore argued that a more accurate diagrammatic representation of the 
overlapping contents of the differing levels of public policy is as follows: 
Figure 7.2 
underlying public policy 
i. p. p. e. p. p. 
Ke Y: 
i. p. p. = internal public policy 
c. p. p. = external public policy 
71 For example, it has been noted that smuggling contracts are contrary to internal public policy. 
Moreover, Hume notes that contracts of smuggling entered into abroad may not be enforced in 
Scotland (G. C. H. Paton (cd. ), Baron David Hume's Lectures 1786-1822, Vol II (Stair Society, 
Vol 13,1949), pp28-31). By contrast, although the Scottish courts have (at least in the past) 
been loathe to become involved in gaming contracts,, as early as 1937 the Court of Session 
allowed a proof in a dispute arising from joint purchase of a ticket for an Irish lottery (Clayton 
v Clayton 1937 SC 619), and see in England the case of Saxby v Fulton [1909) 2 KB 208. On 
both sides of the border, it was recognised early that the status and incidents of slavery should 
not be given effect (in Scotland by the case of Knight v. Wedderburn (1778) Mor 14545; and 
in England by virtue of Somerset v Steinart (1772) 20 State Tr 1), but later an English court 
enforced a contract for the sale of slaves, valid by its Brazilian proper law (Santos v Illidge 
(1860) 8 CB(NS) 859). It is impossible to predict what a Scots court of that period would have 
done in this situation. Collier states that it is "inconceivable"- that such a decision would be 
reached in England now (Collier, Conflict of Latins, p363), and this is undoubtedly true for 
Scotland also. 
72 See Connal & Co. v Loder & Others (1868) 6M 1095; Hammer and Solnre V Hli'T 
Realisations Ltd 1985 SLT (Sh Ct) 21 at 23. 
73 (1894) 21 R (HL) 21. 
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The above model (Figure 7.2) reflects the connection, between the underlying 
public policy of the law, and both internal and external public policy. Changes in 
the former can accordingly alter the application of the latter two. 74 However, it 
also illustrates that although the content of internal and external public policy may 
overlap, they are not entirely coincident, and nor is external public policy merely 
a subset of internal public policy. 
The availability of external public policy objections under statute in an intra-UK 
situation 
External public policy as an exclusionary device has also been built into conflicts 
legislation. Whether this exception is available within the UK, or simply in 
respect of rules or judgments emanating from a politically foreign country, is a 
matter of construction of the individual statute. 
In general, the parliamentary draughtsman has not disapplied public policy 
exceptions in the intra-UK context. Under Article 16 of the Rome Convention, a 
court may decide not to apply a rule of law of the country which governs the 
contract by virtue of the Convention's choice of law rules, if to do so would be 
"manifestly incompatible" with the forum's public policy. In terms of the 
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, the Convention also applies as between the 
UK jurisdictions, and there is nothing in that legislation to prevent reliance upon 
Article 16 within the UK. There is a similar public policy exception in the 
Convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition. 75 Again, the 
legislation which allows the rules of the Convention to apply within the UK, does 
not disapply this public policy exception. 76 The Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 permits the law chosen in terms of its 
provisions not to be applied if to do so "would conflict with principles of public 
74 For example, the statutory introduction of the concept of the floating charge in Scots domestic 
law both represented a change in the underlying public policy of Scots law, and removed the 
possibility that recognition of the effects of an English floating charge might be held by a 
Scots court to be contrary to external public policy. To take another example, ' changes in 
underlying public policy which reflect an alteration in how society views. marriage and 
divorce, may make us more tolerant of certain foreign cultural norms, and thus less likely to 
use external public policy to exclude recognition of the status of, and consequences attendant 
upon, some relationships entered into abroad. 
's Art. 18. 
76 Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, c. 14. 
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policy". 77 Once more, there is nothing to prevent a Scottish court making use of 
this exception so as not to apply English law. 
There are, however, certain exceptions. A judgment may be refused recognition 
under the Brussels Convention, and now Brussels I, if it involves a contravention 
of the forum's public policy. 78 The separate provisions for recognition and 
enforcement in Scotland of judgments from other parts of the UK allow only 
limited exceptions to the general right to recognition, 79 and traditional common 
law challenges based on public policy or fraud have not been preserved. An 
attempt was made in the case of Clarke v Fennoscandia Ltd8° to circumvent the 
statutory provisions by seeking interdict against the taking of steps in Scotland to 
enforce an English judgment which was alleged to be tainted by fraud. However, 
this did not succeed. In terms of the recognition of divorces, annulments, and 
judicial separations, section 51 of the Family Law Act, 1986 sets out the grounds 
on which such recognition may be refused. However, the public policy and fair 
notice objections set out therein are expressly said only to apply with respect to 
overseas divorces, annulments and judicial separations. 81 The Law Commissions 
were of the view that natural justice concerns were more properly raised in the 
British court where the divorce action was heard. 82 They confirmed this view 
when proposing the bringing of nullity within the same statutory framework as 
the recognition of divorces. 83 Although it was recognised that public policy in 
Scotland and England might sometimes differ with'respect to nullity, it was not 
proposed that a public policy exception should be available in respect of intra-UK 
cases on the recognition of nullity decrees. 84 Similarly, it is not proposed that 
77 s. 14(3)(a)(i)" 
78 Art. 27(1) of the Brussels Convention; Art. 34(1) of Brussels I. 79 Broadly, if the registration procedure was not correctly carried out, or if the subject-matter of 
the judgment for which recognition was sought had already been decided in another court 
$o 
(Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch. 6, para 10; Sch. 7, para 9). 
1998 SLT 1014. 
$1 Family Law Act 1986, s51(3). British divorces can only be refused recognition in Scotland on 
the grounds of irreconcilability with a previous Scottish judgment in that case, or if Scots 
international private law dictates that there was in fact no valid marriage (Family Law Act 
1986, s5l(1), (2)). 
82 Law Com. No 34/Scot. Law Com. No 16, Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (1970), para 2 of Notes to clause 8 of draft Bill. 83 Law Com. No 137/Scot. Law Com. No 88, Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees and Related Matters (1984), para 6.67. 
94 Ibid. 
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there be an intra-UK public policy exception with respect to the recognition of 
85 dissolutions and annulments of civil partnerships. 
The Westminster Parliament has the power -to remove the ability to rely on 
external public policy objections within the UK, and has sometimes done so when 
passing internalising rules. However, in many situations where statute provides 
that the Scottish courts may refuse to apply a rule of foreign law on public policy 
grounds, this option is equally open to the court where a rule of English law is 
involved. The paucity of occasions on which Scottish courts have required to do 
so 86 is testament not just to the reluctance of the courts to use such a powerful tool 
as public policy, 87 but also to the many similarities in the underlying public policy 
of the two countries. However, it is submitted that it is appropriate that the option 
remains open. It is always possible that as between two legal systems springing 
from different roots, recourse to public policy objections may sometimes be 
required. 
The impact of devolution on public policy in Scotland 
The establishment of a Scottish Parliament with wide-ranging legislative powers 
could lead over time to a change in the underlying public policy of Scots law. 
The influence of smaller parties on the Scottish legislative process, and the 
possibility that the Scottish Parliament is passing a different style of legislation in 
which principles have a more obvious place than heretofore, has already been 
discussed. 88 The new Parliament has not shied away from morally charged issues 
such as the hunting of foxes. 89 Accordingly, it is quite possible (particularly were 
radically different administrations to be in power in London and Edinburgh in the 
future), that the underlying public policy of Scots law might shift slightly. This 
could affect both internal and external public policy. How, for example, might a 
85 Civil Partnership Bill 2004, cl. 228(3)(c). 
86 There appears to be no Scottish case in which a litigant has successfully invoked the public 
policy exception under the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, the Recognition of Trusts 
Act 1987 or the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, whether in 
respect of English law or any other foreign law. This is not to say that foreign law may not 
have been excluded by other means, but that apparently no judge has taken the bold step of 
refusing recognition to a judgment or rule of law on public policy grounds alone. 
87 W. E. Holder, "Public policy and national preferences: the exclusion of foreign law in English 
private international law" (1968) 17 ICLQ 926 at 929 & 937. 
88 See p147 above. 
89 Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002. 
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Scottish court view an English contractual clause relating to fox hunting? What if 
an action was raised in Scotland for damages relating to the physical chastisement 
of a child which occurred in England? Over time wider chasms in attitude might 
open up, 90 giving rise to even more difficult intra-UK questions. This could also 
lead to judges being less reluctant to invoke external public policy objections 
based on moral values, in intra-UK cases. 
The Scottish Parliament also has the power expressly to legislate in order to 
narrow or expand the scope of internal public policy. Furthermore, in passing 
statutes dealing with international private law, it has a choice as to whether 
external public policy exceptions should be available in respect of English rules 
of law and judgments. What course has been taken thus far? The Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 provides that a rule of law found to be applicable 
by virtue of the legislation need not be given effect to by the Scots courts if it 
would "produce a result which would be manifestly contrary to public policy". 91 
Furthermore, a measure taken in a country other than Scotland may be refused 
recognition if, for example, it involves a breach of natural justice, 92 or of a 
mandatory rule of Scots law, 93 or if to do so would be incompatible with public 
policy. 4 These provisions could equally well be invoked if an English rule, or 
measure, was involved. However, as we have seen, the legislation also allows for 
special regulations to be introduced in future on the subject of intra-UK 
recognition. 95 
90 As Blom notes "[v]iewcd abstractly, fundamental values like honesty and freedom do not 
change much over time, but perceptions as to what violates those values do change, sometimes 
quite swiftly" (Blom, "Public policy", 391). It is submitted that in future Scotland might see 
this type of change of emphasis not just on a temporal, but also on a geographical, basis. 
Belief in certain fundamental values may continue to be common to Scotland and England, 
however, there may be a greater divergence in the way in which those values are respected and 
upheld on either side of the Tweed. 
91 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, Sch. 3, para 6. 92 Ibid., para 7(3)(a). 
91 Ibid., para 7(3)(c). 
94 Ibid., para 7(3)(b). 
95 Ibid., pars 10. 
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Foreign affairs, however, are one of the subjects reserved to the UK Parliament in 
terms of the devolution settlement Thus one of the aspects of external public 96 
policy, that of not damaging the UK's relationships with its allies, will remain 
singularly within the control of Westminster. 
Constitutionalising external public policy? 
In a dispute over the recognition of an American judgment in British Columbia, 
Tetley characterises the public policy challenge as an (unsuccessful) argument 
that recognition would be contrary to British Columbia, rather than Canadian, 
public policy. 97 Could therefore a judgment from a sister-province also be argued 
to contravene public policy? Judgments from outwith Quebec may be refused 
recognition within Quebec on public policy grounds, 98 and logically this would 
seem potentially to encompass those from sister-provinces. The Civil Code of 
Quebec also provides for an ordre public exception to the application of foreign 
laws, 99 and the text of the Code is arguably such that this could be relied upon to 
exclude the laws of Canada's Common Law provinces. ioo Legislation which 
would allow for the registration and enforcement of Canadian judgments has gone 
through some of the provincial assemblies, but has not yet been brought into 
force. To take those of British Columbia and Nova Scotia as an example, both 
allow for the courts of those states to refuse to recognise a judgment from a sister- 
province on the grounds of public policy. ")' For the same reasons expanded upon 
when discussing the availability of an external public policy objection in the intra- 
UK situation, the inclusion of such an exception in the legislation seems both 
necessary and desirable. 
96 Scotland Act 1998, s29; Sch. 5, para 7. Furthermore, paragraph 9, which reserves defence 
matters, explicitly covers "trading with the enemy and enemy property" (Scotland Act 199S, 
Sch. 5, para 9(1)(e)). 
97 It was not "contrary to British Columbia public policy, not being repugnant to any essential 
public or moral interest of the province or to B. C. conceptions of essential justice and 
morality" (Tetley, "On-going saga", 43 (discussing the case of Old North State Breiring Co. t' 
Newlands Services Inc (1999) 58 BCLR (3d) 144,46 OR (3d) 480 (BC CA))). This would 
seem to suggest that each Canadian province could possess a distinctive doctrine of public 
policy, rather than there being a pan-Canadian concept of public policy. 98 Civil Code of Quebec, LQ 1991, c. 64, art. 3155(5). 99 Ibid., art. 3081. 
i°° Ibid., art. 3077. 
10j Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act, RSBC 1996, c. 115, s6(1)(d); Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act, RSNS 2001, c. 30, s8(2)(c)(iv); see also Blom, "public 
policy", 398. 
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However, as has been discussed in an earlier chapter, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has taken quite a different path. 102 In terms of the choice of law rules in 
tort, La Forest J saw "a limited role, if any, for considerations of public policy in 
actions that take place wholly within Canada". 103 The Supreme Court has opined 
that there is, in the Canadian constitution,, an implicit notion of "full faith and 
credit", meaning that judgments from other provinces properly seised of 
jurisdiction should be recognised within Canada. 104 The result of this 
constitutionalising of conflicts is, in Castel's view, that "in light of recent Supreme 
Court of Canada decisions, public policy should no longer be relevant on the 
interprovincial or interterritorial level". 105 It was noted in Morguard Lrvestwents 
Ltd v De Savoye106 that between the Canadian provinces there could not properly 
be "concerns about differential quality of justice". 107 The basis for this was the 
control of Canadian central government over the appointment of judges, and the 
ability of litigants to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which would 
enforce the same (constitutional) rules across Canada in respect of jurisdiction 
and recognition decisions. 108 It was also said that the existence of a Canada-wide 
standard on lawyer's ethics would militate against breaches of natural justice. 109 
As has already been discussed, the House of Lords and the JCPC are not 
analogous in terms of function and approach with the Supreme Court of 
Canada. ' 10 The introduction of the European Convention on Human Rights might 
be thought to standardise minimum natural justice guarantees in Scotland and 
England. However, as has been seen, the method of implementation adopted in 
the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998 is not the same, which can 
lead to Convention articles having different effects north and south of the 
border. l 1 In any event, a means to refuse recognition to judgments considered by 
the forum to breach rules of natural justice is only one aspect of the role played by 
102 See Chap. 3. 
103 Tolofson v Jensen (1994) 120 DLR (0) 289 at 308. 
104 Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077; Hunt v MN plc [1993] 4 SCR 
289; and see generally Chap. 3. 
105 Castel, Introduction to Conflict of Laws, p67. He specifically names Hunt v T&NN plc, supra as 
an example of the Supreme Court decisions to which he refers. 
io6 [1990] 3 SCR 1077. 
107 Ibid. per La Forest J at 1100. 
Ios Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 See pp59-63 above. 
111 See pp52-53 above. 
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external public policy. As has been argued above, external public policy includes 
a whole gamut of objections, ranging from contravention of fundamental moral 
beliefs or notions of fairness to protection of the fabric of our law and its 
fundamental legal principles. Furthermore, there is not the same centralisation or 
harmonisation of judicial appointments and the regulation of lawyers in the 
UK. 112 It is submitted that the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada to the 
availability of a public policy exception within Canada is irredeemably bound up 
with the constitutionalisation of conflicts described in an earlier chapter. 
113 As 
was argued there, it would be neither appropriate, nor desirable, for that approach 
to be followed within the UK. 
In any event, the constitutionalisation of conflicts in Canada may not have been as 
successful as the judicial dicta might suggest in removing public policy front 
interprovincial conflict law. In Hunt v T&Nplc, 114the Supreme Court of Canada 
found that the courts of one province could examine the constitutionality of 
legislation of a sister-province: "all judges within the Canadian judicial structure 
must be taken to be competent to interpret their own Constitution". ' 15 This case 
was an action for damages, based on exposure to asbestos fibres. The action was 
raised in British Columbia where the alleged exposure had taken place: the 
defendants (who had sold goods said to contain the asbestos fibres) were based in 
Quebec. The plaintiff attempted to recover certain documents in terms of the 
relevant British Columbia procedural rules. However, the defendants stated that 
they were unable to produce the requested documents since Quebec legislation 
forbade the taking of business records outwith that province on the strength of an 
order of a court in a sister-province. The Supreme Court made it clear that the 
British Columbia courts had the power to declare the Quebec statute to be 
unconstitutional. "6 It is submitted that the ability to declare legislation frone 
another province to be unconstitutional, is no more than an (admittedly uniquely 
Canadian) expression of public policy. It fulfils the same role as public policy, as 
it could act to exclude rules of law (or judgments based upon then) from other 
112 See p59 above. 
113 See Chap. 3. 
14 [1993] 4 SCR 289. 
its Ibid. per La Forest J at 314. 
116 Ibid. per La Forest J at 307-317. 
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provinces. It says much for the resilience, and usefulness, of the doctrine of 
public policy that an analogue is still required in a system of constitutionalised 
conflicts. 
Conclusion 
External public policy embraces a range of objections to laws or judgments from 
outwith Scotland. It draws on some of our internal public policy objections, but 
also protects the essential structure of the Scots legal system with its underlying 
public policy roots. Because of this wide definition, it has been submitted that 
external public policy can be relied upon at common law by Scots courts to refuse 
recognition to an English judgment, or so as not to apply a rule of English law 
which would otherwise govern the matter under our choice of law rules. Such 
public policy objections are also explicitly allowed by certain statutes, although 
when passing legislation which internalises conflicts, the Westminster Parliament 
has also tended to remove the intra-UK public policy exception. Prior to the 
establishment of the Scottish Parliament, similarities in internal public policy and 
(to a lesser extent) underlying public policy, might suggest that, in practice, there 
would be few occasions on which external public policy would, in fact, be relied 
upon in the intra-UK context, and indeed the case law bears this out. However, 
this does not mean that there is no need for an external public policy exception in 
this particular cross-border situation. Blom has described public policy as "a 
safety valve", 117 and this is an apt metaphor. No matter how close the 
relationship, there should always be such a safety valve. This is well illustrated 
by the introduction of a power to declare legislation from another province 
unconstitutional, even in the midst of a Canadian project to constitutionalise 
conflicts and remove the public policy doctrine from interprovincial disputes. 
The advent of constitutional change in Scotland, in the shape of a devolved 
Parliament, simply reinforces the need for an external public policy exception to 
be open to Scottish courts in intra-UK disputes. The establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament may alter Scottish underlying public policy, and internal public policy, 
causing them to diverge further from that pertaining in England. This in turn 
117 Blom, "Public policy", 398. 
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impacts upon the grounds on which a Scottish court might legitimately and 
properly feel unable to apply an English (or other foreign) law, or recognise a 
judgment from outwith Scotland. It is not thought, however, that Scots judges 
will abandon the restraint which they currently show in utilising such a potentially 
powerful weapon. A further issue in the future for Scots judges might be the 
addition of a further layer of public policy concerns. As Leslie has noted, the 
Giuliano-Lagarde report, which accompanied the Rome Convention, contained a 
reference to "Community public policy". 118 The proposed Rome II Regulation 
would not permit punitive damages, on the grounds that this would contravene 
Community public policy. ' 9 This has been much criticised. 120 However, could a 
breach of a concept of Community public policy be relied upon in an intra-UK 
conflict case? This is a question for the future. 
:$ Leslie, "The relevance of public policy", 485. 
129 Rome II, Art. 24. 
120 House of Lords European Union Committee, "The Rome II Regulation", paras 164-1GS. $ce 
also Carruthers & Crawford, "Conflict of laws update" (2004), 23. Indeed, its deletion is proposed in the Wallis Report. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has sought to explore the effect of the constitutional relationship 
between Scotland and England on the Scottish approach to resolving competitions 
of jurisdiction with English courts, or, cases where both Scottish and English law 
have a claim to applicability, as well as the Scottish attitude to decisions and 
orders emanating from English courts. What makes this particular constitutional 
relationship a good basis for such a study is its different permutations over time: 
from neighbouring independent nation states, to partners in a political but not 
legal union, then to a Scotland with its own devolved legislature but still 
remaining a part of the United Kingdom. 
Anglo-Scottish conflict of laws prior to 1707 
At the most basic level there is an essential interplay between the constitution and 
international private law. Constitutional law is concerned with the source of legal 
authority within a country, with the apparatus, and powers, of the nation state, and 
with defining that state. Once there are different nations subject each to their own 
system of law and each with their own central legal authority, it becomes 
necessary to formulate rules to settle their competing jurisdiction claims, to 
determine which (if either) of their laws should govern a set of facts, and/or to 
consider whether recognition should be afforded to judgments emanating from the 
other nation. 
Between the eleventh and the sixteenth centuries the separate nation states of 
Scotland and England emerged from amongst the peoples of the island of Britain, 
and their laws and rules developed into recognisable systems of law with central 
courts. Even during times of hostility, there was contact between them at 
different levels of society, from royal marriages, and cross-border landholding to 
the merchant or border reiver. 1 However, for Scotland, for quite a considerable 
time, many such types of contact took place in the context of supra-national 
bodies of law. Thus the law merchant provided regulation for traders, and the 
1 See Chap. 2. 
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importance of maritime law cannot be underestimated in a country which relied 
so much on sea travel. In addition, many matters of family law would have fallen 
within the domain of the canon lawyers. Even the Anglo-Scottish border 
lawlessness was controlled for a time by a special set of rules: the March Laws. 
The existence and operation of such supra-national bodies of law acted to dull the 
problems of jurisdiction and clashing laws which otherwise could have arisen in 
Scottish courts, with regard to both English law and other foreign laws. However, 
by the seventeenth century we can discern what we would now describe as choice 
of law questions arising involving Scots and English law. Courts can be seen to 
be concerned with questions of jurisdiction; and institutional writers with the 
concept of domicile. Constitutional changes in the seventeenth century could 
easily have smothered the growth of these early international private law rules, in 
the British context. However, both . the Union of the Crowns 
in 1603, and the 
Cromwellian occupation in the latter half of that century, failed to bring about 
either a harmonisation of Scots and English substantive law, or the imposition of 
one system wholly upon the other. 3 
Intra-UK conflicts and the UK constitution 1707 to 1999, 
Undoubtedly, one of the key constitutional events in the development of intra-UK 
rules of international private law is the union of the Scottish and English 
Parliaments in 1707. It is important not to underestimate how unusual was the 
accommodation arrived at by the two countries. Contemporaries saw the creation 
of the largest free, common, market of their times. Almost three hundred years 
later, the existence of different legal systems which had no separate legislatures, 
ensured that Great Britain possessed a constitutional system without parallel, 
although perhaps, as Nairn muses, what was different in the eighteenth century by 
virtue of being new and exciting, had in the twentieth century had become odd 
and anachronistic. 
Between the creation of Great Britain in 1707 and the advent of a devolved 
Scottish Parliament in 1999, this unusual constitutional arrangement prevailed 
2 See Chap. 2. 
3 See pp22-31 above. 
4 See Nairn, After Britain. 
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between Scotland and England. There was political unity, with one (supreme) 
legislature and executive. 5 However, the separate systems of private law of 
Scotland and England survived the Union, although statutory change and 
development of these two different legal systems was carried out through the 
single, British, Parliament. The separate, hierarchies of courts remained 
unmerged. The eagerness of litigants for a further avenue of appeal led quickly to 
the establishment of jurisdiction by the House of Lords in Scottish civil, but not 
criminal, cases. This did not act so as to create a unified court structure. Nor did 
it lead to the merging of the two systems of law, since the House of Lords must 
apply Scots law to Scots cases, and its decisions in English cases are not 
technically of binding effect on Scottish courts. 6 However, the anomalous 
position of the House of Lords has, over the years, served to introduce a further 
complicating factor into the relationship between Scots and English law. One 
example of this is the ability of the House to call upon its judicial knowledge of 
English law when hearing a Scots appeal on an intra-UK choice of law issue. 
The terms of the Acts of Union which brought about the Union of the Scottish and 
English Parliaments had therefore created a situation in which persons could 
move freely between different territorial legal jurisdictions without altering their 
nationality; a common market whose members might be subject to different laws; 
and separate court systems which could issue conflicting judgments. 
Lack of constitutionalisation of conflicts 
The relationship between the various public law bodies within a state, such as 
legislature to executive, or federal legislature to central legislature, is regulated by 
constitutional law. Latterly, some of the Commonwealth countries such as 
Canada and Australia have experimented with the idea that the regulation of 
private law relationships within a country should also be referred to constitutional 
laws. Thus constitutional rules would dictate whether judgments issued by one 
provincial court should be afforded recognition by the courts of a sister province, 
and also delimit the occasions on which the court may choose to exclude the laws, 
S Despite Lord President Cooper's dicta in MacCormick v Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396 (sec p44 
above). 
6 See pp61-63 above. 
See pl 15 above. 
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or judgment, of a sister province. This method of approach is referred to in this 
thesis as the 'constitutionalising of conflicts'. 8 
How far did such reasoning find favour in the UK prior to the devolution 
settlement of the late twentieth century? It is true that there is a different 
approach to the subject of the applicability of statutes within the UK, than to the 
operation (extra-territorially) of statutes of (entirely) foreign sovereigns. 
Traditionally the reach of legislation of politically foreign countries has been 
prohibited (except in matters of status) by the application of the doctrine of extra- 
territoriality, which insists that a law-making body is only sovereign within its 
own territory. Attempts to legislate outwith those confines will not be afforded 
recognition by the Scottish, or indeed the English, courts. Within the UK, 
however, the Westminster Parliament holds sovereign power to legislate for the 
all of the territories which comprise it. The existence of separate legal systems 
and court structures means that the Parliament is obliged to legislate in a variety 
of different modes: either for England and Wales alone, for Scotland alone, 
latterly for Northern Ireland alone, or for a combination of these. Even when 
directing its legislative attention to, say, England, Westminster undoubtedly 
retains the power to make statutory provision, for Scotland. Accordingly, the 
concept of extra-territoriality is of no application when determining the 
geographical reach of statutes within the UK. Instead it is a question of pure 
statutory construction: a matter of "constitutional practice, not ... international 
comity". 9 Given that the theory of sovereignty also underpins the unwillingness 
of the Scots and English courts to give effect to the penal and revenue laws of a 
foreign state, it has been submitted that a Scottish court may not invoke this 
exception so as to exclude an English penal, revenue, or other public, law. 10 
However, these are isolated examples, not part of a wider trend. The creation of 
the British state in the early eighteenth century did not lead then, or at any other 
time in the years which followed, to the wide-spread constitutionalising of 
8 See Chap. 3. 
9Rv Treacy [1971] AC 537 per Lord Diplock at 564 (see pp45-48 above). 1° See pp48-51 above. 
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conflicts. " Part of the reason for this was the lack of a constitutional base on 
which such an approach could have been founded: Great Britain does not have a 
founding constitutional document in the style of the American Constitution, nor 
was one adopted on its enlargement into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland. Furthermore, although the Acts of Union which established the new state 
might have provided the necessary basis, their potential has never been 
developed. There have been many hints in Scottish cases over the years that the 
Acts of Union might be a type of higher law, limiting the power of the 
Westminster Parliament. However, there has been little agreement on how such 
power might be loosed, and certainly no Scottish court has successfully relied 
12 upon the Acts of Union to strike down legislation. 
The internalisation of conflicts 
Whilst there was not a constitutionalisation of the conflicts of jurisdiction, laws, 
and judgments between Scotland and England in the British state, this is not to 
say that the constitutional arrangements of that state did not affect how such 
conflicts were handled. The existence of one Parliament made possible the 
phenomenon which has been described in this thesis as the 'internalising of 
conflicts', 13 and indeed such internalisation is, by and large, the result of 
legislative, and not judicial, action. An early example of internalisation is 
provided by runaway marriages. Differences between Scots and English marriage 
laws had made Scotland a paradise for young lovers marrying against their 
parents' wishes: not just in the penny novel, but in real life. Both the Scots and 
English courts initially dealt with all the issues arising from this situation in terms 
of the fledgling rules of international private law. ' However, by 1856 legislation 
had been passed in an attempt to prevent such runaway marriages occurring at 
all. '4 
11 See Chap. 3. 
12 See Chap. 3. 
13 Which has been defined as including, firstly, the removal of a conflict by changes to the Scottish and/or English domestic rules which give rise to the conflict and, secondly, the introduction of special rules to regulate cross-border consequences as a replacement for the 
normal international private law rules. 
14 See pp72-74 above. 
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The internalisation of conflicts has been most prevalent in two areas. 15 The first 
of these is in what might be called 'UK common market law'. This includes such 
topics as company law and insolvency law, and the law of sale. The response of 
the common UK legislature has been to harmonise (for example, the law of 
sale), 16 or to internalise the conflicts which could arise (for example, in 
insolvency). 17 Internalisation of conflicts has also allowed the sublimation of 
property law principles where these were thought to hinder the UK common 
market. It is submitted that this underscores the nature of the union in which 
Scotland and England were the major partners. Matters of trade and access to an 
Empire, rather than legal integration, had been uppermost in the forging of the 
British state. This attitude is therefore reflected in the drive to internalise 
conflicts where they could occur in the operation of the British common market 
which had been created. It also coheres with the wider arguments which link the 
flourishing of Britain with the growth and existence of the Empire with all its 
opportunities for trade, and question whether the, collapse of Empire led to 
Scottish discontentment with the UK partnership. 18 
The second field in which there has been much internalising of conflicts within 
the UK is 'recognition', in its very widest sense. A succession of UK statutes have 
replaced with special intra-UK rules the normal international private law rules on 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments, culminating in the near automatic 
intra-UK scheme contained in Schedules 6 and 7 of the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982. Registration of judgments in terms of the scheme is more 
akin to an administrative than a judicial procedure, and Parliament has also 
removed the ability to refuse recognition on the basis of public policy, fraud or 
other such objections. The recognition in Scotland of divorces obtained in 
England is subject to only very limited exceptions. After a fraught history of 
conflicting decrees on both sides of the border, the recognition and enforcement 
See Chap. 4. 
16 See pp77-79 above. 
17 See pp79-84 above. 
8 See Fry, The Scottish Enrpire, Chap. 38; Nairn, After Britain; Welsh, The Four Nations, 
p381; Urwin, "Territorial structures and political developments in the United Kingdom", p67" Colley, Britons, pp374-375; Devine, Scotland's Empire, p350; C. Lee, Scotland and the United Kingdom: the economy and the Union in the twentieth century (Manchester University 
Press, 1995), ppl7-18; cf Devine, Scotland's Empire, pp62-63. 
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of custody decrees within the UK has also been placed by internalising legislation 
on an almost administrative footing. Furthermore, internalising statutes have 
eased 'recognition' in a wider sense. Thus a Scottish confirmation gives an 
executor sufficient title to deal with property belonging to the deceased but 
situated in England, without any need for resealing or the obtaining of a fresh 
confirmation. This applies in the reverse situation for an English personal 
representative. In the criminal law sphere, prosecutors may place in front of a 
Scottish court previous convictions from England, but not those of a politically 
foreign country. Provisions also exist allowing for the enforcement of warrants 
for apprehension and imprisonment within the UK. Implicit in all of these rules, 
it is submitted, is recognition in Scotland of the status and powers conferred upon 
a person by an English court, or the warrants granted under its authority, or the 
judgment reached by such a court in criminal matters. Furthermore, both in these 
examples and in the mainstream recognition and enforcement of judgments, 
recognition within the UK has become, at the legislator's hand, an administrative 
rather than judicial procedure. 
The use of international private law rules in an intra-UK context 
Outwith UK common market law and the intra-UK recognition of judgments and 
other court decisions, however, Scottish courts have generally called upon rules of 
international private law (usually) regardless of whether the other court claiming 
jurisdiction, or the potentially applicable law, is English or politically foreign. 
Indeed English law, like any other law, must be introduced into an action in 
Scotland by the party who wishes to rely upon it. Contrary to what may 
commonly be believed, it has been argued that it is not even true to say that on 
exceptional occasions English law may come within the judicial knowledge of a 
Scots judge. As with any other foreign law, English law is a matter of fact 
requiring proof before a Scots court. This is not simply a result of the 
preservation of the Scottish legal system by the Acts of Union, but is essential to 
the maintenance of the distinction between the, legal systems obtaining in the 
different territories of the UK. Furthermore, whilst in practice Scots lawyers 
might have acquired some knowledge of the English legal system and English 
law, the danger of falling into error as to the content of the law, or failing properly 
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to appreciate its structure or effect, is too great to allow evidence of English law 
to be led otherwise than with the involvement of an expert English practitioner. 
But it has been submitted that it would not be desirable to allow English lawyers 
to appear in the Scottish courts in a representative capacity, rather than simply as 
an expert witness. To do so would endanger Scots practices, and indeed the 
Scottish legal system itself. The teens of the British Law Ascertainment Act 
1859 allow a remit from a Scots court to an English court to determine how 
English law would be applied to a set of facts, and this could provide a valuable 
method of accurately ascertaining the effect of English law in an important choice 
of law question involving difficult issues of English law. That aside, it has been 
argued that in all the circumstances there is no justification for allowing English 
law to be proved any differently from a politically foreign law, i. e., for example, 
by way of leading an expert witness or remit to a foreign lawyer. 19 
Another consequence of the lack of legal integration in the Acts of Union was that 
nationality could not be used in Britain as a connecting factor in matters of status, 
and it was necessary to make use of a concept of domicile. 20 The way in which 
the rules of domicile have developed owes much to Scotland's enthusiastic 
participation in the British Empire. Scotland contributed to the jurisprudence, 
cases which firmly establish the theories of the continuance, and revival, of the 
domicile of origin. Both of these doctrines reflect a desire to retain unbroken the 
bonds of an Empire administrator or merchant to his homeland, as well as the 
reality of an outward flow of emigrants. It is submitted that it is not true to say 
that it is easier to effect a change of domicile as between Scotland and England, 
than as between Scotland and a politically foreign country. Furthermore, the 
Polish experience of differing internal and external connecting factors in 
questions of status was never copied in Britain. 2,1 Instead any variation in 
connecting factors over the years has been on a topical basis, particularly as 
concepts such as habitual residence have taken hold in certain areas of the law, 
Consequently it is possible in future that in a particular area Scots and English 
law might make use of different connecting factors., This has occurred in the past 
19 See pp107-115 above. 20 See p116 above. 
21 See pp 116-120 above. 
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in the field of child custody, although the result was somewhat unfortunate, 
resulting inevitably in conflicting decrees in some custody disputes with a cross- 
border element. 2 
The extent to which disputes over property with a truly international element 
could arise in Scotland or England was diminished by the laws in place prior to 
the Naturalization Act 1870. There was, however, no limit on cross-border 
landholding within Britain. Rules required therefore to be devised to regulate 
potential clashes between the two very different systems of property law which 
obtained on either side of the Tweed, and the courts turned to principles of 
international private law. These rules could be Applied with equal ease to 
international disputes, once the bar on foreigners acquiring British land was 
removed. The traditional absence of statute in the field of Scots property law has 
also spared it from internalising legislation. 23 
There were also very different approaches, in both domestic and conflict rules, to 
legitimacy and legitimation in Scots and English law. This quickly gave rise to a 
study of the choice of law issues involved, and nothing over the years has shaken 
the hold of international private law rules as the optimum method of resolving 
conflicts in this area. 24 
Criminal law is one of the areas where the English and Scots legal systems have 
always been most distinct, free even from the rather anomalous appellate role of 
the House of Lords. The strictly territorial nature of criminal law means that the 
only cross-border issues which can arise are those of jurisdiction. For the most 
part this difficult question has been approached and analysed in the same way 
irrespective of whether criminal conduct has taken place in England or in a 
politically foreign country. 25 Indeed, while crime may have taken on more of an 
international aspect in modern times, the issues, of jurisdiction actually raised 
22 See pp120-121 above. 23 See pp122-124 above. 
24 See pp 127-130 above. 25 See ppI3S-141 above. 
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perhaps do not differ greatly from those presented in late nineteenth century intra- 
UK cases such as HMA v Bradbury26 and HMA v Allan. 27 
Delict is another area of law in which the selection of which set of rules should 
govern wrongdoing within the UK has been left to traditional choice of law rules, 
making no differentiation between intra-UK, and international, cases. This lack 
of a special intra-UK approach remains the position, even after the enactment of 
legislation by Westminster to reform the choice of law rules in both Scotland and 
England. 28 Given that the common law double rule had been interpreted 
somewhat differently by the English and Scots courts, it will be interesting to see 
whether the courts of the two countries interpret in the same way the new choice 
of law rules in the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995. It has been argued that a Scottish court may prove to be more capable of 
resisting the homeward pu11.29 
It has also been submitted that at common law, external public policy, that most 
powerful of weapons in conflicts cases, remains available to Scottish courts in 
intra-UK cases. 0 Internalising legislation has blunted its force with regard to 
English judgments, since public policy is not a valid ground of objection in intra- 
UK cases under either the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 or the 
Family Law Act 1986. By contrast, however, the ability of a Scottish court to 
refuse to apply English rules of law on public policy grounds has been retained in 
the twentieth century legislation on choice of law 31 It has been argued that the 
ability to exclude English law on grounds of public policy is desirable. Although 
the moral backdrop in Scotland and England prior to the devolution settlement 
may have been similar, external public policy also has a role to play in protecting 
underlying public policy values expressed in the very fabric of Scots law, and 
which have no English equivalent. 2 Undoubtedly the existence of an external 
public policy objection has been asserted, more often than it has been utilised, in 
26 (1872) 2 Coupcr 311. 
27 (1873) 2 Coupcr 402. 
28 See ppl3l-133 above. 
29 See pp135-136 above. 
30 See Chap. 7. 
31 See pp198-199 above. 
32 See Chap. 7. 
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intra-UK cases. In this there is a parallel with the power of a Scottish court to 
strike down legislation as contrary to the Acts of Union: a power hinted at, but 
never effectively accessed. Although the latter is a facet of constitutional law, 
and external public policy is a tool of the conflict lawyer, they can both perform 
the same function, viz., protection of the legal system which both helps to define 
the Scottish community and has been greatly shaped by it. 
To sum up, the degree of harmonisation and internalisation in that area of law 
which can be described as 'UK common market law' is unusual, and in areas such 
as delict and succession, for example, conflict rules accordingly remain relevant 
on an intra-UK basis. Jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, can be described as the three pillars of international 
private law. The traditional conflict rules on recognition are now, however, of 
little relevance in an intra-UK context. 'Recognition', in its widest sense, of 
orders or judgments emanating from English courts is so often automatic, and 
achieved by procedures so akin to administrative rules, that the relevant 
legislation can accurately be described as internalising in its. nature 33 Special 
intra-UK rules also exist for many questions of jurisdiction in terms of the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, although the extent to which these were a 
modified response to the Brussels Convention (and the reasons for the 
modifications) have been discussed. 34 In family law matters, by contrast, there 
are generally not special jurisdictional rules as between Scotland and England. 35 
The connecting factors in matters of status vary on a topical, rather than a 
geographical, basis. 36 Nor are the difficult questions of jurisdiction in criminal 
law usually answered any differently whether England, or a politically foreign 
jurisdiction, is involved. 37 Rules of international private law continue to 
constitute the main method of solving questions of choice of law, irrespective of 
33 See pp91-100 above. 
34 See pp163-167 above. 
35 See pp9G-97 above, and discussion of the connecting factor in matters of status at pp115-122 
above, and see, for example, Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, s7, and Family 
Law Act 1986, s9 (although see pp167-172 above on the effect of EU legislation in this area). 
However, note that the secondary base of custody jurisdiction in the Family Law Act 1986, 
sl0, of presence in Scotland, is not available if the child is habitually resident in another part of 
the UK. 
36 See p120 above. 
37 See pp138-141 above. 
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whether those questions arise in an intra-UK, or international, context. 
Furthermore, there would appear to be no special intra-UK choice of law rules. 8 
This is fortified both by the continued treatment of English law as any other 
foreign law in terms of the necessity for (and the method of) proof, 39 and also by 
the continuing availability of an external public policy objection in respect of 
English law. 440 
Existence of a separate Scottish international private law 
It is submitted that international private law rules have been invaluable in 
providing a mechanism to ease potential conflicts in areas where the approach of 
Scots and English domestic laws may differ sharply, , and in regulating the 
attempts of litigants to exploit the variation in available remedies, and costs 41 It 
might be thought that the conflict rules of the two countries are themselves very 
similar, but different paths have sometimes been taken in Scots and English 
conflict rules over the years. 42 It would be inaccurate to suggest that international 
private law rules are any less Scottish than the other areas of Scots law. Nor 
should it be thought that similarities between the two systems must always be put 
down to slavish Scottish copying of the English conflicts approach. There is, 
internationally, an underlying correspondence between many of the rules of 
international private law, and it could not be expected that Scots law would be an 
exception to this. Furthermore, cross-border borrowing within the UK has not 
been all one way: English law, for example, adopted the Scots doctrine of foruu: 
non conveniens. 43 It must also be remembered that even the use of the same 
conflict rule on both sides of the border will not, produce uniform effects 
throughout Britain if the approach to characterisation differs, or if the domestic 
rules themselves differ significantly. This is illustrated by the scission principle, 
which is utilised in conflict cases involving succession to property in Scotland 
and England. The Law Commissions have observed how this may, in their view, 
31 9 See Chaps 4&5. 
39 See pp107-115 above. 40 See pp192-198 above. 41 See pp152-157 above. 42 See pp141-144 above. 43 See pp62 & 144 above. 
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act to frustrate the policy of both sets of succession laws in an intra-UK cross- 
border case. 
Intra-UK conflicts and Scottish devolution 
The establishment of the devolved Scottish Parliament has been one of the most 
significant constitutional events in Scotland's history. However, it is submitted 
that it is also an important event for the Scottish conflicts lawyer. 
Undesirability of the constitutionalisation of conflicts on the basis of the Scotland 
Act 1998 
Very quickly, the Scotland Act 1998 became seen as providing at least a partial 
constitution for Scotland. 45 Could this, and indeed should this, trigger the 
constitutionalising of conflicts in Scotland? . After all, the 
Canadian 
constitutionalisation of conflicts was not built on a traditional or orthodox 
constitutional document. In truth, however, the existence of a constitutional 
document of sorts came too late to provide a basis for the constitutionalising of 
conflicts in Scotland. The legacy of the Acts of Union meant that the variety of 
legal systems in the UK was more marked than in Canada, where Quebec is 
merely a pocket in a Common Law whole. The jurisdiction of the House of Lords 
springs more from the exploitation of a loophole in the Acts of Union, than from 
an express grant in those Acts. Even when taken together with the new functions 
of the JCPC under the Scotland Act, there is not such a strongly and avowedly 
unifying central court in the UK as there is in Canada, in the form of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Most important of all, is the difference in political direction 
between the UK and Canada. Whilst Canada is becoming more closely unified 
under a Canadian 'brand', the UK is fragmenting, with its constituent parts such as 
Scotland gaining more control over their own affairs. It has therefore been 
submitted that the passing of the Scotland Act 1998 is unlikely to lead to the 
widespread constitutionalising of conflicts in Scotland 
46 This conclusion should 
not be a cause for lament. The very purpose of international private law rules is 
as See pp126-127 above. Whilst, in that particular circumstance, it may be doubted whether that 
is the case, conflict lawyers must always be alert to the possibility of 'false conflicts', whether 
in an intra-UK, or international, sphere. 
as See pp52-56 above. 
46 See pp57-68 above. 
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to provide a means of resolving conflicts between jurisdictions, and it is submitted 
that they are equally well-suited to the resolution of such disputes even within one 
political country. By contrast, the 'conflict' role is not a natural, far less principal, 
function of constitutional rules and trying to stretch them to perform such a 
function is as undesirable as it is unnecessary. Proponents of the 
constitutionalising approach are often driven by political concerns. They wish to 
stress the political unity of the country, and see the use of international private 
law rules as a threat to that union. But this is a fundamental misunderstanding. 
Conflict rules do not create disharmony: they merely recognise it, and aim to 
provide a solution. 
Internalisation of conflicts after Scottish devolution 
As has been seen, one approach which has heretofore been possible in the UK, 
and which has been adopted in certain areas, is the internalising of conflicts. It 
has been submitted that devolution will bring a number of factors to bear on this 
practice. 7 On the one hand the fragmentation of legislative power inherent in the 
devolution settlement could act to inhibit further internalisation of conflicts, 
particularly since legislation is generally the medium through which 
internalisation has occurred. On the other hand, the greater than expected use of 
the Sewel Convention means that the Scottish Parliament could allow 
Westminster to continue to pass internalising legislation, even though such 
legislation concerns areas of law now devolved. It must be borne in mind that 
this may only be a short-term consideration, since the current scale of use of the 
Convention may owe much to the similarity in the policies of the administrations 
now governing in Scotland, and the UK as a whole. Thus a change in government 
in either Edinburgh or London could result in a reduction in the occasions in 
which the Sewel Convention is invoked. More significant in the long term is the 
reservation, under the Scotland Act 1998, of 'UK common market law' to the UK 
Parliament in Westminster. This has been an area where there has always been a 
great deal of internalisation. Not only does the passing of such measures remain 
possible after devolution, but the very fact that UK common market law has been 
reserved may persuade those in power at Westminster that internalising 
47 See pp103-105 above. 
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legislation is singularly appropriate. Perhaps once again this illustrates the extent 
to which the economy, rather than legal integration, is of the greatest importance 
in the Anglo-Scottish union. 
International private law rules after Scottish devolution 
The Scottish Parliament has the power to legislate in a variety of areas. The 
voting system currently in use has involved 'many smaller parties and 
independents in the legislative process, on a scale unknown in Westminster. It 
has also been argued that the Edinburgh Parliament may have stressed principles 
and rights in its legislative output, rather than adopting a pragmatic, remedy- 
driven approach. Some controversial issues have been tackled, such as fox 
hunting. 8 For all of these reasons the new devolutionary situation may encourage 
the emergence of greater differences between the laws which apply in Scotland 
and England respectively. This is particularly so if different administrations were 
to be in power at Holyrood and Westminster in the future. Thus the introduction 
of a concept of civil partnerships is a radical reform, but it would appear currently 
that internalising legislation will be used to ensure uniform rules throughout the 
UK. 49 This was made possible by the passing of a Sewel motion in the Scottish 
Parliament. 50 However, it is possible that in the future there may be occasions 
(particularly if different political parties are in control in Edinburgh and in 
London) where such radical changes will be made in the law of England, but not 
Scotland, and no consensus for internalising legislation will exist. It would then 
be necessary to utilise international private law rules to deal with the intra-UK 
conflicts which would be bound to arise. In this way, devolution may give rise to 
new conflicts, and accordingly to an increased need to rely upon rules of 
international private law within the UK. 
All the factors set out above could also result in a shift in the underlying public 
policy in Scotland, or even express changes in the rules of internal public policy 
applying in the Scottish legal system. In itself, this could produce consequent 
changes in the external public policy which, in an intra-UK context, can be relied 
49 Sec p146 above. 
49 See pp105 & 150-151 above. 
50 See p105 above. 
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upon mainly for the purpose of excluding rules of English law which are 
otherwise indicated to apply by Scots choice of law rules. Furthermore, whereas 
at present a Scottish court would be unlikely to use, or even threaten to use, an 
external public policy objection based on what could be described as 'moral' 
grounds in an intra-UK case, this may subtly change over time. 
51 
The Scottish Parliament also has the power to legislate for the conflicts aspect of 
any of the devolved areas of law. 52 Thus far, it has been necessary to define such 
entities as a Scottish taxpayer and a Scottish student, and it has been argued that 
there may be an increase in statutorily defined domiciles, or similar concepts, as a 
result. A most significant event has also taken place on the Scottish Parliament's 
watch, with Scotland signing up alone to a Hague Convention, and passing the 
appropriate legislation. 3 This is an important precedent. When considering the 
making of a change to Scottish conflicts rules, it is of course important to bear in 
mind the practical consequences which would follow in both the intra-UK and the 
international arena; a different approach to jurisdiction in custody cases in the 
past produced unfortunate results. However, if the case for reform of a conflicts 
rule is convincingly made out, the Scottish Parliament should be prepared to act, 
alone if necessary. 
In the course of this thesis, a number of areas have been highlighted where, it is 
submitted, reform could be beneficial. For example, it has been suggested that 
the invocation of rules of international private law, and consequently of foreign 
law, should not be a matter of choice by the litigants.. It has also been noted that 
convincing arguments can be made out for judges to insist that foreign law is 
introduced into an action in appropriate circumstances and properly proven. 'This 
would end any reliance on presumptions that Scots law applies, or that the content 
of Scots and foreign law are the same, in the absence of argument to the 
contrary. 54 In the field of succession law, the basis upon which property falls to 
the Crown in Scotland should be altered to bring it into alignment . with the 
mainstream continental analysis. In the context . of 
the new constitutional 
51 See Chap. 7. 
52 See p145 above. 
53 See pp151-152 above. 
54 See pp111-112 above. 
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settlement now obtaining in the UK after devolution, it is no longer valid to object 
to a change in the law simply because it would mean that the basis of Crown 
acquisition differs north and south of the Tweed. 
55 Finally, it has been noted that 
there are advantages to the treatment of the quantification of damages in certain 
delictual actions as a matter for the lax causae, which in an intra-UK setting at 
least, may appear to outweigh the disadvantages. 
56 It is submitted that this area in 
general is therefore one which deserves further study. . 
One of the benefits of the establishment of a Scottish Parliament has been the 
speed with which it has been able to react to Scottish problems, and the ability to 
give Scottish legislation more time and consideration than had been possible in 
Westminster. Cheshire once famously described the conflict of laws as "only 
lightly touched by the paralysing hand of the Parliamentary draftsman": 
57 a 
statement which became less and less accurate as the twentieth century 
progressed. If the Scottish Parliament is prepared to grasp the nettle (or perhaps 
more properly the thistle), this may serve to hasten the trend towards a statutory 
basis for international private law rules. 
The effect of the European Communities Act 1972 on intra-UK international 
private law 
A further constitutional change of enormous importance which occurred in the 
twentieth century has been the UK's entry into what was then the European 
Economic Community, and is now the EU. Parallels can perhaps be drawn 
between the UK and the EU, with respect to the importance of economic factors 
in bringing countries together into a union, and the, drive to harmonisation of 
laws, or the internalisation of conflicts, where this would assist the development 
of a common market. 
The significance of this constitutional event for international private law cannot 
be underestimated. North has commented: "I believe it fair to say that, for half a 
century, the agenda for change in this area of the law has been very substantially 
55 See pl30 above. 
56 See ppl37-138 above. 57 Quoted in P. North, "Private international law: change or decay? " (2001) 50 ICLQ 477 at 477. 
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set abroad and not in this country" 58 The EU has overseen the introduction of 
legal instruments dealing with jurisdiction and recognition, insolvency and choice 
of law in contract. 59 Further measures on choice of law on non-contractual 
obligations, matrimonial property and succession, remain on the agenda. Indeed, 
concern has been expressed that the EU is now branching out beyond economic 
matters G0 No less significant is the way in which the EU agenda is carried out. 
Initially the measures took the form of Conventions to which the consent of 
countries was required, and which in the UK needed parliamentary legislation to 
be effective. Increasingly now, Regulations are used: this is a form of legal 
instrument which will affect the laws of all countries which have not been 
allowed to opt out, and the provisions of which can be relied upon directly 
61 without any domestic legislation being required. 
Whichever form they take, these EU measures raise a stark question in the UK. 
Should the provisions of the Convention or Regulation be replicated for intra-UK 
conflicts, or should their effect be confined to questions arising between Scotland 
(or England) and other EU member states? It is disappointing that there seems to 
have been no overriding methodology or serious thinking applied to the UK 
approach. Indeed sometimes, it seems, there has been no clear legal opinion at 
the outset upon the legal effect of participation in negotiations: 'opting-in' to a 
conflict measure may be seen as less far-reaching than participation in the 
drafting of measures to harmonise substance. 62 With respect to the recognition 
rules contained in the Brussels Convention, the opportunity was taken to improve 
upon internalising rules which had previously applied in Britain. Thus Schedules 
6 and 7 contain an internalising scheme more far-reaching than the recognition 
rules applying as between EU member states. 63 In general, however, the UK 
approach so far has been shaped somewhat by tension between the admitted 
convenience of uniform rules, and a reluctance to adopt EU measures more fully 
than is required. The Rome Convention, which contained rules not greatly 
58 North, "Private international law: change or decay? ", 505. 
S9 See Chap. 6. 
60 See Chap. 6. 
See Chap. 6. 
62 See Report of the House of Lords European Union Committee, The Rome II Rcgu1atioac, paras 
80-81. 
63 See pp94-95 above. 
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dissimilar to those obtaining in Scotland and England at common law, was 
adopted on an intra-UK basis, seemingly on the grounds of convenience. 
However, some of the differences between the Brussels Convention, and the 
Modified Convention in Schedule 4 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982, arguably serve simply to signal discontent with aspects of the Brussels 
Convention scheme. It has also been posited that the Brussels II Regulation, 
which was thought by many commentators in the UK to be unnecessary, does not 
apply to regulate either jurisdiction or recognition in matrimonial and related 
custody matters as between Scotland and England. 
65 
In the past one might observe ever-decreasing ease of enforcement and ever- 
increasing availability of forum discretion and objections, as one moved out from 
the intra-UK, to intra-Empire, to international, arrangements (for example in the 
recognition of judgments, or in the administration of a succession). Such a clear 
pattern does not emerge in the UK response to EU instruments. Partially this may 
be due to a lack of control. As the centre of Empire, the UK took the lead not just 
in devising intra-UK schemes, but also those which applied in the Empire. 
Within the EU, the UK is required to submit to closer co-ordination with its 
attendant advantages and disadvantages. The UK is simply one voice among 
many (and a voice moreover from beyond the Franco-Genpan power axis) asking 
for a compromise solution. It has been suggested that Scotland may perhaps be 
rather less sceptical of the European project than her southern neighbour. In 
terms of the law, the Scottish mixed legal system may be more amenable to 
European harmonisation of conflict rules, and of substantive law, than the English 
Common Law system. However, there is also some common ground in Britain. 
In truth, the Scottish and English responses to harmonisation of international 
private law rules by the EU may well fall at slightly different parts of the same 
spectrum 6.6 Despite the establishment of a devolved, legislature, however, 
negotiations with the EU are a matter for the UK Parliament. Indeed many 
64 Although as has been seen, there has not been a uniform 'British' interpretation in the courts 
(see p160 above). 
65 Sec pp167-170 above. 
66 See pp173-179 above. 
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political commentators are concerned that this will be a future source of friction 
between the Holyrood and Westminster Parliaments. 67 
It is not being suggested that the UK reaction to EU measures in the field of 
international private law must always be a full-scale adoption of the rules on an 
intra-UK basis. Nor is it being argued that it would be unreasonable to have 
concerns about some aspects of EU legislation in the field of international private 
law. For example, elsewhere in this thesis it has -been argued that forum non 
conveniens is a valuable doctrine which should continue to be utilised on an intra- 
UK basis, in preference to the lis alibi pendens rule currently favoured by the 
EU. 68 It is, however, submitted that at present the UK response is typified more 
by the desire to apply EU measures only insofar as is strictly necessary, rather 
than by a principled and methodical consideration of whether or not it would be 
valuable to adopt any of the EU rules on an intra-UK basis, or whether it would 
be permissible (or desirable) to have separate intra-UK rules operating in parallel 
with EU measures. 69 
In the long term, the effect on intra-UK conflict rules of becoming a member of 
the EU could be far-reaching, if not apocalyptic. The scope of EU legislation has 
moved beyond matters directly concerned with economic union, and a 
Community public policy has been mooted. The fast-paced harmonisation of 
conflict rules is seen by many merely as preparatory to the harmonisation of 
substantive law itself. There are currently groups working on such a project. It 
has been noted that international private law would survive to regulate the 
conflicts arising between this new European law, and the law of other nations 
outwith the EU. However, any replacement of Scots and English law, along with 
all the other European systems, with a uniform European law would remove the 
need for conflict rules in the intra-UK context. 0 
61 See p149 above. 
68 See pp155-157 above. It is worthy of note that Article 15 of the Brussels II bis Regulation 
will, exceptionally, allow a case involving matters of parental responsibility to be transferred 
to a court in another member state which is "better placed to hear the case", than the court 
otherwise indicated by the Regulation's jurisdiction provisions. 
69 See Chap. 6. 
70 Sec pp179-181 above. 
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Conclusion 
There is an important interaction between constitutional law and international 
private law within the UK. The growth of Scottish and English nation states set 
the scene for the development of conflict rules to regulate questions as to which 
court should take jurisdiction in a case and which law should be applied, as well 
as the related issue of what effect a judgment from a court of the neighbouring 
country should have. Crucially, the constitutional settlement reached in the early 
eighteenth century embraced legislative unity, but eschewed legal integration. 
This quite novel system had the effect, over time, of leading to the internalising of 
certain conflicts, and their removal from the scope of traditional international 
private law. Such internalisation has, however, been dictated, to a large extent, by 
economic imperatives, although it is also clear that the Westminster Parliament 
has sought to achieve near-automatic recognition of judgments and court orders 
throughout the UK. Furthermore, certain conflicts concepts (such as extra- 
territoriality) were rendered irrelevant on an intra-UK basis by constitutional 
rules, although there was no widespread constitutionalising of conflicts within the 
UK. However, in many other areas, such as property law, delict and substantive 
succession law, the questions of choice of law, and sometimes jurisdiction, arising 
between the Scots and English legal systems have been settled by the use of 
international private law rules with no discrimination between intra-UK, and truly 
international, conflicts. The concept of domicile has also been of service in 
providing a connecting factor to the Scots or English legal system in matters of 
status. External public policy has provided the comfort of a safety valve in the 
relationship between the two legal systems bound together in a political whole. 
But fortunately, not unlike the threat of relying on the Acts of Union themselves 
as a fundamental law, it is a power which has very rarely required to be drawn 
upon. 
The devolution settlement of the late twentieth century is another key 
constitutional event for Scotland. Given the interplay between constitutional law 
and international private law, it is necessary to re-assess the role of conflicts law 
in this new Scottish constitutional landscape. It has been submitted that the 
constitutionalising of conflicts, which has been thought appropriate in some other 
countries, is of no value in the context of a devolved Scotland within a UK state. 
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The nature of the constitutional settlement will, however, as has been seen, result 
in a continued potential for the internalisation of conflicts within the UK. 
However, the significance of Scottish international private law rules in a UK 
setting is heightened by devolution, as such rules may increasingly require to be 
called upon to deal with difficult cross-border issues. They are ideally suited for 
this task, their very purpose being the provision of a mechanism for resolving 
conflicts of jurisdiction, laws or judgments, arising between different legal 
systems. Devolution also brings with it the real potential to alter the content of 
Scots conflict rules, and the opportunity should be taken to hone the tools 
available to us for the task in hand. 
It is perhaps ironic, however, that quite the most crucial constitutional change for 
the use of international private law rules within the UK, may be one which goes 
much further than simply a regulation of the relationship between Scotland and 
England. As we have seen, entry into the European Economic Community may 
have been the first step to a uniform European substantive law. Just as supra- 
national bodies of law slowed the development of international private law in 
Scotland in earlier centuries, the return to supra-national rules in the future may 
remove the need for any conflicts mechanism within the UK. But that is a long 
journey, whose end is not yet in sight. In the meantime, international private 
lawyers must be alert to recognise, and skilful in treating, the conflict issues to 
which in the twenty-first century, the constitutional system within the UK may 
give rise. 
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